New Light on Mao: His View of the World

1974 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 750-766 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gittings

As much as one-quarter of the contents of the two Wan-sui volumes deals with matters relating either to the theory or the practice of foreign policy. Very little material of this kind had emerged in the earlier “unofficial” collections of Mao's speeches and writings which came to our knowledge after the Cultural Revolution, and this latest acquisition breaks entirely new ground. As far as the “official” record is concerned, we have until now known more of Mao's views on international affairs before 1949 than after the Liberation. During the 1950s there were a few formal statements on Sino-Soviet relations – telegrams, greetings and the like which required very close analysis to reveal the complex web of tensions beneath the surface. There were some brief and fairly stereotyped descriptions of the international scene in Mao's published speeches to Party and Government conferences. The second decade of the People's Republic was served rather better in the “official” record, but only if one regarded the major documents in the Sino-Soviet polemic as either written by Mao or expressing his views. There were some well-publicized reports of Mao's various meetings with Third World visitors in the 1960s though the level of conversation with, in the main, overawed and deferential amateurs clearly never taxed Mao's intellect. One could perhaps have pieced together the scraps of documentary evidence to construct the bare bones of Mao's outlook on the world, but it would have lacked all the flesh and substance now imparted to it by the Wan-sui documents.

1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-241
Author(s):  
J. D. Armstrong

If Churchill's aphorism about Russia being ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ was an apt formulation of Western puzzlement about that nation, several further layers of obfuscation would be required accurately to depict Western perceptions of China. Since 1949 a number of conflicting conceptions of China's nature and purpose have vied with each other to gain the allegiance of analysts, governments and the general public alike. There was, for too many years, the China of American demonology: aggressive, expansionist and cruel, conspiring with the USSR to bring about world domination, its implacable rulers brooding malevolently over their nation of docile ants. Even while this notion held centre stage, an alternative perspective was available from such eminent Sinologists as C. P. Fitzgerald and I. K. Fairbank: that China had not undergone such a dramatic metamorphosis under the communists as many believed but was still ‘eternal China’, reproducing the same age-old patterns of behaviour that had persisted with little change through many centuries, if not millennia. Then, during the 1960s a new image emerged: China the ultrarevolutionary power, itself engaged upon a process of radical transformation through the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, while simultaneously acting as the principal inspiration of violent revolution elsewhere in the world. The Sino-American rapprochement soon produced an entirely different perspective: China was now a responsible great power, maintaining a global balance of power in accordance with the Nixon–Kissinger vision of international order.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 68-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aryo Makko

Traditionally, Sweden has been portrayed as an active bridge-builder in international politics in the 1960s and 1970s. The country advocated a “third way” toward democratic socialism and greater “justice” in international affairs, but these foreign policy prescriptions were never applied to European affairs. This article examines Sweden's relations with Europe by contrasting European integration with the Cold War. Negotiations on Swedish membership in the European Communities and Swedish policy at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were influenced by a general Berührungsangst toward Europe, which persisted during the years of détente. Because Swedish decision-makers believed that heavy involvement in European affairs would constrict Sweden's freedom of action, Swedish leaders' moral proclamations were applied exclusively to distant Third World countries rather than the egregious abuses of human rights in the Soviet bloc.


1977 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 675-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lowell Dittmer

The extent to which the Cultural Revolution has transformed the world-view of the Chinese masses remains among the psycho-cultural imponderables, but clearly it has revolutionized the western view of Chinese politics. The dominant pre-1966 image of a consensual solidarity disturbed only rarely by purges, also handled in an orderly way by a consensus excluding only its victims, was challenged by a sudden multitude of polemical claims to the effect that a struggle for power and principle had been raging behind the scenes for decades. This struggle was characterized as a “struggle between two lines”: a “proletarian revolutionary line,” led by Mao Tse-tung, and a “bourgeois reactionary line,” led by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiaop'ing. This struggle allegedly represented a deep underlying ideological cleavage within the leadership that had repercussions on every aspect of Chinese life: foreign policy, strategies of economic development, techniques of leadership and administration, pay scales and living standards, delivery patterns for education, medicine, and other services; even scientific method. Allegations concerning this struggle were supported by a wealth of documentary evidence, culled from hitherto confidential Party and government files. Initially greeted with scepticism among western journalists and academic circles, some variant of the “two lines” paradigm has made increasing inroads into our attempts to understand the origins of the Cultural Revolution. The time has come to re-evaluate the conception of a two-line struggle in retrospect and to try to determine just what it means and how it functions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengxin Pan ◽  
Oliver Turner

Neoconservatism in US foreign policy is a hotly contested subject, yet most scholars broadly agree on what it is and where it comes from. From a consensus that it first emerged around the 1960s, these scholars view neoconservatism through what we call the ‘3Ps’ approach, defining it as a particular group of people (‘neocons’), an array of foreign policy preferences and/or an ideological commitment to a set of principles. While descriptively intuitive, this approach reifies neoconservatism in terms of its specific and often static ‘symptoms’ rather than its dynamic constitutions. These reifications may reveal what is emblematic of neoconservatism in its particular historical and political context, but they fail to offer deeper insights into what is constitutive of neoconservatism. Addressing this neglected question, this article dislodges neoconservatism from its perceived home in the ‘3Ps’ and ontologically redefines it as a discourse. Adopting a Foucauldian approach of archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis, we trace its discursive formations primarily to two powerful and historically enduring discourses of the American self — virtue and power — and illustrate how these discourses produce a particular type of discursive fusion that is ‘neoconservatism’. We argue that to better appreciate its continued effect on contemporary and future US foreign policy, we need to pay close attention to those seemingly innocuous yet deeply embedded discourses about the US and its place in the world, as well as to the people, policies and principles conventionally associated with neoconservatism.


