Law Libraries of the United States: Development and Growth

1975 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor I. Kavass

Law libraries occupy a unique and, in many respects, an ambiguous status in the United States. This status tends to set them apart in a variety of significant ways from the ubiquitous prototypes of general libraries and, with the possible exception of medical libraries, even from the different categories of specialized libraries in other academic or professional areas. The distinctiveness of law libraries in the United States, which is shared to a greater or lesser extent by many law libraries elsewhere in the world, and especially in countries possessing legal systems based on common law, cannot fully be appreciated by anyone who does not have at least a rudimentary knowledge of the nature and content of law as well as a working familiarity with the idiosyncratic uses of library materials by the legal profession in the exercise of judicial and legislative processes. Unfortunately, the incontro-vertible value of this self-evident requirement if frequently overlooked.

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-260
Author(s):  
Lawrence Azubuike

AbstractThe influence of the United States of America in the world is reflected not just in the export of its values and policies, but also in the spread of US jurisprudence and legal norms around the world. Many nations try to emulate US trial practice and procedure, while others measure the utility of their procedural rules by US standards. The rule generally prohibiting the admissibility of hearsay evidence is firmly rooted in the common law which is the basis of the legal systems in both the USA and Nigeria. This article explores and compares the jurisprudential and other rationales underpinning the hearsay rule in both jurisdictions. It finds that, although there are slight differences in the trial procedures of the two systems, the general stricture against hearsay evidence is informed by similar rationales in both jurisdictions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-260
Author(s):  
Julian R Murphy

AbstractOccasionally traced back to Byzantine times, the rule that penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly in favor of the subject, also known as the rule of lenity, now finds expression in common law countries across the world. This Article compares the origins and evolution of the rule in Australia and the United States. The comparison is timely because of the current uncertainty in both jurisdictions about the rule's rationale and scope and because of an emerging global trend towards the “constitutionalization” of common law rules of interpretation. In the course of the analysis, various facets of the rule are discussed, including its common law origins; jurisprudential development; purported constitutional foundations; and modifications by state and federal statutes. Tracing the rule's development in each country reveals significant commonalities, but also important differences, in the respective approaches to the interpretation of criminal statutes. Most importantly, despite similarities in the two countries’ constitutional structures, the rule has assumed constitutional significance in the United States but not in Australia. Identification of this marked difference provides an opportunity to reflect on the separation of powers, and the federal structure, of each country.


Author(s):  
Richard Lippke

This chapter examines the fundamental values that ought to inform criminal procedure. More specifically, it considers what we ideally should want from the rules and procedures that exist in legal jurisdictions throughout the world. Three fundamental values are discussed—human dignity, truth, and fairness—and the ways in which they can be upheld or subverted by criminal justice practices. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the United States, but reference is also made to criminal procedure in other countries, including those in the civil law tradition. The article concludes by analyzing two further candidates for inclusion on the list of fundamental values of criminal procedure: the “effectiveness” of criminal procedure and the value of “expertise” that highlights the distinction between the common law and civil law traditions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-87
Author(s):  
Bruce Avery Lasky ◽  
Shuvro Prosun Sarker

This article began with a consideration of the history and an evaluation of CLE in the United States, and it now moves on to evaluate the characteristics of CLE in Asia. However, using the term ‘Asian characteristic’ is somewhat amorphous. It can be quite vexing to try to define what is meant by Asia, as it is a broad continent with many nationalities, religions, ethnicities, languages and cultures. The same can be said for Asian legal systems, which possess a mixture of common law, civil law, Sharia law and customary law structures, often with a number of these structures existing within a single nation state. These legal systems have a multitude of roots and origins, with some dating back centuries and others having a more recent strong colonialist influence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 69-74
Author(s):  
Musa Adamu Aliyu ◽  
Nasiru Adamu Aliyu

Competence of academics to become judges has attracted divergent opinions among legal scholars. Intellectually academics have been conducting researches and disseminating the findings of the works in journals. Outside the four walls of the universities, the scholars are helping courts to appreciate difficult legal issues by filing scholars’ brief. They appear before the courts as friends or amici curiae. In the United States, it is a tradition to appoint academics as judges, and there is similar practice in various parts of the world. Nigeria is one of the countries where academics were elevated to become judicial officers or judges of Superior Courts. Late Justice Teslim Elias was an academic appointed as a judicial officer. There are opinions for and against appointment of members of the academia into judicial offices. Proponents of the appointment believe that academics are suitable to be appointed as judges by virtue of their knowledge. On the other hand, those against such appointment are of the view that the academics lack practical experience in the courtroom. This reason makes them unqualified to be appointed judges. This paper has adopted a socio-legal research approach to understand the perspectives for and against appointing academics as judges. Nine members of the legal profession have been interviewed and majority of them have supported the appointment.


