scholarly journals Legal Theology: The Turn to Conceptualism in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Law

2006 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaim Saiman

The nineteenth century was the age of legal science. Across the globe, numerous cultures began to think of their law in terms of an interlocking system of internally coherent rules. While the details differ, these movements shared the belief that numerous legal propositions were held together by a small number of core legal concepts, and that correct decisions could be determined via formal methods of legal deduction and analysis. This mode of legal thought gave increased importance to legal concepts and analytic categories. Duncan Kennedy has termed this mode of legal analysis Classical Legal Thought.This restructuring of legal analysis brought about changes in the understanding of what the law is and how it should be studied. In its American variant, the ascendance of Classical Legal Thought is usually associated with Christopher C. Langdell's tenure as dean of Harvard's law school. Langdell created the modern law school by shifting legal training away from apprenticeship and moving it to a university setting where students were trained as legal scholars. Underlying the Langdellian moment is the assumption that law is comprised of analytic concepts which can be apolitically applied through a series of deductions made from the core legal principal.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 61-68
Author(s):  
Viktor A. Kovalev ◽  
◽  
Konstantin E. Krylov ◽  

The main theme of the article is investigation of the electoral culture in the European political and legal thought. Authors argue the ancient sources of this tradition tracing it from the three sources — Roman, German and Christian political thoughts. During the Middle Ages European legal concepts of the supreme power’s nature oscillated between hereditary and election as a foundation of the supreme power. Only on the edge of the Middle Ages and the Modern Era monarchy became strait hereditary. The idea of election did not disappear, remains the core ingridient of the image of power’s legitimacy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 01008
Author(s):  
Sergey Borisovich Zinkovsky

The purpose of the study is to identify the methodological limitations of sociocultural studies of law. The research methods center around the thesis that the sociocultural approach in legal scholarship is most persuasive when implemented in a relatively limited social context. This kind of research is empirical and shows no attention to the creation of explanatory theoretical constructs. The possibilities for comparative legal analysis are also limited because empirical research is primarily descriptive. The result of the study proved that the methods of considering law through the prism of culture are not always able to provide clear tools for analyzing the social factors that determine the features of institutional and procedural differences in law. In addition, the study concludes that the study of law as a cultural phenomenon requires the use of ideal constructions in the process of cognition. On the one hand, it allows operating with concepts whose content is not formally defined. On the other hand, it entails the impossibility of identifying the general principles of the organization of real legal phenomena, the cause-and-effect relationships between them. Foreign sociocultural studies of law often use the concept of “cultural community”, the scope of which allows asserting that the subject of research goes far beyond the scope of legal science. The study’s novelty lies in an attempt to assess whether the search for cultural foundations of law “blurs” the subject of legal science. The main reason for the “conceptual blurring” of sociocultural studies of law is the lack of a universal, generally recognized approach to defining the concept of culture in Russian and foreign legal science. However, the reductionism of the context of sociocultural studies of law, the use of legal and non-legal concepts and categories cannot always be characterized as unproductive. The revealed methodological limitations of sociocultural studies of law do not prevent the explanation of the actual nature of legal phenomena.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On the occasion of the republication of the “blue volume,” containing the proceedings of the 1986 “Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate” Conference at the University of Bremen Law School, much or little might be said as to the significance, promises or learned lessons of that event. The original conference conveners, like the editors of the ensuing volume, do much of that in the following pages. In fact, their recollection of the motivations and ideas driving the transatlantic event provides a marvelous view into the evolving mystery of legal thought, education and professionalism - on both sides of the Atlantic. The two accounts rightly embed the mid-1980s conference in a much larger historical context. Christian Joerges’ much-referenced account reaches back deep into the constituting phases of nineteenth-century German legal thought. David Trubek's essay is a thoughtful critical assessment of both the gaps and the overlaps between the German and the American legal cultures in the lead-up to and of the globalizing aftermath of the event.


Author(s):  
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann

This chapter offers an overview of the Dutch tradition of legal anthropology as it developed from the Adat Law School of the early twentieth century, especially from the contributions of its leading member, Cornelis van Vollenhoven. It begins with a brief sketch of the precursors of the Adat Law School, then traces the development of the Dutch tradition from the work of Van Vollenhoven and his colleagues to that of later scholars, showing how, in the last two decades of the colonial era, research on adat law became an ever more conservative and shallow legal science. The second part of the chapter focuses on the emerging Dutch anthropology of law after 1950, describing its institutional bases and emphasizing its increasing embeddedness in international debates. It also discusses some of the conceptual problems posed by the Indonesian indigenous rights movement, which draws both on international legal concepts and on concepts developed by the Adat Law School.


This paper is concerned with the ways in which undergraduates are first introduced to Law of Contract in a University Law School. Concept mapping is used to document students’ changing understanding in the course of one first year undergraduate module. Forty seven students (the members of four tutorial groups) made concept maps of “Law of Contract” at the start and at the finish of a twenty-four week study-programme and their maps were compared with two other concept maps made by their lecturer: 1) a map of the teaching sequence; 2) a map of the practices of Law of Contract. The analysis shows how the teaching sequence inscribes itself upon the students’ concept mapping structures even while this temporal pattern has little (or no) genuine accord with the knowledge-shape of legal analysis. The paper explores two different approaches to concept map analysis: First the more traditional perspective of cognition (and cognitive-structure); second the “linguistic-turn”. Both of these highlight the “artifice of teaching sequence” but they locate this problem in different arenas. While the cognitive approach suggests that the problem is a general issue of student learning quality, the linguistic approach is more specific, suggesting that the problem is confined to the lesson planning which does not actually involve the students. This paper also concludes that while concept mapping shows the acquisition of a new vocabulary of legal concepts, the method itself is rather less useful for showing whether or not students are developing the skills of making judgement.


