A Vindication of Politics: On the Common Good and Human Flourishing. By Matthew D. Wright. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2019. 232p. $39.95 cloth.

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 260-261
Author(s):  
Carson Holloway
Author(s):  
Mary L. Hirschfeld

There are two ways to answer the question, What can Catholic social thought learn from the social sciences about the common good? A more modern form of Catholic social thought, which primarily thinks of the common good in terms of the equitable distribution of goods like health, education, and opportunity, could benefit from the extensive literature in public policy, economics, and political science, which study the role of institutions and policies in generating desirable social outcomes. A second approach, rooted in pre-Machiavellian Catholic thought, would expand on this modern notion to include concerns about the way the culture shapes our understanding of what genuine human flourishing entails. On that account, the social sciences offer a valuable description of human life; but because they underestimate how human behavior is shaped by institutions, policies, and the discourse of social science itself, their insights need to be treated with caution.


What has social science learned about the common good? Would humanists even want to alter their definitions of the common good based on what social scientists say? In this volume, six social scientists—from economics, political science, sociology, and policy analysis—speak about what their disciplines have to contribute to discussions within Catholic social thought about the common good. None of those disciplines talks directly about “the common good”; but nearly all social scientists believe that their scientific work can help make the world a better place, and each social science does operate with some notion of human flourishing. Two theologians examine the insights of social science, including such challenging assertions that theology is overly irenic, that it does not appreciate unplanned order, and that it does not grasp how in some situations contention among self-interested nations and persons can be an effective path to the common good. In response, one theologian explicitly includes contention along with cooperation in his (altered) definition of the common good.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-303
Author(s):  
Daniel Mark ◽  

Some critics question new natural law theorists’ conception of the common good of the political community, namely, their interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas and the conclusion that the political common good is primarily instrumental rather than intrinsic and transcendent. Contrary to these objections, the common good of the political community is primarily instrumental. It aims chiefly at securing the conditions for human flourishing. Its unique ability to use the law to bring about justice and peace and promote virtue in individuals may make the common good of the political community critically important. Nevertheless, it is still not an intrinsic aspect of human flourishing. Unlike the family or a religious group, membership in a political community is not an end in itself.


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Hoyt-O'Connor

AbstractJohn B. Cobb, Jr and his associates offer a critique of prevailing economic theory and practice in the hopes of contributing to the reformation of both by examining the meaning and relevance of the common good in the economic sphere. This paper examines Cobb's critique of economic theory and practice and his contribution toward an understanding of economic life that would do greater justice to environmental and communal sustainability. It also examines the contours of the new paradigm for economic theory and practice that he and Herman E. Daly propose. While that paradigm stands in need of greater elaboration, their work suggests a line of further development, one that anticipates Bernard Lonergan's macroeconomic dynamics. The latter, I argue, accounts for Cobb's concerns and criticisms and provides a basis for the formulation of moral precepts that promote economic progress in ways consonant with a fuller vision of human flourishing.


2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejo José G. Sison ◽  
Edwin M. Hartman ◽  
Joan Fontrodona

ABSTRACT:Virtue ethics, the authors believe, is distinct and superior to other options because it considers, in the first place, which preferences are worth pursuing, rather than just blindly maximizing preferences, and it takes into account intuitions, emotions and experience, instead of acting solely on abstract universal principles. Moreover, virtue ethics is seen as firmly rooted in human biology and psychology, particularly in our freedom, rationality, and sociability. Work, business, and management are presented as vital areas for the development of virtues, not the least with a view to human flourishing. We conclude by introducing the articles included in this special issue.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (10) ◽  
pp. 1598-1611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fan Yang ◽  
You-Jung Choi ◽  
Antonia Misch ◽  
Xin Yang ◽  
Yarrow Dunham

Human flourishing depends on individuals paying costs to contribute to the common good, but such arrangements are vulnerable to free riding, in which individuals benefit from others’ contributions without paying costs themselves. Systems of tracking and sanctioning free riders can stabilize cooperation, but the origin of such tendencies is not well understood. Here, we provide evidence that children as young as 4 years old negatively evaluate and sanction free riders. Across six studies, we showed that these tendencies are robust, large in magnitude, tuned to intentional rather than unintentional noncontribution, and generally consistent across third- and first-party cases. Further, these effects cannot be accounted for by factors that frequently co-occur with free riding, such as nonconforming behaviors or the costs that free riding imposes on the group. Our findings demonstrate that from early in life, children both hold and enforce a normative expectation that individuals are intrinsically obligated to contribute to the common good.


Author(s):  
Joshua Ralston

Joshua Ralston observes that the Christian tendency to place law in an oppositional relationship to love, grace, and/or the gospel has had unfortunate byproducts. It denigrates Judaism and Islam and misconstrues their conceptions of the Compassionate One who gives Torah and/or shari‘a for the sake of human flourishing. Thinking beyond such divisions, this essay explores points of convergence and divergence in the thinking of the Protestant reformer John Calvin and the Islamic jurist, mystic, and reformer al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali’s understanding of shari‘a as a pathway to the common good that is willed by the Compassionate and Merciful One resonates with Calvin’s third use of the law. Together, these revise the adversarial renderings of law in Calvin’s first and second uses. Christian theology might therefore embrace an understanding of gospel and law—or, better, the way or shari’a of God—that focuses on the path to flourishing.


Author(s):  
Douglas V. Porpora

Although “the common good” is not a term of art in sociology, sociologists are concerned to contribute to greater human flourishing. Thus, concerted sociological attention to social problems, or common “bads,” suggests an implicit sociological understanding of the common good. Beyond the admonition for all people to think critically, sociology enables us in a special way to understand how we sin not just individually but also socially and collectively through our social relations. It is toward a better understanding of such oppressive and unjust social relations and how to overcome them that sociology contributes to the common good. Such insights can provide assistance to Catholic social thought in its own understanding of the common good.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fan Yang ◽  
You-jung Choi ◽  
Antonia Misch ◽  
Xin Yang ◽  
Yarrow Dunham

Human flourishing depends on individuals paying costs to contribute to common goods, but such arrangements are vulnerable to “free-riding”, in which individuals benefit from others’ contributions without paying costs themselves. Systems of tracking and sanctioning free-riders can stabilize cooperation, but the origin of such tendencies is not well understood. Here, we provide evidence that children as young as four negatively evaluate and sanction free-riders. Across six studies we show that these tendencies are robust, large in magnitude, tuned to intentional rather than unintentional non-contribution, and generally consistent across third- and first-party cases. Further, these effects cannot be accounted for by factors that frequently co-occur with free-riding, such as the costs that free-riding imposes on the group or that free-riding is often non-conformity. Our findings demonstrate that from early in life children both hold and enforce a normative expectation that individuals are intrinsically obligated to contribute to the common good.


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