Foucault and the Incompletion of Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 747-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
BEN GOLDER
Keyword(s):  
Michel Foucault ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Review Essay ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

In a late interview given to the French newspaper Le Monde, Michel Foucault discussed his dreams for a different style of criticism. ‘I can't help but dream about a kind of criticism’, remarked Foucault, in which one would ‘not try to judge, but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea-foam in the breeze and scatter it.’ This somewhat wistful, poetic thought resonates with more familiar Foucauldian notions regarding the use of theory as a ‘toolkit’ or ‘toolbox’. Common to both these tropes – critique as affirmation and theory as functional – is the desire for thought to be put to work rather than put on trial, for sentences to be brought to life rather than delivered. And yet this presents the would-be Foucauldian book reviewer – and more so where the venue is the impeccably juridical one of the law journal – with a series of alluring problems. How might one elaborate such a Foucauldian critique in a context where one is expressly called upon to judge? What would such a non-judgmental Foucauldian critique look like? Are juridical practices of critique readily susceptible to Foucauldian appropriation or subversion? This set of related questions is emblematic of a wider concern of mine which forms the subject matter of this review essay, namely the place of Foucault (if indeed he has one) in legal theory. How does Foucault, that fabled figure of postmodern antinomianism who supposedly announced the demise and ‘expulsion’ of modern law, relate to legal theory? What might it mean to bring Foucault's unruly poststructuralism ‘into law’? And with what possible effects?

Derrida’s Legal Times

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-167
Author(s):  
Bernadette Meyler
Keyword(s):  
Michel Foucault ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Political Sphere ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

The aim of this essay is to suggest what Jacques Derrida’s late forays into law and politics might contribute to thinking in legal theory beyond what can be derived from Michel Foucault and his inheritors. The key differences pertain to time and timing. In particular, Derrida’s writings lead us to reconsider the timing of the relation between the subject and the law, whether that subject is declaring independence or awaiting death. Through the vector of time, the trace of the subject—not self-present or autonomous but a subject nonetheless—is recovered within the juridico-political sphere.

TROUBLE FOR LEGAL POSITIVISM

Legal Theory ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny Priel
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Validity ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

Many contemporary legal positivists have argued that legal theory is evaluative because it requires the theorist to make judgments of importance. At the same time they argue that it is possible to know “what the law is” without resort to evaluative considerations. I distinguish between two senses of “what the law is”: in one sense it refers to legal validity, in another to the content of legal norms, and I argue that legal positivism is best understood (as indeed some legal positivists have explicitly said) as a claim about legal content. Understood this way, however, it is open to the objection that knowing the content of legal norms requires evaluative considerations for reasons similar to those offered by positivists for thinking that legal theory is requires evaluative considerations. I then distinguish between evaluative considerations in general and moral considerations and argue that because of the subject-matter of legal norms, there are good reasons for thinking that it is moral considerations, and not just any other evaluative considerations, that are required for knowing the content of legal norms.

The Province of Jurisprudence Contested

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 515-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Halpin
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
The People ◽  
Core Feature ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Split Field ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Field Of Inquiry

