Before Pigs' Germs Fly: Xenotransplantation and a Call for Federal Action

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-444
Author(s):  
SUSAN E. HERZ

When surgeons transplant animal organs into humans, people who did not receive the organs incur risks. These third parties may stand near or far in time or space. No one knows the likelihood, breadth, or nature of the risks in question. The common wisdom among infectious-disease specialists is that in the best of xenotransplant conditions, such third-party risk may be minimized but not eliminated.

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Służewska

THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP AS A BASE OF IN SOLIDUM LIABILITY IN ROMAN LAWSummary In the modern civil law joint and several liability of partners in a partnership is a rule rather than an exception. According to the common opinion this concept did not originate in the Roman law but was first invented in the medieval times by glossators and commentators. The Roman partnership created only a private relation between partners (who, due to a conclusion of that contract were reciprocally obliged to act together in accordance with a good faith in order to conduct common business and to divide profits and bear losses in proportion to their respective shares) and its conclusion did not affect their liability against third parties. The partners had no right to bind themselves contractually to any third parties, unless they all acted jointly (in this case, however, their joint representation was derived from their expressed declarations and not the existence of a contract o f partnership). Thus, any commitment made by an individual partner, even if made within the scope of a partnership having obtained other partners’ consent, was treated as a personal debt of this partner and the remaining partners were not liable against his contractor. Then, of course, the partner who made a commitment (acting within the partnership’s business) could claim a part of what he had paid to a third party from other partners in proportion to their respective shares in the common enterprise.Such a solution was necessary because of the purely consensual character o f the Roman partnership and the lack of any formal procedure of its conclusion and dissolution. The existence of that contract could not affect the model of the external liability of partners, because it would be too risky for third parties, which had no possibility to make sure if a contract of partnership between some persons had been actually concluded or not. Thus, the role of a contract of partnership in the Roman law was only limited to determine a mutual liability o f partners, to specify their respective rights and obligations and to define the scope of their liability against other partners.There are only a few written sources concerning so called specific kinds of partnership characterized by untypical joint and several responsibility of partners. Moreover these texts are not very clear and are difficult to interpret, so the issue of specific kinds of a partnership is a matter of doubts among Romanists. Some authors even believe that the specific types of partnership did not exist in the Roman law at all.It should be firstly observed that the texts regarding a contract of partnership itself (the texts included in the title pro socio of Justinian’ Digest) did not raise the question of the external liability of partners because they were devoted to internal settlement o f accounts within sociu Thus, taking into account only these texts one cannot ascertain that a conclusion of a contract of partnership could not affect in any way the model of the partners’ liability against third parties.Secondly, the other texts concerning the regulation of conducting an economic activity in the Roman law (actio institoria, actio exercitoria and actio de peculio) present some regularity in an introduction of joint and several liability of debtors.On the one hand that model of the liability was introduced in situations in which protecting safety of trade required that the creditor be able to claim a whole amount o f the debt from one person only.On the other hand this model of liability could be introduced only in these cases in which some internal relation existed between several debtors. On the grounds of such relations the debtor who satisfied in full the creditor’s claim could sue other debtors in order to recover their respective parts in the debt. In the Roman law that internal relation that guaranteed the possibility of a recourse could be either a joint-ownership or a partnership.Having considered that, one may say that the texts concerning specific kinds o f partnership do not prove existence of any special type of societas. These sources regard only the situations when a joint and several liability between several debtors was introduced because it was justified by the circumstances: that is the necessity to protect the safety of trade on one hand and the existence of the contract of partnership that guaranteed a possibility to realize the recourse, on the other.In conclusion one may say that although a closing of a contract of partnership did not create a joint and several liability of partners, in some cases its existence was decisive for introducing this model of liability since it guaranteed to every party a possibility to act against the others to obtain the recourse. Thus, Roman jurisprudence made an important step towards the future introduction o f joint and several liability of partners as a rule of a civil law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 307-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally, it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.


