John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality

John Searle ◽  
2003 ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Smith
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-31
Author(s):  
Veronica Saragi ◽  
Sikin Nuratika ◽  
Fransiska Fransiska ◽  
Maya Yolanda ◽  
Niki Ardiyanti

Before John Searle wrote the book of Speech Acts, he wrote an article about “What is a Speech Act?” (in Philosophy in America, Max Black, ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), 221–239). He was born in Denver in 1932. He spent some seven years in Oxford, beginning as an undergraduate in the autumn of 1952 with a Rhodes Scholarship, and concluding as a Lecturer in Philosophy at Christ Church. He has spent almost all of his subsequent life as Professor of Philosophy in Berkeley according to Smith (2003). This article aims to review the speech act theories by Searle (1969) to know what the theories of speech acts according to him to aid researchers understand more on how to apply it in real social life. Moreover, this article’s references are accurate (valid) and they well argued. This article is highly recommended for the philosopher, specialists and analysts in the field of pragmatics, discourse analysis, sociolinguistics and conversational analysis, communication studies who have a significant part in this study. Therefore, this paper seen the speech act theories by Searle (1969) will be more effective if we know and understand more about the speech act theories by Searle (1969) to use it in real social life.


2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Smit ◽  
Filip Buekens ◽  
Stan du Plessis

In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim that such institutional objects can be fully understood in terms of actions and incentives, and hence the Searlean apparatus solves a non-existent problem.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
THORVALD GRAN

Abstract:John Searle has developed a strong theory of how speech acts and agreements generate institutions. How is the general theory specified for political institutions? He, like Max Weber, suggests that a government monopoly of soldiers is a condition for the existence of political institutions. However, governments' wielding of force is only political if those attacked consider the attack a responsible and a morally acceptable act. All political power in Searle's theory is deontic. It is assigned as a right, an obligation or the like, as a status function. If power wielding by a government is not assigned, it is beyond the political; it is only brute force. My contention is that this distinction limits the power of Searle's theory in the analysis of politics. From the idea of political institutions as ultimate institutions in a specific, bordered territory it is the strong idea of deonticity that is misleading. Ultimate institutions cannot by definition have externally assigned status. Leaders of other ultimate institutions can accept their existence, but then mainly because they have the military power to defend their borders. Nation states, demanding territorial sovereignty, therefore logically demand a monopoly of soldiers. This sovereignty seen over time suggests an evolutionary first principle of political institutions.


2016 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kamusella

Nations in the bubble of social reality: language and all that In the last century and a half scholars from different disciplines began to distinguish between material reality (the universe), the biosphere, and social reality (the semiosphere), as three important heuristic categories. In the latter half of the 20th century, the philosophers John L. Austin and John Searle proposed that language and its use enable humans to generate social reality. They also analyzed the mechanisms of the process. From another perspective, the evolutionary anthropologist Robin Dunbar offered an explanation of how language was selected in the process of human evolution, and argued that its primary function is group-building, that is, the generation of social cohesion. Drawing on these insights, the article proposes that the dilemma of whether nations exist objectively or are subjective entities can be resolved by analyzing this problem in the light of Searle’s distinction between ontological objectivity / subjectivity and epistemic objectivity / subjectivity. Narody w koronie rzeczywistości społecznej widziane z perspektywy językaOd półtora stulecia badacze z zakresu różnych dyscyplin zaczęli wyraźnie rozróżniać pomiędzy rzeczywistością materialną (tj. wszechświatem, ogółem bytów materialnych), biosferą oraz rzeczywistością społeczną (semiosferą), jako powiązanymi ze sobą trzema kategoriami analizy heurystycznej. W drugiej połowie XX stulecia filozofowie języka John L. Austin i John Searle dali tezę, iż to język oraz jego użycie pozwala ludziom generować rzeczywistość społeczną. Obydwaj również badali mechanizmy rządzące tym procesem generacji. Z kolei psycholog ewolucyjny Robin Dunbar przedstawił model wyjaśniający, jak język (tzn. biologiczna zdolność językowa) został wyselekcjonowany w procesie ewolucji. Na tej podstawie postawił on tezę, iż prymarną funkcją języka jest umożliwianie budowania grup ludzkich, czyli innymi słowy, generowanie potrzebnej ku temu spójności społecznej. Korzystając z powyżej wymienionych ustaleń, artykuł proponuje nowe podejście do szeroko dyskutowanej kwestii czy narody istnieją obiektywnie lub są subiektywnymi bytami, analizując to zagadnienie w świetle zaproponowanego przez J. Searle’a rozróżnienia pomiędzy ontyczną obiektywnością/subiektywnością a epistemiczną obiektywnością/subiektywnością.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 587-600
Author(s):  
Tazanfal Tehseem ◽  
Muazzma Batool ◽  
Aqsa Arshad ◽  
Zohaib Hassan

