Theater Missile Defenses: Possible Chinese Reactions; U.S. Implications and Options. By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-154 S, 23 February 1994. 4pp.] - Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies: Implications and Options for the United State By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-422 S, 25 March 1994. 22pp.] - China in World Affairs – U.S. Policy Choice By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-265 S, 31 January 1995. 19pp.] - China After Deng Xiaoping – Implications for the United States. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-465 S, 7 April 1995. 27pp.] - China Policy: Managing U.S.–PRC–Taiwan Relations after President Lee′s visit to the U.S. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-727 S, 19 June 1995. 5pp.]

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 643-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxane D. V. Slsmanidis
1969 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 788-807 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. L. M. Burns

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.


Author(s):  
Sergey Rogov

In his presentation, the speaker focuses on the problems in relations between the United States and its European NATO allies. Firstly, he talks about the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, that Sergey M. Rogov considers the first serious defeat of the Western countries since the foundation of NATO. At the same time, he notes the significant military and economic contribution of the U.S. allies to the operation in Afghanistan, and the fact that the US did not take into account the opinion of its allies as well as the issues that may await European countries and the alliance as a whole in this regard. Second, the speaker notes the huge difference in military spending and military capabilities between the United States and the European allies, and concludes that NATO countries will continue to be militarily dependent on the United States. In nuclear sphere, despite the approval of the START III extension by the Biden administration, European countries did not actively resist the collapse of the INF Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. The forthcoming deployment of American missiles in Poland and the Baltic states will further exacerbate of the NATO-Russia crisis. J. Biden's support for the sole purpose concept, which to certain extent implies no first use of nuclear weapons, jeopardizes the U.S. security obligations towards its European allies. Fourth, there is the problem of "new" NATO members, which make minimal contribution to common security, but require economic support and protection from possible Russian aggression. In conclusion, the problem of the U.S.-China confrontation is considered, where the US is actively seeking to involve European countries.


Author(s):  
Alexander Savelyev

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.


Author(s):  
N. Sokov

The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.’ own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia’s decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.


Author(s):  
Gisela Mateos ◽  
Edna Suárez-Díaz

On December 8, 1953, in the midst of increasing nuclear weapons testing and geopolitical polarization, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace initiative. More than a pacifist program, the initiative is nowadays seen as an essential piece in the U.S. defense strategy and foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. As such, it pursued several ambitious goals, and Latin America was an ideal target for most of them: to create political allies, to ease fears of the deadly atomic energy while fostering receptive attitudes towards nuclear technologies, to control and avoid development of nuclear weapons outside the United States and its allies, and to open or redirect markets for the new nuclear industry. The U.S. Department of State, through the Foreign Operations Administration, acted in concert with several domestic and foreign middle-range actors, including people at national nuclear commissions, universities, and industrial funds, to implement programs of regional technical assistance, education and training, and technological transfer. Latin American countries were classified according to their stage of nuclear development, with Brazil at the top and Argentina and Mexico belonging to the group of “countries worthy of attention.” Nuclear programs often intersected with development projects in other areas, such as agriculture and public health. Moreover, Eisenhower’s initiative required the recruitment of local actors, natural resources and infrastructures, governmental funding, and standardized (but localized techno-scientific) practices from Latin American countries. As Atoms for Peace took shape, it began to rely on newly created multilateral and regional agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Nevertheless, as seen from Latin America, the implementation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was reinterpreted in different ways in each country. This fact produced different outcomes, depending on the political, economic, and techno-scientific expectations and interventions of the actors involved. It provided, therefore, an opportunity to create local scientific elites and infrastructure. Finally, the peaceful uses of atomic energy allowed the countries in the region to develop national and international political discourses framing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean signed in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, in 1967, which made Latin America the first atomic weapons–free populated zone in the world.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Hunt

