The Rule of Climate Policy: How Do Chinese Judges Contribute to Climate Governance without Climate Law?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Mingzhe Zhu

Abstract China's climate governance is distinguished by the contrast between an abundance of policies on climate change and the lack of legally binding laws. This article argues that Chinese courts bridge this difference, which fosters a ‘rule of climate policy’ rather than a strict rule of law. The effective authority of Chinese climate policy is made possible in practice both by provisions of the Chinese Constitution and the prevailing use of legal reasoning. China's constitutional design of ‘ecological civilization’ delegates the duty and the power of managing climate change issues to the executive branch of its government. Most Chinese documents on climate governance have no binding legal force, which means, according to positive law, that they cannot serve as legal grounds for judicial decisions. Chinese judges, in deciding climate-related disputes, must combine legal provisions and non-binding materials to achieve regulatory goals. They use non-legal materials to support statutory or contractual interpretations and determine the existence or limits of rights, which alters the meaning and scope of existing legal terms and principles. This rule of climate policy is possible in the courtroom because judges justify public policy considerations with arguments of principle that are substantiated in various non-binding climate plans.

2018 ◽  
Vol 04 (02) ◽  
pp. 281-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongyuan Yu

President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change is both a major reversal of the Obama administration’s climate policy and a huge blow to global climate governance. The comprehensive regression of President Trump’s climate policy manifests mainly in three aspects: abolition of the clean energy plan, exit from the Paris Agreement, and a return to traditional energy policies, which reflect the cyclical and volatile nature of the U.S. climate policy. With its lasting negative impact, the China-U.S. cooperative leadership in global climate governance is stranded. In this light, China should strive for a bigger role in leading global efforts to address climate change and enhance cooperation through various mechanisms. Under the current U.S. policy environment, China can still strengthen cooperation with the United States in such fields as traditional energy, infrastructure investment, global energy market, and green finance.


2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (spe) ◽  
pp. 174-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larissa Basso ◽  
Eduardo Viola

If the world is not to jeopardize the chances for human life on Earth, climate change must be mitigated; therefore, achieving low carbon development is crucial. China is the world's greatest GHG emitter, energy producer and energy consumer; investigating its energy-climate policy developments and international positions are of utmost importance to understand and tackle current stumbling blocks of the global energy and climate governance.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Unger ◽  
Sonja Thielges

Abstract International climate policy is increasingly shaped by alternative forms of governance. Coalitions of national, subnational and/or non-state actors have the potential to address the global challenge of climate change beyond the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. While initially such ‘clubs’ spurred hope that they could be an option to achieve climate action more effectively than the UNFCCC, more recently their role has been seen as preparing and orchestrating climate policy. In spite of its conceptual proliferation, literature on climate clubs stops short in examining practical evidence and conducting analyses beyond categorization and labelling of climate clubs. This article aims at contributing to filling this gap with a comparative perspective on three specific governance initiatives that act on different governance levels: The G20, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) and the Under2 Coalition. What contribution do these club-like initiatives make to global climate governance and how does it relate to existing structures such as the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC process?Our paper applies central aspects of clubs research, namely membership, public goods, and the provision of additional benefits as an analytical framework to examine the three cases. We find that these club initiatives, though highly diverse in their origin and membership, make a similar contribution to international climate governance. Their largest contribution lies in preparing emissions reductions through raising awareness, orchestrating different actors and actions, and establishing a large cooperation network. They complement the UNFCCC and especially the Paris Agreement.


Author(s):  
Eugen Pissarskoi

How can we reasonably justify a climate policy goal if we accept that only possible consequences from climate change are known? Precautionary principles seem to offer promising guidelines for reasoning in such epistemic situations. This chapter presents two versions of the precautionary principle (PP) and defends one of them as morally justifiable. However, it argues that current versions of the PP do not allow discrimination between relevant climate change policies. Therefore, the chapter develops a further version of the PP, the Controllability Precautionary Principle (CPP), and defends its moral plausibility. The CPP incorporates the following idea: in a situation when the possible outcomes of the available actions cannot be ranked with regard to their value, the choice between available options for action should rest on the comparison of how well decision makers can control the processes of the implementation of the available strategies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-210
Author(s):  
Simone Borghesi

AbstractThe present article describes the main insights deriving from the papers collected in this special issue which jointly provide a ‘room with a view’ on some of the most relevant issues in climate policy such as: the role of uncertainty, the distributional implications of climate change, the drivers and applications of decarbonizing innovation, the role of emissions trading and its interactions with companion policies. While looking at different issues and from different angles, all papers share a similar attention to policy aspects and implications, especially in developing countries. This is particularly important to evaluate whether and to what extent the climate policies adopted thus far in developed countries can be replicated in emerging economies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinjia Wu ◽  
Jiansheng Qu ◽  
Hengji Li ◽  
Li Xu ◽  
Hongfen Zhang ◽  
...  

The theme of global sustainable development has changed from environmental management to climate governance, and relevant policies on climate governance urgently need to be implemented by the public. The public understanding of climate change has become the prerequisite and basis for implementing various climate change policies. In order to explore the affected factors of climate change perception among Chinese residents, this study was conducted across 31 provinces and regions of China through field household surveys and interviews. Combined with the residents’ perception of climate change with the possible affected factors, the related factors affecting Chinese residents’ perception of climate change were explored. The results show that the perceptive level of climate change of Chinese residents is related to the education level and the household size of residents. Improving public awareness of climate change risk in the context of climate change through multiple channels will also help to improve residents’ awareness of climate change. On the premise of improving the level of national education, improving education on climate change in school education and raising awareness of climate change risk among dependents will help to improve the level of Chinese residents’ awareness of climate change, which could be instrumental in promoting public participation in climate change mitigation and adaptation actions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 122 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elmar Kriegler ◽  
Jae Edmonds ◽  
Stéphane Hallegatte ◽  
Kristie L. Ebi ◽  
Tom Kram ◽  
...  

2013 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 1350008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mou WANG

Drawing on the idea that countries are eligible to implement differentiated emission reduction policies based on their respective capabilities, some parties of UNFCCC attempt to weaken the principle of “Common but differentiated responsibilities(CBDR)” and impose carbon tariff on international trade. This initiative is in fact another camouflage to burden developing countries with emission cut obligation, which has no doubt undermined the development rights of developing countries. This paper defines Carbon Tariff as border measures that target import goods with embodied carbon emission. It can be import tariffs or other domestic tax measures that adjust border tax, which includes plain import tariffs and export rebates, border tax adjustment, emission quota and permit etc. For some developed countries, carbon tariffs mean to sever trade protectionism and to build trade barriers. Its theoretical arguments like “loss of comparative advantage”, “carbon leakage decreases environmental effectiveness” and “theoretical model bases” are pseudo-propositions without international consensus. Carbon tariff has become an intensively debated issue due to its duality of climate change and trade, but neither UNFCCC nor WTO has clarified this issue or has indicated a clear statement in this regard. As a result, it allows some parties to take advantage of this loophole and escape its international climate change obligation. Carbon tariff is an issue arising from global climate governance. To promote the cooperation of global climate governance and safeguard the social and economic development of developing countries, a fair and justified climate change regime and international trade institution should be established, and the settlement of the carbon tariff issue should be addressed within these frameworks. This paper argues that the international governance of carbon tariff should in cooperation with other international agreements; however, principles and guidelines regarding this issue should be developed under the UNFCCC. Based on these principles and guidelines, WTO can develop related technical operation provisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.


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