This paper attempts to explain the application of speech act theory (John Searle, 1976) on the soliloquies expressed by Hamlet and Keshulal Singh. The descriptive focus of this study is to draw attention to the felicity conditions whether they are being fulfilled by the speakers while making an utterance or not. Content analysis based on speech act theory is used for this paper. It has been pointed out that declaratives are less while directives are more applicable on these soliloquies, with the help of analysis. Hamlet and Keshulal’s inner self is being depicted through their speeches and it is analyzed that they are so much upset and are in the situation of to be or not to be that they do not know what should be their strategies, in taking their revenge. In actuality, they are trying to extinguish the storm which is bursting inside them through their soliloquies but by comparing the inner devastation of both characters. It is highlighted that Hamlet’s soliloquies are more self-explanatory than that of Keshulal because Hamlet makes vows, questions, deplores, and challenges the circumstances more than the Keshulal.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-198
Author(s):  
A. A. Sanzhenakov

The article is devoted to the comparison of the social ontology of John Searle with the social theory of Emile Durkheim. It was shown that the approaches of Searle and Durkheim have a number of similar features. These common features are the rejection of reductionism of the collective to the individual, attention to language as one of the most important conditions of the emergence of social reality, the recognition of unawareness and automatism in accepting the rules of social interaction by its participants. However, there are certainly differences between the conceptions of Searle and Durkheim, and therefore the possibility of influence of analytic philosophy represented by Searle on social theory is obvious. As the basis from which this discrepancy arises, the author points to the understanding of science and the level of objectivity of scientific research that have changed since by the time of Searle.


Author(s):  
Michelle Cardoso Montoya

O presente artigo tem por objetivo expor de forma sucinta a noção de analiticidade proposta pelo filósofo alemão Immanuel Kant, para então apresentar de forma básica a crítica de Quine à leitura empirista acerca da noção de analiticidade. E então, a partir das apresentações da analiticidade em Kant e Quine, desenvolverei a argumentação de John Searle à favor do uso utilitário do conceito de “analítico” na Filosofia. Embora esse conceito seja falho, segundo Searle, ao contrário do que se poderia afirmar, nós poderíamos fazer um bom uso dele, desde que utilizássemos seus critérios adequadamente. Sendo assim, serão desenvolvidos os argumentos de Searle presentes em sua obra Speech Acts a favor de um novo uso utilitário do termo “analítico” para a Filosofia. Com isso, conseguiremos expor um posicionamento favorável acerca da analiticidade kantiana pré-dita antes como obscura.   Palavras chave: Analiticidade; Positivismo lógico; Semântica.


2009 ◽  
pp. 109-121
Author(s):  
Davide Grasso

- The association of truth with history gives rise to three different theoretical questions: how to characterise historical truth, what is the criterion to discover it, and what is historical truth as such. The author takes this third issue into account by making a series of conceptual distinctions, and formulating an ontological thesis about the object of historical sciences. Contrary to physical reality, social reality is constructed by human beings in history. Writing and speech acts provide the instruments to create norms and contexts, and to make social entities and institutions interact. These are real entities which correspond to the terms that denote them, thus, realizing that correspondence between propositions and world called truth. Therefore, propositions describing historical facts can be true or false, and in many cases such truth or falsity may be verified, even though the hypotheses concerning the causal relations between historical facts lack the same degree of justification of the experimental method. The scientific character of historiography is founded on a constant documentary reference, and on a textual organisation which brings to light the different levels of objectivity and subjectivity of judgement (statement of facts, historiographic hypotheses, critical judgements). Moreover, by constantly referring to documented facts, historical research stably grounds its interpretations on reality. Key words: truth, knowledge, ontology, social reality, writing, historiography.


Author(s):  
Ernie Lepore

John Searle was a pupil of J.L. Austin at Oxford in the 1950s. He is the Mills Professor of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley, where he has taught philosophy since 1959. According to Searle, the primary objects of analysis in the philosophy of language are not expressions but the production of expressions, speech acts, in accordance with rules. Learning a language involves (often unconsciously) internalizing rules that govern the performance of speech acts in that language. Speech-act theory aims to discover these rules and is itself a part of action theory, which concerns intentional states directed at or about something. It follows that speech-act theory is part of a more comprehensive theory of intentionality.


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