A Mannheim for All Seasons: Bloor, Merton, and the Roots of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kaiser
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Sociology Of Knowledge ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Karl Mannheim ◽  
Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge

The ArgumentDavid Bloor often wrote that Karl Mannheim had “stopped short” in his sociology of knowledge, lacking the nerve to consider the natural sciences sociologically. While this assessment runs counter to Mannheim's own work, which responded in quite specific ways both to an encroaching “modernity” and a looming fascism, Bloor's depiction becomes clearer when considered in the light of his principal introduction to Mannheim's work — a series of essays by Robert Merton. Bloor's reading and appropriation of Mannheim emerged from his background in experimental psychology and his attempts to supercede Merton's own structural-functionalist program for the sociology of knowledge. By retracing this extended trail of readings and re-readings, we may begin to understand the roots of Bloor's curious interpretation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, and inquire in a reflexive way about the present and future directions of science studies.

THE THIRD WAVE OF SCIENCE STUDIES AS A PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR STS

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Expert Knowledge ◽  
Sociology Of Science ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Interactional Expertise ◽  
Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Third ◽  
Philosophical Ontology ◽  
Empirical Sociology

The principle of reflexivity is a stumbling block for David Bloor’s “strong program” in the sociology of scientific knowledge — the program that gave rise to alternative projects in the field called science and technology studies (STS). The principle of reflexivity would require that the empirical sociology of scientific knowledge must itself be subject to the same kind of causal, impartial, and symmetrical investigation that empirical sociology applies to the natural sciences. However, applying reflexivity to empirical sociology would mean that sociologists of science fall into the trap of the “interpretive flexibility of facts” just as natural scientists do when they try to build theories upon facts, as the empirical sociology of scientific knowledge has discovered. Is there a way to overcome this regression in the empirical sociology of knowledge? Yes, but it lies in the philosophical rather than the empirical plane. However, the philosophical “plane” is not flat, because philosophy is accustomed to inquiring into its own foundations. In the case of STS, this inquiry takes us back to the empirical “plane,” which is also not flat because it requires philosophical reflection and philosophical ontology. This article considers the attempt by Harry Collins to bypass the principle of reflexivity by turning to philosophical ontology, a manoeuver that the empirical sociology of science would deem “illegal.” The “third wave of science studies” proposed by Collins is interpreted as a philosophical justification for STS. It is argued that Collins formulates an ontology of nature and society, which underlies his proposed concepts of “interactional expertise” and “tacit knowledge” — keys to understanding the methodology of third-wave STS. Collins’ ontology begins by questioning the reality of expert knowledge and ends (to date) with a “social Cartesianism” that asserts a dualism between the physical and the mental (or social).

Where Else Would you Look? Constructivism and the Historiography of Economics

2001 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross B. Emmett
Keyword(s):  
Reference Point ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Careful Analysis ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Good Combination ◽  
Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Philosophy Of Economics ◽  
History Of ◽  
Benefits And Costs

Eleven years ago, at my first HES conference, I attended a session on the historiography of economics. In my naiveté and brashness (not a good combination!) as a grad student, I asked why so much of the conversation about how to do historical work in economics was dominated by reference to methodological categories provided by philosophers of science like Lakatos, Popper, and Kuhn. I enjoyed my own investigations in the philosophy of economics, and was starting to write about Frank Knight, who was certainly not naive philosophically, but I wanted a different reference point as a historian of economics. I remember one member of the panel looking at me somewhat puzzled and asking, “Where else would you look?”Today, we gather to reflect, once again, on the historiography of economics. This time, we are asked to reflect on a new reference point for our work: the sociology of scientific knowledge or science studies. Jan Golinski has provided us with an excellent survey of work in this field, and a synopsis of its relevance over the past fifteen years or so to the history of the natural sciences. His book is not a rallying cry for constructivism, but rather a careful analysis of the benefits and costs to historians of science if they choose to adopt constructivist techniques.

