Laying Blame for Flight and Fight: Sino-Soviet Relations and the “Yi–Ta” Incident in Xinjiang, 1962

2019 ◽  
Vol 238 ◽  
pp. 504-523
Author(s):  
Charles Kraus

AbstractIn spring 1962, 60,000 individuals fled from northern Xinjiang into the Soviet Union. Known as the “Yi–Ta” incident, the mass exodus sparked a major flare up in Sino-Soviet relations. This article draws on declassified Chinese and Russian-language archival sources and provides one of the first in-depth interpretations of the event and its aftermath. It argues that although the Chinese government blamed the Soviet Union for the Yi-Ta incident, leaders in Beijing and Xinjiang also recognized the domestic roots of the disturbance, such as serious material deficits in northern Xinjiang and tensions between minority peoples and the party-state. The Chinese government's diplomatic sparring with Moscow over the mass exodus reflected Mao Zedong's continued influence on Chinese foreign policy, despite claims by scholars that Mao had retreated from policymaking during this period.

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodric Braithwaite

Sir Rodric Braithwaite was educated at Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, from where he went to serve in HM Diplomatic Service, having worked in Jakarta, Moscow, Washington, Warsaw, Rome, and Brussels, where he was a member of the British delegation to the European Community. From 1988 to 1992, Sir Rodric served as HM Ambassador in the Soviet Union during the decisive years of the Perestroika and the first British ambassador in Russia. Subsequently, he was appointed foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister in the second John Major ministry and chaired the UK Joint Intelligence Committee between 1992 and 1993. He was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) in 1994. As a career diplomat, Sir Rodric gained decades of insight into the troubled relations between Russia and West, having taken part in numerous negotiations on arms control. His affinity with the decision-making circles in both Russia and Britain alongside with the mastery of the Russian language allow him to skillfully dissect the underlying causes of ups-and-downs in Moscow’s relationship with the West, employing the works of both English- and Russian-speaking analysts. Among his recent books are Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). In this essay, Sir Rodric reminisces of the years spent as a diplomat and provides his view on the usefulness and applicability of historical lessons while devising a foreign policy course.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Sheng ◽  
Qiang Zhai ◽  
Deborah Kaple

In this forum, three leading experts on Sino-Soviet relations and Mao Zedong's policy toward the Soviet Union offer their appraisals of Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens, The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967, published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. The commentators praise many aspects of Radchenko's book, but Michael Sheng and to a lesser extent Qiang Zhai and Deborah Kaple wonder whether Radchenko has gone too far in downplaying the role of ideology in Mao's foreign policy. Unlike Lorenz Lüthi, who gives decisive weight to ideology in his own book about the Sino-Soviet split, Radchenko argues that a classical realist approach is the best framework for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Sheng and Zhai also raise questions about some of the sources used by Radchenko. Replying to the commentaries, Radchenko defends his conception of Mao's foreign policy, arguing that it is a more nuanced view than Sheng and Zhai imply. Radchenko also stresses the inherent shortcomings of the source base scholars are forced to use when analyzing Chinese foreign policy.


1991 ◽  
Vol 125 ◽  
pp. 55-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Garver

Chinese foreign policy is typically a complex mix of bilateral, regional and global considerations shaped by the perceptions and domestic political concerns of various participants in China's decision-making process. One significant factor shaping Chinese foreign policy over the past decade which has not been given adequate attention is Chinese consideration of South Asia, and especially India. India's size, substantial aggregate national power, central geographic position in South Asia, prominent role in the Third World/Non-Aligned Movement, and the determination of its leaders to establish India as the pre-eminent power in South Asia, have given India significant weight in Chinese foreign policy calculations. This includes, I will argue, Beijing's calculations regarding China's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.


1980 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 214-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Garver

It has become conventional wisdom that the U.S.–Chinarapprochementwas a result (from the Chinese side) of Beijing's fear of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the border confrontation which developed rapidly in the months after the clashes at Zhen Bao island on the Ussuri River in March 1969, are seen as exacerbating Chinese fears of Soviet attack.1 These fears had emerged during the Cultural Revolution when Moscow began insinuating that it might intervene in China in support of the anti-Maoist, “healthy forces.” 2 It was in hopes of deterring possible Soviet invasion, surgical strike, or intervention – so the argument runs – that Beijing wanted to improve relations with Washington. By establishing more cordial relations between Beijing and Washington, the risks which Moscow would assume in making a decision to attack China would be increased. Soviet-American détente would, conceivably, be endangered. The possibility of a Soviet-American confrontation arising out of such a Soviet attack on China could not be ruled out. This added increment of uncertainty about the U.S. response to a Soviet attack on China would be useful in preventing such an attack. Thus, it is concluded, in November 1968 Beijing moved to reopen the talks with the U.S. at Warsaw as a first step towards substantially improving Sino-American relations. Two years after the clashes at Zhen Bao the U.S. table tennis team arrived in Beijing in April 1971. A snowballing series of events rapidly unfolded, culminating in the 15 July 1971 announcement of Henry Kissinger's visit to China and President Nixon's impending visit