The development of military arms harnessing nuclear energy for mass destruction has inspired continual efforts to control them. Since 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa acquired control over these powerful weapons, though Pretoria dismantled its small cache in 1989 and Russia inherited the Soviet arsenal in 1996. Throughout this period, Washington sought to limit its nuclear forces in tandem with those of Moscow, prevent new states from fielding them, discourage their military use, and even permit their eventual abolition. Scholars disagree about what explains the United States’ distinct approach to nuclear arms control. The history of U.S. nuclear policy treats intellectual theories and cultural attitudes alongside technical advances and strategic implications. The central debate is one of structure versus agency: whether the weapons’ sheer power, or historical actors’ attitudes toward that power, drove nuclear arms control. Among those who emphasize political responsibility, there are two further disagreements: (1) the relative influence of domestic protest, culture, and politics; and (2) whether U.S. nuclear arms control aimed first at securing the peace by regulating global nuclear forces or at bolstering American influence in the world. The intensity of nuclear arms control efforts tended to rise or fall with the likelihood of nuclear war. Harry Truman’s faith in the country’s monopoly on nuclear weapons caused him to sabotage early initiatives, while Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in nuclear deterrence led in a similar direction. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear exchange mounted in the late 1950s, stoked by atmospheric nuclear testing and widespread radioactive fallout, which stirred protest movements and diplomatic initiatives. The spread of nuclear weapons to new states motivated U.S. presidents (John Kennedy in the vanguard) to mount a concerted campaign against “proliferation,” climaxing with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Richard Nixon was exceptional. His reasons for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Moscow in 1972 were strategic: to buttress the country’s geopolitical position as U.S. armed forces withdrew from Southeast Asia. The rise of protest movements and Soviet economic difficulties after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office brought about two more landmark U.S.-Soviet accords—the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty (INF) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—the first occasions on which the superpowers eliminated nuclear weapons through treaty. The country’s attention swung to proliferation after the Soviet collapse in December 1991, as failed states, regional disputes, and non-state actors grew more prominent. Although controversies over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear programs have since erupted, Washington and Moscow continued to reduce their arsenals and refine their nuclear doctrines even as President Barack Obama proclaimed his support for a nuclear-free world.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-68
Author(s):  
Li Bin

The U.S. government considers “power competition” to be the nature of the relations among big powers, and that it will have an impact on the evolving nuclear order in the near future. When big powers worry about power challenges from their rivals, they may use the influence of nuclear weapons to defend their own power and therefore intensify the danger of nuclear confrontation. We need to manage the nuclear relations among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation. The fact is that big powers including the United States have neither the interest nor the capability to expand their power, and understanding this might cause big powers to lose their interest in power competition. If we promote dialogue among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states on their strategic objectives, it is possible to reduce the power competition that results from misperceptions and overreactions. Some other factors, for example, non- nuclear technologies and multinuclear players, could complicate the future nuclear order. We therefore need to manage these factors as well and develop international cooperation to mitigate nuclear competition.


Worldview ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 24 (8) ◽  
pp. 19-20
Author(s):  
John A. Marcum

Contrary to popular perceptions, the governments of the United States and Angola share a core of compatible foreign policy objectives. Each government, for its own reasons, believes that its national interests may be best served by reducing border conflict and external intervention in highly flammable Southwest Africa. This congruence of interests became increasingly apparent and even led to a measure of bilateral cooperation dur ing the last years of the Carter administration.


1982 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 32-39
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Nye

In the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan and the advent of the Reagan Administration, cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union seems to have diminished, particularly in the area of arms control. Nuclear non-proliferation is the oldest area of Soviet-American cooperation in arms control, dating back to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1950s. But the fact that the two countries have a common interest does not mean that there is necessarily an equal interest or that it can survive the current tension.Some analysts argue that the Soviet Union has more at risk from proliferation than does the United States. For example, many of the potential new entrants to nuclear weapons status–India, Pakistan, Korea, Taiwan, Iraq–are countries geographically close to the Soviet Union and distant from the United States. Thus, it could be argued that the Soviet Union has more to fear than we do, and from the zero-sum perspective of U.S.-Soviet hostility, further proliferation may hurt the Soviet Union more than the United States. To judge whether this is a sensible basis for policy, or whether cooperative action is a better basis requires a closer look at the skeptical arguments.


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