Friendship as a scientific method

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meritxell Ramírez-i-Ollé
Keyword(s):  
Research Ethics ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Research Subjects ◽  
Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Social ◽  
Knowledge Formation ◽  
The Ideal

Friendships formed in the course of scientific research are common and should be foregrounded in discussions of how the sciences are done. Inspired by the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, I propose a ‘symmetrical’ analysis of friendships in both the social and natural sciences as a way of comparing knowledge-making practices. The research question that derives from this approach is: How are friendships with and between subjects generative of new forms of scientific knowledge and new types of relating? I provide an answer based on my experience of befriending a group of dendroclimatologists to whom I referred metaphorically as ‘my chimps’ in an analogy with the primatologist Jane Goodall’s affectionate relation with her research subjects. In my case, befriending dendroclimatologists involved cultivating a curiosity about each other’s research and worlds through different means. As a result, my work also came to matter to them and we produced it collaboratively. The instrumentalisation of friendships for the purpose of achieving a certain control and agreement with subjects and beings is, I argue, a normal aspect of knowledge formation, and should not be seen as unethical. If anything, befriending subjects promotes better research ethics as it generates a form of mutuality based on partial relatedness, constructive dissent and playfulness, rather than hybridity, totalising consensus and domination. Overall, my argument about friendship as a method in science seeks to criticise the ideal that isolation and indifference are at the heart of the way scientific knowledge, both social and natural, is and should be made.

Sociology and the mirror of nature: Robert Brandom and the strong programme

2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 245-263
Author(s):  
Duncan Law ◽  
Nicole Pepperell
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Sociological Analysis ◽  
Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Strong Programme ◽  
Epistemological Relativism

The ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of scientific knowledge has both exerted enormous influence on science studies, and been widely criticised for its apparent commitment to epistemological relativism. In this article we argue that the recent work of the pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom provides a potential resolution to these debates. Brandom’s work, we argue, meets the key commitments of the strong programme, including particularly commitments to symmetry and reflexivity, while also demonstrating how these commitments are compatible with a robust – but non-dogmatic, pragmatist – concept of objective knowledge. In so doing, it provides a theoretically developed account of why the traditions of empirical science studies that emerged from the strong programme need not be seen as undermining scientific objectivity, while it also supports a reflexive, critical sociological analysis of scientific practice.

Sociology of knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Bloor
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Sociology Of Knowledge ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Pivotal Role ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Naturalistic Account

Sociologists of knowledge contribute to the enterprise of generating a naturalistic account of knowledge by describing and explaining the observed characteristics of shared cultures. They assume that knowledge can be treated as an object of empirical investigation (rather than mere celebration or condemnation). Because science is understandably taken as our best example of knowledge, the sociology of scientific knowledge plays a pivotal role in the field. It is argued that our natural reasoning capacities, and our sense experience, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for scientific knowledge. Sociologists looking for the causes of its content and style focus on the contribution of conventions and institutions.

scholarly journals Sociologia do conhecimento em Mannheim, Bloor e Bourdieu: alguns princípios teóricos e metodológicos

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Hochsprung Miguel
Keyword(s):  
Social Studies ◽  
Social Construction ◽  
Elementary Principals ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Sociology Of Knowledge ◽  
Pierre Bourdieu ◽  
Social Study ◽  
Scientific Field ◽  
Karl Mannheim ◽  
The Social

Esse artigo discute as ideias e princípios metodológicos fundamentais da sociologia do conhecimento proposta por Karl Mannheim, David Bloor e Pierre Bourdieu. A compreensão do nexo entre o conhecimento e sua posição social, a concepção da construção social do conhecimento científico e o estudo da razão das lutas travadas no campo científico correspondem a propostas diferentes a respeito do procedimento de pesquisa em sociologia do conhecimento as quais esse artigo pretende esclarecer. Ao mesmo tempo, aproximando-se dos conhecimentos elementares das propostas de cada autor, identificam-se desafios comuns entre os autores ao tentarem compor seu plano metodológico para a sociologia do conhecimento, dentre eles a incontornável condição de reflexividade desses estudos que exige que a própria sociologia submeta-se ao escrutínio da condição social da produção de seu conhecimento. Palavras-chave: Sociologia do Conhecimento; Reflexividade; Objeto e método; Karl Mannheim; David Bloor; Pierre Bourdieu.This article discuss the fundamental ideas of Karl Mannheim, David Bloor, and Pierre Bourdieu about the social study of knowledge. The study of nexus between knowledge and its social position, the conception of social construction of scientific knowledge and the study of struggles in the scientific field correspond to different proposals and procedures in sociology of knowledge discussed by the authors. However, approaching the elementary principals of the sociology of knowledge, we can see a common difficulty in trying to compose a methodological plan for the sociology of knowledge, the inescapable condition of reflexivity in the social studies of knowledge as proposed by Mannheim, Bloor and Bourdieu.Keywords: Sociology of Knowledge; Methods; Concepts, Reflexivity; Karl Mannheim; David Bloor; Pierre Bourdieu.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document