Author(s):  
Oleksiy Kresin

The article is devoted to the extremely rich and insufficiently studied heritage of Polish legal thought. The political and geographical determinants of the chosen research topic are the restoration of statehood in central Polish lands in 1807 (Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Poland) and the defeat of the November Uprising (1830-1831) followed by measures taken by the Russian authorities to limit the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland. The intellectual milestones are the founding of the School of Law in 1807 (later the Faculty of Law of the University of Warsaw), and the closure of the University of Warsaw in 1831, as well as the significant emigration of scientists in the same year and the liquidation of the Society of Friends of Science in 1832. The intellectual milestones are also European (and first of all Central European) processes of legal thought evolution in the second half of the XVIII – first third of the XIX century, which led to the formation of the first and still insufficiently understood and studied positivism in jurisprudence, being a profound phenomenon that reveals the essence of positivism in legal thought in general. The study found that the basic principle of jurisprudence in the vision of most Warsaw scholars during the study period was its independence from a priori and metaphysical philosophizing, and vice versa, the formation of its own philosophical and legal discourse (philosophy of positive law) based on generalization and understanding of research results. It was recognized that legal science should be a fundamentally new system of legal knowledge – positivist and social. Recognizing the historical and modern pluralism of such an organization of knowledge, Warsaw scholars have unequivocally identified themselves with the Central European jurisprudence, the core of which is the German. Warsaw scholars believed that jurisprudence was based on historical, dogmatic and philosophical approaches. Accordingly, they considered three relatively separate areas of scientific knowledge, which together can be considered as a single legal science or a system of interrelated legal sciences. Depending on the emphasis in the views of scholars on the fundamental or applied side of legal science, this system was seen differently, as well as the subject of jurisprudence – universal or more national. It can be argued that this to some extent correlated with the predominance in the views of certain scholars of the principles of historical-philosophical or historical schools.


2015 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catriona M. M. Macdonald

The career and posthumous reputation of Andrew Lang (1844–1912) call into question Scottish historiographical conventions of the era following the death of Sir Walter Scott which foreground the apparent triumph of scientific methods over Romance and the professionalisation of the discipline within a university setting. Taking issue with the premise of notions relating to the Strange Death of Scottish History in the mid-nineteenth century, it is proposed that perceptions of Scottish historiographical exceptionalism in a European context and presumptions of Scottish inferiorism stand in need of re-assessment. By offering alternative readings of the reformation, by uncoupling unionism from whiggism, by reaffirming the role of Romance in ‘serious’ Scottish history, and by disrupting distinctions between whig and Jacobite, the historical works and the surviving personal papers of Andrew Lang cast doubt on many conventional grand narratives and the paradigms conventionally used to make sense of Scottish historiography.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Renker

American literary histories of the post-Civil War period typically treat “poetry” and “realism” as oppositional phenomena. The core narrative holds that “realism,” the major literary “movement” of the era, developed apace in prose fiction, while poetry, stuck in a hopelessly idealist late-romantic mode, languished and stagnated in a genteel “twilight of the poets.” This chapter excavates the historical origins of the twilight narrative in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It shows how this narrative emerged as a function of a particular idealist ideology of poetry that circulated widely in authoritative print-culture sites. The chapter demonstrates that the twilight narrative was only one strain in a complex cultural debate about poetry, a debate that entailed multiple voices and positions that would later fall out of literary history when the twilight narrative achieved institutional status as fact.


Author(s):  
Mark Storey

This chapter employs recent approaches to the study of world literature to offer a new reading of nineteenth-century American regionalism. The huge body of texts usually included in the regional or “local-color” genre often take rural communities as both subject matter and foregrounded setting, communities that are held in a structurally “peripheral” position within the combined and uneven world economy of the late nineteenth century. This chapter argues that such a position is registered in the genre’s distinctive oscillation between realist and “irrealist” literary modes—between the professionalized and ascendant cultural standard of the core and the persistence of nonrealist generic devices and registers. Calling on two of the genre’s quintessential representatives, Hamlin Garland and Sarah Orne Jewett, the chapter ultimately makes a case for reading local-color writing as a form of (semi)peripheral realism within world literature’s expanded geographical and temporal horizons.


Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
João Alberto de Oliveira Lima ◽  
Cristine Griffo ◽  
João Paulo A. Almeida ◽  
Giancarlo Guizzardi ◽  
Marcio Iorio Aranha

Abstract At the core of Hohfeld's contribution to legal theory is a conceptual framework for the analysis of the legal positions occupied by agents in intersubjective legal relations. Hohfeld presented a system of eight “fundamental” concepts relying on notions of opposition and correlation. Throughout the years, a number of authors have followed Hohfeld in applying the notion of opposition to analyze legal concepts. Many of these authors have accounted for Hohfeld's theory in direct analogy with the standard deontic hexagon. This paper reviews some of these accounts and extends them employing recent developments from opposition theory. In particular, we are able to extend application of opposition theory to an open conception of the law. We also account for the implications of abandoning the assumption of conflict-freedom and admitting seemingly conflicting legal positions. This enables a fuller analysis of Hohfeld's conceptual analytical framework. We also offer a novel analysis of Hohfeld's power positions.


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