Much Ado about Amsterdam: CDU-CSU Politics, Länder Influence and EU Treaty Reform

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (14) ◽  
Author(s):  
Colette Mazzucelli
Keyword(s):  
Initial Section ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Conceptual Issue ◽  
Open Sea ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Political Dimensions ◽  
Treaty Reform

“Not a year goes by without some fresh blueprint being drawn up and fed into the continuing debate. Each succeeding blueprint can be likened to the way in which some artists go over their work again and again, gradually building up a deep richness to the emerging picture.”“Old paint on canvas, as it ages, sometimes becomes transparent. When that happens it is possible, in some pictures, to see the original lines: a tree will show through a woman's dress, a child makes way for a dog, a large boat is no longer on an open sea. That is called pentimento because the painter ‘repented,’ changed his mind. Perhaps it would be as well to say that the old conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of seeing and then seeing again.”I. Introduction [1] The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the legal and political dimensions of treaty reform in the European Union (EU). It raises a conceptual issue by addressing the conditions under which Chancellor Kohl yielded to an increase in subnational influence and the extent to which Länder (Federal State) politicians were able to exercise that influence to determine the outcome in a key area during the Amsterdam European Council, 16-18 June 1997. The initial section highlights a political and legal analysis of German politics and European treaty reform during the 1996 process. The second section explores emerging asymmetrical specificity on the German political and institutional landscape post-Maastricht. The closing section offers an explanation of the results in qualified majority voting (QMV) for the treaty provisions on freedom, security and justice at Amsterdam, and the implications for our understanding of treaty reform in the Union.

Much Ado about Amsterdam: CDU-CSU Politics, Länder Influence and EU Treaty Reform

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (15) ◽  
Author(s):  
Colette Mazzucelli
Keyword(s):  
Initial Section ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Conceptual Issue ◽  
Open Sea ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Political Dimensions ◽  
Treaty Reform

“Not a year goes by without some fresh blueprint being drawn up and fed into the continuing debate. Each succeeding blueprint can be likened to the way in which some artists go over their work again and again, gradually building up a deep richness to the emerging picture.”“Old paint on canvas, as it ages, sometimes becomes transparent. When that happens it is possible, in some pictures, to see the original lines: a tree will show through a woman's dress, a child makes way for a dog, a large boat is no longer on an open sea. That is called pentimento because the painter ‘repented,’ changed his mind. Perhaps it would be as well to say that the old conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of seeing and then seeing again.”The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the legal and political dimensions of treaty reform in the European Union (EU). It raises a conceptual issue by addressing the conditions under which Chancellor Kohl yielded to an increase in sub-national influence and the extent to which Länder (Federal State) politicians were able to exercise that influence to determine the outcome in a key area during the Amsterdam European Council, 16–18 June 1997. (3) The initial section highlights a political and legal analysis of German politics and European treaty reform during the 1996 process. The second section explores emerging asymmetrical specificity on the German political and institutional landscape post-Maastricht. The closing section offers an explanation of the results in qualified majority voting (QMV) for the treaty provisions on freedom, security and justice at Amsterdam, and the implications for our understanding of treaty reform in the Union.

Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der EU-Sozialpolitik: effizientere Entscheidungsfindung durch Mehrheitsentscheidungen und differenzierte Integration?

IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Miriam Hartlapp
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Member State ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Differentiated Integration ◽  
Aktuelle Entwicklungen ◽  
Organizational Heterogeneity

Design and adoption of common social policy is conditional. Limited competencies, institutional and organizational heterogeneity among member states, and ideological-programmatic majorities in the institutions of the European Union (EU) have led to far fewer new legal instruments in recent decades. One of the key challenges is the unanimity requirement in the Council, enshrined in the Treaties in areas of great member state sovereignty. In 2019 the Commission proposed to allow a transition to qualified majority voting. This paper discusses what the transition entails in legal and procedural terms and highlights three key advantages it holds. To this aim it provides an overview of the policy areas and instruments that the Commission would like to transfer to qualified majority voting. It outlines how the potential that majority voting offers for EU social policy could be exploited better with more ambitious initiatives and discusses differentiated integration as an alternative.

Explaining Brexit: How the City of London came to be Regulated by the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Vaubel
Keyword(s):  
Majority Voting ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Financial Market Regulation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Free Movement Of Goods ◽  
City Of London ◽  
The City

Abstract Qualified majority voting on financial market regulation was made possible by the European Court of Justice changing the meaning of the term “internal market” from “free movement of goods, services, persons and capital” to “conditions of competition which are not distorted”.