1978 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chadwick F. Alger

Proposals for change in the present international order, particularly in the context of the increasing desire for self-reliance and fulfillment of needs in Third World communities, require creative thought about the role of people in the future global order. Perception of the world as a system of nation-states and traditional nonparticipation of the public in foreign-policy making by national governments inhibits the creation of a future in which people can fulfill their needs in self-reliant communities. Evidence suggests that lack of confidence in their national governments is inhibiting people in industrialized countries from responding to the needs of Third World people. At the same time, it is doubtful that Third World governments can satisfy the needs of people without wider participation of the people in governmental foreign-policy making. The future needs of people in both Third World and industrialized communities will only be served by the creation of symmetrical and responsive relationships between local communities in all parts of the world.


White Balance ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 44-59
Author(s):  
Justin Gomer

This chapter examines Third World Cinema’s first film, Claudine, within the context of the emerging colorblind ideology and widespread antistatism of the early 1970s. It begins with an overview of the racialization of welfare discourse beginning in the 1960s. The chapter then analyzes the film through three lenses. The first is TWC’s larger philosophy, rooted in the integrationist ethos of the civil rights movement. The second is a close analysis of the film itself, focusing on how the movie offers a black nationalist critique of the welfare state and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society that includes a direct rebuke of colorblindness. Finally, despite TWC’s civil rights origins and the film’s race-conscious black nationalist politics, the film’s marketing catered explicitly to colorblind sentiments, thereby contradicting the racial critique of the film.


1995 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 388-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven F. Jackson

The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty. Mao ZedongIn the middle of October 1975, a dusty column of South African troops, equipped with armoured cars and helicopters, rumbled north into Angola, further internationalizing the already complex civil war there. The South African attack not only broadened the war, prompting an even greater Cuban intervention, it also posed a dilemma for China, which supported the same Angolan parties as did South Africa: should China follow its policy of tit-for-tat opposition to Soviet expansion world-wide, even if it meant allying with the racist government of South Africa? Or should it follow the opinions of its fellow Third World nations in Africa, even if it led to a Soviet bloc advance? The difficulty China's leaders faced in the autumn of 1975 was one which had hidden origins in the different ways in which China viewed conflicts around the world, a difficulty that had lain dormant for years but which erupted in 1975 into full view, and with disastrous consequences for Chinese foreign policy in Africa. It is, moreover, a discrepancy which continues to exist in China's views of the world today.How does China view conflicts and revolutions in the Third World? How do the Chinese organize their relations with Third World revolutionary organizations and their post-independence governments? This article examines the tensions and shifts of Chinese policy towards two essentially simultaneous revolutionary struggles and their post-independence governments: Angola and Mozambique.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Therese Martin

Abstract By focusing on San Isidoro de León in the central Middle Ages, this study investigates the multiple meanings behind the presence of objects from other cultures in a royal-monastic treasury, suggesting a reconsideration of the paths by which such pieces arrived. The development of the Isidoran collection is reexamined through a close analysis of a charter recording the 1063 donation together with early thirteenth-century writings by Lucas of Tuy. Documentary evidence is further weighed against visual analysis and technical studies of several key pieces from the medieval collection. In particular, the Beatitudes Casket (now at the Museo Arqueológico Nacional, Madrid) is singled out to demonstrate how art historical, epigraphic, and historical research come together with carbon-14 testing, revealing that this object was assembled in a very different moment from those traditionally assumed.


Author(s):  
Gregg A. Brazinsky

Even as the PRC sought to win over radical and neutralist Afro-Asian states through diplomacy, it also sought to gain prestige in the Third World by becoming a leader of revolutionary forces. The PRC befriended a diverse group of Afro-Asian and insurgents guerilla that espoused Maoist doctrines during the 1960s. They believed that doing so would help to spread Mao Zedong thought throughout the world, raising the status of both the PRC and its leader. America’s fear that insurgent victories in countries such as Vietnam, Thailand and the Congo would enhance Chinese prestige and legitimate Maoism played a key role in precipitating some of the most dramatic and costly instances of U.S. intervention of the Cold War.


Worldview ◽  
1961 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-9
Author(s):  
A. William Loos

From what perspective should we who are concerned with religion and international affairs view the current foreign policy situation? Two factors of overriding importance stand out. First is the movement away from a bi-polar world and toward the pluralization of the world; second is the power shift, doubtless limited in character, but no less real, favoring the USSR at the expense of the U. S. A. (Henry A. Kissinger flatly asserts that “the missile gap in the period 1961-65 is now unavoidable”; and it is recognized by all competent observers that the USSR is leading the U. S. A. two to one in scientists under age thirty-five.)


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