Allan Hutchinson’s recent book, The Province of Jurisprudence Democratized, is regarded as presenting the opportunity for considering what is involved in seeking to establish the province of jurisprudence as a distinctive field of inquiry. The scale of Hutchinson’s ambition matches John Austin’s original efforts to determine the Province of Jurisprudence, but seeks to replace an analytical approach to jurisprudence he associates with Austin by a theoretical approach committed to advancing “strong” democracy. This provokes an initial reflection on the nature of theoretical disageement, and in particular disagreement which goes beyond trivial theoretical contestability so as to contest the nature of the subject matter that is being investigated by establishing an appropriate field of inquiry for it. Three different techniques are introduced which are capable of demarcating the subject matter of jurisprudence through establishing a field of inquiry favouring a particular theoretical viewpoint: axiomatic disengagement, ambitious insight, and a split field of inquiry.Hutchinson’s principal concern with the democratization of law, legal theory, and the province of jurisprudence is examined in detail. The process of democratization and its anti-elitist character is traced through Hutchinson’s opposition to the aloof philosophical analysis of the universal in favour of an engagement with local and particular issues. However, the weight Hutchinson places on his conception of strong democracy, so as to provide a different understanding of the the law-power nexus and of the relationship between law and morality operating in strong democracies, is shown to be misplaced. Two related failings are pointed out. First, there is a failure to recognize competing groupings within the people, which contradict the uniform collective body Hutchinson associates with those formerly governed by elites and then constituting those liberated to exercise self-governance. Secondly, this links into Hutchinson’s exclusive preoccupation with the participatory axis of democracy – which he regards as the core feature of strong democracy, and at the same time the basis for the law-power nexus and the law-morality relationship within a strong democracy. This is revealed as an inadequate and impoverished understanding of democracy once the presence of competing groupings within the people is acknowledged. Hutchinson’s one-dimensional representation of democracy along a participatory-representational continuum is rejected for failing to recognize a distinct fiduciary-beneficiary axis, which a richer understanding of “for the people” conveys. These corrections have important consequences for a role for law that cannot be reduced solely to politics, and for a broader sweep to analytical jurisprudence than Hutchinson allows.Hutchinson’s own efforts to capture the province of jurisprudence are then assessed. These are recharacterized as seeking to establish within a split field of inquiry a theory of strong democratic law, but, in the absence of a convincing account of the nature of democracy and its relationship with law, the project is judged to be unfulfilled.

ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ ПАРАДИГМЫ МЕТОДОЛОГИИ ЮРИСПРУДЕНЦИИ

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 32-40
Author(s):  
Ю. М. Оборотов
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
The State ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Methodological Question ◽  
Modern Development ◽  
Decisive Importance ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Methodological Approaches ◽  
The Law

В современной методологии юриспруденции происходит переход от изучения состо­яний ее объекта, которыми выступают право и государство, к постижению этого объек­та в его изменениях и превращениях. Две подсистемы методологии юриспруденции, подсистема обращенная к состоянию права и государства; и подсистема обращенная к изменениям права и государства, — получают свое отображение в концептуальной форме, методологических подходах, методах, специфических понятиях. Показательны перемены в содержании методологии юриспруденции, где определяю­щее значение имеют методологические подходы, определяющие стратегию исследова­тельских поисков во взаимосвязи юриспруденции с правом и государством. Среди наи­более характерных подходов антропологический, аксиологический, цивилизационный, синергетический и герменевтический — определяют плюралистичность современной методологии и свидетельствуют о становлении новой парадигмы методологии юриспру­денции.   In modern methodology of jurisprudence there is a transition from the study the states of its object to its comprehension in changes and transformations. Hence the two subsystems of methodology of jurisprudence: subsystem facing the states of the law and the state as well as their components and aspects; and subsystem facing the changes of the law and the state in general and their constituents. These subsystems of methodology of jurisprudence receive its reflection in conceptual form, methodological approaches, methods, specific concepts. Methodology of jurisprudence should not be restricted to the methodology of legal theory. In this regard, it is an important methodological question about subject of jurisprudence. It is proposed to consider the subject of jurisprudence as complex, covering both the law and the state in their specificity, interaction and integrity. Indicative changes in the content methodology of jurisprudence are the usage of decisive importance methodological approaches that govern research strategy searches in conjunction with the law and the state. Among the most characteristic of modern development approaches: anthropological, axiological, civilization, synergistic and hermeneutic. Modern methodology of jurisprudence is pluralistic in nature alleging various approaches to the law and the state. Marked approaches allow the formation of a new paradigm methodology of jurisprudence.

On hating and despising legal philosophy

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50
Author(s):  
Jesse Wall
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Critical Distance ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Current Form ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Cry For Help ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Legal Theorist

This article is a cry for help. It is a search for some possible view of legal philosophy that does not render it either intrinsically useless or useless in its current form. In this article I focus on two methodological hallmarks of contemporary anglophone legal philosophy. The first is the Archimedean way in which the legal theorist places a critical distance between him- or herself and the subject matter of the philosophical inquiry. The second is the introverted way in which the accuracy of any given legal theory is confined to the theorist’s own puzzles, concerns, controversies, and preoccupations. Whilst I consider those who have turned against these methodological commitments and called for an anti-Archimedean or extroverted approach to legal theory, I explain how those who accept both commitments adopt a very modest view of the helpfulness of legal philosophy. I then consider whether, contrary to the modest view, if we accept both commitments, then whatever is true in legal philosophy will always be trivially true, irrelevant, or inconsequential, for any non-philosophical practice or non-philosophical inquiry about the law. The value of this article, I hope, lies in its refutation.