Author(s):  
Joost Blom

This article examines the choice of law methods developed in four legal systems for problems relating to the substantial or essential validity of contracts. The complicated questions of formation and capacity have had to be left aside. The first two parts of this article discussed the choice of law methods used by courts in France, Germany, and the United States. This concluding part deals with the law in England and the common law jurisdictions in Canada, and also, by way of epilogue, with the recently completed European Communities Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations. Finally, some general conclusions will be offered about the patterns of law that have emerged in the course of this survey.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Carl H. Esbeck

Australia adopted the Charities Act of 2013, consolidating and restating the country's governing statutes on the registration and qualification of charities, but leaving to the future any reconciliation between faith-related charities claiming religious liberty and others demanding marriage equality and no discrimination based on sexuality. Concurrent to this development, but with an eye to the direction of charity law in common law systems throughout the world, major works have come to us from two Australian scholars. In this review I offer much about these two monographs, but the discussion that immediately follows concerns the law of charitable nonprofits in the United States, the basic structure of that law, and current issues implicating religious freedom.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Daniela Ries Winck ◽  
Mariana Pellizzaro

<p class="resumo"><strong>Resumo</strong>: O objetivo do presente estudo, desenvolvido através de pesquisa bibliográfica realizada a partir do método indutivo, foi apresentar a origem do Tribunal do Júri no Brasil, bem como expor breves considerações sobre as principais características desse instituto na Inglaterra, Estados Unidos, Itália, França, Portugal, Espanha e no Brasil. Com origem incerta, o instituto do Tribunal do Júri tem sido o modo de resolução de conflitos desde a sua criação, evoluindo  de formas diversificadas nos países do mundo. No Brasil, seu surgimento se deu ainda na época do Brasil Império, quando o país era uma colônia de Portugal.</p><p class="resumo"><strong>Palavras-chave</strong>: Tribunal do Júri; Direito Comparado; História do Direito; Common Law; Civil Law.</p><h3>THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JURY COURT IN BRAZIL AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS IN THE MAIN COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD</h3><div><p class="abstractCxSpFirst"><strong>Abstract: </strong>With uncertain origin, the institute of the Court of the Jury has been the mode of conflict resolution since its inception. In Brazil, its emergence occurred even in the time of Brazil Empire, when the country was a colony of Portugal. The objective of this study, developed through a bibliographical research based on the inductive method, was aimed at presenting the origin of the Jury's Court in Brazil, as well as presenting concise notes on the main characteristics of this institute in the United States United States, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain and Brazil.</p><p class="abstractCxSpLast"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Jury Court; Comparative Law; The History of Law; Common Law; Civil Law.</p></div>


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Patrícia Pasqualini Philippi ◽  
Caroline Testoni Wehmuuth

<p class="resumo"><strong>Resumo</strong>: O objetivo do presente estudo, desenvolvido através de pesquisa bibliográfica realizada a partir do método indutivo, foi apresentar a origem do Tribunal do Júri no Brasil, bem como expor breves considerações sobre as principais características desse instituto na Inglaterra, Estados Unidos, Itália, França, Portugal, Espanha e no Brasil. Com origem incerta, o instituto do Tribunal do Júri tem sido o modo de resolução de conflitos desde a sua criação, evoluindo  de formas diversificadas nos países do mundo. No Brasil, seu surgimento se deu ainda na época do Brasil Império, quando o país era uma colônia de Portugal.</p><p class="resumo"><strong>Palavras-chave</strong>: Tribunal do Júri; Direito Comparado; História do Direito; Common Law; Civil Law.</p><h3>THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JURY COURT IN BRAZIL AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS IN THE MAIN COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD</h3><div><p class="abstractCxSpFirst"><strong>Abstract: </strong>With uncertain origin, the institute of the Court of the Jury has been the mode of conflict resolution since its inception. In Brazil, its emergence occurred even in the time of Brazil Empire, when the country was a colony of Portugal. The objective of this study, developed through a bibliographical research based on the inductive method, was aimed at presenting the origin of the Jury's Court in Brazil, as well as presenting concise notes on the main characteristics of this institute in the United States United States, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain and Brazil.</p><p class="abstractCxSpLast"><strong>Keywords</strong>: Jury Court; Comparative Law; The History of Law; Common Law; Civil Law.</p></div>


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 549-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariela J. Gross

What are we comparing when we compare law and race across cultures? This was once an easier question to answer. If we take “races” to be real categories existing in the world, then we can compare “race relations” and “racial classifications” in different legal systems, and measure the impact of different legal systems on the salience of racial distinction and the level of racial hierarchy in a given society. That was the approach of the leading comparativist scholars at mid-century. Frank Tannenbaum and Carl Degler compared race relations in the United States and Latin America, drawing heavily on legal sources regarding racial definition, manumission of slaves, and marriage. They were studying relations between “white people” and “Negroes,” as well as the possibility of an intermediate class of “mulattoes.” But once we understand race itself to be produced by relations of domination, through several powerful discourses of which law is one, we are up against a more formidable challenge. We must compare the interaction of two things—legal processes and ideologies of race—in systems in which neither is likely to have a stable or equivalent meaning. Because “law” is likewise no longer as clear-cut a category as it once was; in addition to the formal law of statute books and common law appellate opinions, we now understand “law” to encompass a broad set of institutions, discourses, and processes produced by a larger cast of characters than solely jurists, legislators, and appellate judges.


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