1952 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-257
Author(s):  
T. C. Thomas

The purpose of this article is to consider the legal effects of a transfer of property by A to B subject to the performance by B of some obligation in favour of C, a third party to the transfer. The student of the law of contract is well familiar with the common law rule that no one who was not an original party to the contract is entitled to the benefit of that contract. But this rule creates hardship in particular cases and it has been shown that, in the main, three methods have been evolved to evade those unfortunate results. First, the legislature has intervened and provided C, the third party, with statutory rights. Secondly, the doctrine of agency has been invoked whereby C may claim that he is the principal of B. Thirdly, but with varying success, the trust concept has been pressed into service whereby C has sometimes been able to show that he is a beneficiary.


1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-270
Author(s):  
Peter Kincaid

In a revolutionary but unsatisfactory recent decision, the High Court of Australia has allowed a third-party beneficiary of an insurance contract a right to sue the promisor. The decision casts doubt upon the whole doctrine of privity and ultimately upon bargain as the theoretical basis of promissory liability. The Trident case is unsatisfactory not because it allowed a third-party beneficiary a cause of action or because it challenges privity and bargain, but because it offers no satisfactory replacement for the theory of bargain. The reasons the court gave for recognising a right to sue are weak and inconsistent with the common law's approach to questions of civil liability. That approach is to give a plaintiff a cause of action against a defendant not solely because of something the defendant has done, but because there is a legally relevant link between what he has done and the plaintiff's condition. That is, the plaintiff must, in order to establish a right, satisfy some criterion for linking the defendant's behaviour to his complaint.


Author(s):  
David Fung

This chapter examines the Malaysian position on privity and third party beneficiaries. Given that the Malaysian Contracts Act 1950 (‘MCA 1950’) is virtually a copy of the Indian Contract Act 1872, the issues are, unsurprisingly, similar. The absence of a clear statement of the rule in the MCA 1950 meant that its existence was susceptible to challenge. It was only in Kepong Prospecting Ltd v Schmidt, when the Privy Council pronounced on the fundamentality of the privity rule, that the matter was finally settled. This chapter demonstrates the ingenuity and the limitations of the common law. The strategy of finding an express trust of a promise finds a familiar trajectory in the use of that strategy in England. The need to prove the three certainties of intention to create a trust, beneficiaries, and subject matter emphasizes the clear intention to create property rights. An alternative explored by the author relates to the institutional constructive trust which requires a proprietary base by which the constructive trust may be found.


Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies

This chapter considers two principal questions: firstly, may a person who is not a party to a contract acquire rights under it? Secondly, can a contract impose duties on a person who is not a party to it? With some exceptions, the common law answered ‘No’ to both. A contract between A and B cannot be enforced by a third party, C, even if the contract is for the benefit of C. Nor can a contract between A and B impose burdens on C. Following the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 there is now a statutory exception to the principle that C acquires no rights under a contract between A and B. Under this Act, a third party might be able to enforce a term of the contract if the contract expressly provides that he may, or if the relevant term purports to confer a benefit on him.


Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

The Casebook series provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


2021 ◽  
pp. 123-148
Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies

This chapter considers two principal questions: firstly, may a person who is not a party to a contract acquire rights under it? Secondly, can a contract impose duties on a person who is not a party to it? With some exceptions, the common law answered ‘No’ to both. A contract between A and B cannot be enforced by a third party, C, even if the contract is for the benefit of C. Nor can a contract between A and B impose burdens on C. Following the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 there is now a statutory exception to the principle that C acquires no rights under a contract between A and B. Under this Act, a third party might be able to enforce a term of the contract if the contract expressly provides that they may, or if the relevant term purports to confer a benefit on them.


2021 ◽  
pp. 377-412
Author(s):  
André Naidoo

This chapter highlights the doctrine of privity of contract; that means it is about the rights and obligations of third parties. The starting point is the basic common law rule of privity. At common law, third parties have no general right to enforce contracts made by others. Likewise, contracts made by others cannot impose obligations on third parties. This is a fairly straightforward principle and is based on sound reasons, but in practice privity has become a complex area. The existence of the rule resulted in a range of clever devices being developed to get around it, all of which are of commercial importance. And the rule against parties enforcing contracts made by others in particular was also severely criticized over the years for various reasons. The basis for such criticism resulted in some partial exceptions being developed in the case law, and ultimately in a statute—namely the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. This complicates matters further because the Act only applies in certain circumstances and its application can be excluded by the terms of the contract. As such, there will be circumstances in which the common law exceptions and devices remain relevant, and they must therefore be studied alongside it.


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