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priscilla Roberts ◽  
Steven I. Levine ◽  
Péter Vámos ◽  
Deborah Kaple ◽  
Jeremy Friedman ◽  
...  

This forum includes six commentaries on Lorenz M. Lüthi's book The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, published by Princeton University Press in 2008. Drawing on recently declassified documents and memoirs from numerous countries, Lüthi explains how and why the close alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fell apart in a remarkably short time, dissolving into fierce mutual enmity. Amassing a wealth of evidence, Lüthi stresses the role of ideology in the split, lending support to the arguments put forth nearly five decades ago by analysts like Donald Zagoria in his pioneering book on the Sino-Soviet rift. Six leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Soviet relations discuss the strengths of Lüthi's book but also raise questions about some interpretations and omissions. The forum includes Lüthi's reply to the commentaries.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-110
Author(s):  
Sergey Radchenko

In this forum, three leading experts on Sino-Soviet relations and Mao Zedong's policy toward the Soviet Union offer their appraisals of Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens, The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967, published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. The commentators praise many aspects of Radchenko's book, but Michael Sheng and to a lesser extent Qiang Zhai and Deborah Kaple wonder whether Radchenko has gone too far in downplaying the role of ideology in Mao's foreign policy. Unlike Lorenz Lüthi, who gives decisive weight to ideology in his own book about the Sino-Soviet split, Radchenko argues that a classical realist approach is the best framework for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Sheng and Zhai also raise questions about some of the sources used by Radchenko. Replying to the commentaries, Radchenko defends his conception of Mao's foreign policy, arguing that it is a more nuanced view than Sheng and Zhai imply. Radchenko also stresses the inherent shortcomings of the source base scholars are forced to use when analyzing Chinese foreign policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 486-498
Author(s):  
Elena A. Kotelenets ◽  
Maria Yu. Lavrenteva

The research investigates a publishing history of the Britansky Souyznik (British Ally) weekly (further - British Weekly) in Russian language, which was published in the Soviet Union by the UK Ministry of Information in the Second World War years and to 1950. This newspaper published reports from fronts where British troops fought against Nazi Germany and its allies, articles on British-Soviet military cooperation, materials about British science, industry, agriculture, and transport, reports on people’s life in the UK, historical background of British Commonwealth countries, cultural and literature reviews. British Weekly circulation in the USSR was 50,000 copies. The main method used for the research was the study of the newspaper’s materials, as well as the propaganda concepts of its editorial board and their influence on the audience. The researched materials are from archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry as well as of the UK Ministry of Information and Political Warfare Executive (1940-1945), declassified by the British Government only in 2002, on the basis of which an independent analysis is conducted. The British Weekly played a bright role in the formation of techniques and methods of British foreign policy propaganda to Soviet public opinion in 1942-1945. Results of the research indicates that the British government launched foreign policy propaganda to the USSR immediately after breaking-out of World War II and used the experience of the British Weekly for psychological warfare in the Cold War years.


1969 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 41-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gittings

“Oppose the strategy of striking with two ‘fists’ in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one ‘fist’ in one direction at one time.” This is a good year for looking back at the triangular relationship between China, the Soviet Union and the United States—and not only because it is the twentieth anniversary of the People's Republic. For it is also a year which has seen the contradictions in this relationship sharpened to an extreme and almost satirical degree.


Think India ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-34
Author(s):  
Dr.Ramesh Kumar

Most nations and large ones at that do not simply alter their worldwide orientation. States tend to be conventional about foreign policy. Fundamental changes in foreign policy take place only when there is a radical change either at home or in the world. Much as the ascent of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s shaped key changes in Chinese foreign policy, India’s associations with the world have seen a fundamental alteration over the last decade and a half. A number of factors were at work in India. The old political and economic order at home had distorted and outwardly the end of the Cold War detached all the old benchmarks that guided India’s foreign policy. Many of the center viewpoints of the older system had to throw away and consensus generated on fresh ones. The fall down of the Soviet Union and the new wave of financial globalization left India scrambling to find new anchors for its conduct of outer relations.  


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