Letter to the Editor

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 192-192
Author(s):  
Ian Winspur
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Performing Arts ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Performing Arts Medicine ◽  
Letter To The Editor ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

I enjoyed Alice Brandfonbrener’s editorial “But I Didn’t Ask to Be a Lawyer” in the June 2002 issue of MPPA [MPPA 2002;17(2):57]. I understand and sympathize with her. Many physicians who, like her, are involved in these cases for altruistic reasons rather than pure commercial—-and I believe that this is more common in the world of performing arts medicine—-must find themselves in the same predicament. However, in the words of an eminent English lawyer, who qualified and practiced as a gynecologist before turning to the law, when considering medical and scientific evidence (or in many cases, including performers, non-scientific evidence!): “However scientific the subject matter of the claim and however recondite the evidence and the argument, the legal definitions must apply in a Court of Law; the problem for the lawyer is in making the scientist understand a totally different concept of proof required by the court.” Therefore physicians involved, whether altruistic or not, must understand the basis of these claims.

Does the Name of a Case Matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-489
Author(s):  
Haris Jamil
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Fishing Vessel ◽  
International Commerce ◽  
Arbitral Award ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
A Company

Abstract The arbitral award in The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India) brings to the fore the issue of assigning a name to a case. To contextualise India’s contention regarding the name, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, in this article, I outline the law and practice regarding assigning names to cases by different international judicial bodies (ICJ, ITLOS, WTO and PCA). Examining India’s objection to the name, I argue that the name of the case does not capture the subject matter of the dispute accurately and emanates from the mainstream view of international law. The name prioritises an Italian flagged vessel, owned by a company engaged in international commerce and navigating under the protection of the Italian navy, over a fishing vessel owned by private individuals. The name reinforces a state-centric view of international law in which the victims of the incident do not picture.

8. Patent Protection and Exploitation

2019 ◽  
pp. 178-198
Author(s):  
Justine Pila ◽  
Paul L.C. Torremans
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
European Patent ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Patent Grant

Once a European patent has been granted the nature and scope of the protection it confers must be determined. In considering such protection this chapter focuses on four issues of central importance to that end. The first is the effects of a patent, namely, the territories in and term for which it is valid. The second is the object of protection, namely, the subject matter that the public is excluded from using during the term of its protection. The third is the nature of protection, namely, the uses of the subject matter from which the public is excluded. And the fourth is the limitations to protection, namely, the uses of an invention that the law permits notwithstanding its protection by patent grant.

Part VI The Law of Property, 29 The Distinction Between Movables and Immovables

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torremans Paul
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

This chapter examines the distinction between movables and immovables under English private international law. The first task of the court in a private international law case when required to rule on the question of a proprietary or possessory nature is to decide whether the item of property in dispute is movable or immovable. The legal system that will be applicable to the case depends on this preliminary decision. This chapter first considers the classification of the subject matter of ownership into movables and immovables by the law of the situs before looking at some examples relating to mortgages, trusts for sale, and annuities. It also discusses the relevance of the distinction between realty and personalty and concludes by explaining the distinction between tangible and intangible movables.

Constitutional and Administrative Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Writing Style ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Self Test ◽  
The Law

The purpose of this book is to introduce the reader to the fundamental principles and concepts of constitutional and administrative law. It is highly popular with undergraduates for its clear writing style and the ease with which it guides the reader through key principles of public law. This eleventh edition incorporates the significant developments in this ever-changing area of the law. The book also includes a range of useful features to help students get to grips with the subject matter. These include further reading suggestions to support deeper research, a large number of self-test questions to help reinforce knowledge, and chapter summaries and numbered paragraphs to aid navigation and revision. This new edition has been fully updated to cover all the latest developments in constitutional and administrative law, including those relating to devolution and Brexit.

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