Beyond Quietism: Party Institutionalisation, Salafism, and the Economy

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 796-817
Author(s):  
Francesco Cavatorta ◽  
Valeria Resta
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Political Program ◽  
Party Institutionalization ◽  
Policy Proposals

AbstractBreaking with a long tradition of political quietism, many Salafis in Tunisia and Egypt decided to found political parties and participate in competitive elections after the collapse of the regime. In doing so, they had to present a political program to voters, including policy proposals on economic issues. The article examines how Salafi parties dealt with economic policy-making and finds that they reluctantly engaged with it, offering contradictory and naïve policies meant to pander to the electorate. Policy-making preferences and positions on economic issues are employed to look at the degree of party institutionalization Salafi parties have.

scholarly journals From preferences to policies in coalition governments—Unpacking policy making in European higher education

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 323-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Jungblut
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Higher Education Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Qualitative Content Analysis ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Policy Proposal ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Policy Proposals

This article focuses on the role of political parties for policy making, and it traces the development from party preferences over coalition positions to policy proposals. The main argument is that parties with more similar preferences agree on more encompassing sets of policies, and that if a coalition formulates a policy in its agreement the chances for a policy proposal are higher. However, the need to negotiate the coalition agreement with other parties mediates the influence of partisan preferences. The article is based on a qualitative content analysis of documents as well as expert interviews from three West European countries and focuses on higher education policy. The results show preferences of governing parties influence policy proposals also in situations of coalition government. Furthermore, coalition agreements are found to be central documents in policy making as they limit veto capacities and indicate where substantial policy change is likely.

scholarly journals Dealing with bad guys: actor- and process-level determinants of the “devil shift” in policy making

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Fischer ◽  
Karin Ingold ◽  
Pascal Sciarini ◽  
Frédéric Varone
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Policy Actors ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Devil ◽  
Process Level

AbstractPolicy actors tend to misinterpret and distrust opponents in policy processes. This phenomenon, known as the “devil shift”, consists of the following two dimensions: actors perceive opponents as more powerful and as more evil than they really are. Analysing nine policy processes in Switzerland, this article highlights the drivers of the devil shift at two levels. On the actor level, interest groups, political parties and powerful actors suffer more from the devil shift than state actors and powerless actors. On the process level, the devil shift is stronger in policy processes dealing with socio-economic issues as compared with other issues. Finally, and in line with previous studies, there is less empirical evidence of the power dimension of the devil shift phenomenon than of its evilness dimension.

scholarly journals Economists as Public Policy Advisers

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 61-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee H Hamilton
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Joint Economic Committee ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
Policy Making Process ◽  
Active Interest ◽  
Important Quality

As a member of the Joint Economic Committee for over 15 years I have had ample occasion to observe economists testifying. When I was Chairman of the Committee in the last Congress, for example, we held over 100 hearings and heard from at least that many different economists. From this experience, I have developed some views about how economists can be effective witnesses and, more generally, how they can make a useful contribution to economic policy. For me, the most important quality for economists to have when they are testifying or advising policymakers is the ability to express their ideas on important policy issues clearly and simply, without jargon. There is an art to telling policymakers what they need to know but don't want to hear. An economist who wants to contribute to the policy-making process needs to be a good salesman—but not a snake-oil salesman. I encourage more economists to take an active interest in public policy and to contribute to the debate on the economic issues.

scholarly journals When Does Income Inequality Cause Polarization?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jacob R. Gunderson
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Party Positions ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The Right ◽  
Issue Content

Scholars have long been concerned with the implications of income inequality for democracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that high income inequality is associated with political parties taking polarized positions as the left advocates for increased redistribution while the right aims to entrench the position of economic elites. This article argues that the connection between party positions and income inequality depends on how party bases are sorted by income and the issue content of national elections. It uses data from European national elections from 1996 to 2016 to show that income inequality has a positive relationship with party polarization on economic issues when partisans are sorted with respect to income and when economic issues are relatively salient in elections. When these factors are weak, however, the author finds no relationship between income inequality and polarization.

The World. Challenges of the Global Crisis. Germany

2014 ◽  
pp. 38-52
Author(s):  
I. Semenenko ◽  
G. Irishin
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Social Market Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Leadership Positions ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Political Landscape ◽  
The World ◽  
Social Market ◽  
The Eu

The economic crisis of 2008–2009 highlighted new problems in the development of the German social market economy model and brought to the forefront the factors of its resilience that have ensured Germany’s leadership positions in the EU. Changes in economic policy have affected in the first place the energy and the financial sectors. Shifts in the political landscape have led to the appearance of new political parties. These changes have affected the results of the 2013 elections, the liberal democrats failure to enter the Bundestag has made the winner – CDU – seek new coalition partners.

scholarly journals Multiparty government and economic policy-making

Public Choice ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 170 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 33-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Bäck ◽  
Wolfgang C. Müller ◽  
Benjamin Nyblade
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Policy Making
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