The Nice Treaty: Reforming European Union Institutions in Anticipation of Eastern Enlargements

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Finn Laursen
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
Member States ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The Future ◽  
Eastern European Countries ◽  
Year 2000

The Nice Treaty negotiated during the year 2000, signed in 2001 and in force from 2003, focused on institutional changes considered necessary, especially by the larger member states, for the anticipated large enlargement of the European Union with several central and eastern European countries. Efforts to adopt such changes in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in 1996–1997 had failed. The Nice Treaty therefore dealt with what was known as the “Amsterdam leftovers,” namely size and composition of the European Commission, reweighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, and increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council. Concerning the reweighting of votes the intergovernmental conference agreed to increase the number of votes per member state, but the larger member states got a relatively larger increase that the smaller member states. This should make it more difficult for the smaller member states to dominate in the future, something feared by the larger states. Concerning the Commission, it was decided that each member state would nominate one commissioner in the future from January 1, 2005. When the membership of the union reached 27 the size would have to be reduced. How much and how would be decided later. Concerning the use of qualified majority voting the decision was to extend the use to some policy areas from the entry into force of the new treaty and for some policy areas considered more controversial the extension would take place later. For the most controversial areas no extension to qualified majority voting was considered. During the intergovernmental conference, which negotiated the new treaty, the topic of “enhanced cooperation” was added. Most of these topics were quite controversial, and afterward there was a feeling that the treaty did not adequately deal with all the issues. This in turn led to further efforts to improve the institutions, first in the failed Constitutional Treaty (2004) and eventually in the successful Lisbon Treaty (2007).

scholarly journals Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Crombez ◽  
Simon Hix
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Legislative Procedures ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Legislative Activity

This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval. The study predicts smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, under the co-decision (consultation) procedure when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament (Commission) are closer to each other. More activity is expected under qualified majority voting in the Council than under unanimity. The results find support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009.

The European Union and International Outcomes

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Jupille
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
The European Union ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
International Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Positions ◽  
The Eu

Analysts of the European Union (EU) and international bargaining have generally failed to appreciate how the shift within the EU from unanimity to qualified majority voting has affected European bargaining positions and international outcomes. I analyze the international effects of changes in EU decision-making rules with a simple spatial model and assess the utility of the model in two cases of environmental bargaining that span the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The EU can decisively shape international outcomes by concentrating the weight of its fifteen member states on a single substantive position and rendering that position critical to any internationally negotiated agreement. The findings generalize to numerous areas of EU external relations and suggest that analysts should attend specifically to the EU and more generally to domestic and regional institutional factors in explaining international bargaining outcomes.

Equitable Voting in the EU?: Options for Change

Politics ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-87
Author(s):  
Mark Baimbridge ◽  
Brian Burkitt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Population Size ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
European Council ◽  
Alternative Methods ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The Eu

The disagreement within the European Union (EU) concerning the system of qualified majority voting highlighted the inequalities within the present allocation of votes. With enlargement these inequalities are likely to intensify. We suggest that the EU should examine alternative methods for the allocation of Council votes. Two possible scenarios are allocation according to population size, and second, allocation based upon contributions to the EU budget. We conclude that either of these methods would offer a greater degree of equity, stability and flexibility in the decision-making process of the European Council.

scholarly journals Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Marta Migliorati
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Several Variables ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The One ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract Drawing on a principal–agent framework the article analyses the European Union (EU) politics of delegation in the post-Maastricht era. By means of statistical analysis, it tests the impact of several variables upon the selection of national and supranational agents, as well as on the discretion they enjoy, on the basis of a recently collected data set of EU laws. Findings reveal that pooling and policy complexity favour the involvement of supranational actors in the implementation of EU laws. Moreover, the degree of supranational integration of a policy affects the likelihood of choosing supranational implementers. On the one hand, the Commission enjoys higher discretion vis-à-vis national actors when qualified majority voting applies, and when higher levels of conflict in the Council of Ministers is present. On the other, conflict between the European Parliament and the Council under codecision seems associated with lower supranational discretion, although the result needs further corroboration.

Various Forms of Differentiation and Majority Voting as an Alternative

2021 ◽  
pp. 12-42
Author(s):  
Caroline Heber
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The People ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Law Making

This chapter sets out the different forms of differentiation and asks whether qualified majority voting in the field of taxation would be a practical and suitable alternative to differentiated law-making. The first sections show that enhanced cooperation is not the only flexibility mechanism within the European Union. Member States can also establish differentiation through primary EU law, secondary EU law, or by using partial international agreements. Partial international agreements may be a real alternative to enhanced cooperation law-making as they grant Member States the possibility to introduce rules which are only binding between some Member States. However, these sections reveal the clear differences between enhanced cooperation laws and partial international agreements which allow a protection of enhanced cooperation laws within the EU’s legal framework. Based on constitutional legal theory, in particular consociational democracy, the second part of this chapter argues that qualified majority voting should not be pursued in the field of taxation because it may lead to a European Union plagued by internal frustration and conflicts. The people of Europe are too heterogeneous, and unlike many other subject areas, taxation is a vehicle to pursue sensitive national policy objectives. Taxation is not only a revenue raiser, it is also a nuanced tool to steer taxpayers’ behaviour, achieve justice and equal opportunities through redistribution, and address economic needs.

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