scholarly journals “Effectivity” in International Law: Self-Empowerment against Epistemological Claustrophobia

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 103-105
Author(s):  
Jean d’Aspremont

When we think of “effectivity,” we usually come to think of a pragmatic and factual construction. The idea of effectivity, however, is anything but concrete and raises a variety of questions of legal theory, legal philosophy, epistemology, and theory of knowledge. It should also be highlighted that from a linguistic standpoint the word effectivity does not exist in British English. The attachment of the International Court of Justice to her Majesty’s English explains that the World Court uses the French word (effectivité) when it seeks to refer to effectivity. These linguistic debates, however, matter less than the semantics and especially less than the consensus that effectivity ought to be opposed to “effectiveness.”

Author(s):  
Prabhakar Singh

Professor RP Anand analysed the birth of new states and their theoretical and functional inclusion in the post-UN world. The 1947 Indian independence afforded Indian lawyers a choice between Nehruvian internationalism and Judge Pal’s Tokyo dissent. Essentially, Anand preferred state interest over cultural differences as the currency of international law while celebrating the UN Charter, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Convention of the Law of Sea as the achievements of the mankind. Anand saw the rejection of international law as synonymous with power politics. While optimistic, his universalism engendered a Western anti-thesis that an Asian approach to international law, if any, was otiose. Subsequently, post-colonial scholars responded with a synthesis that brought colonialism from periphery to the centre of international legal theory.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
SANTIAGO VILLALPANDO

In the process of selection of articles for the International Court of Justice section at the Editorial Board of the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL), we tend to be seduced by those manuscripts which are effective in making use of the jurisprudence of the Court as an instrument to engage in an in-depth examination of substantive legal issues of a general nature. This reflects our conviction – hardly an original one, since it appears to be shared by our entire legal community – that the Court has a fundamental role to play in the advancement of international law as a legal system. It also echoes an idea that is present in the mission statement of our journal, which is conceived as ‘a forum for two vital areas, namely international legal theory and international dispute settlement’, thus establishing an intrinsic link between them. But how is the Court's contribution to the development of international law to be assessed? And what do we expect from a scholarly piece examining its case law in this respect?


Author(s):  
Ole Spiermann

This chapter takes a look at Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. This article intends to define so-called sources or origins of international law to be used by the World Court. The text dates back to 1920, before the predecessor of the ICJ, i.e. the PCIJ, took up its activities. The chapter notes that since 1920, Article 38 has featured prominently in the theory on so-called sources of international law, while the provision has been of little relevance in the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its predecessor. Based mainly on historical records, the chapter seeks an explanation, which in turn may shed new light on sources theory.


1996 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 491-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Kwiatkowska

Abstract"On the whole, the World Court has a distinguished record of achievement-even if that record is not as extensive or exemplary as one might wish. It is one of the principal tasks of the student and practitioner of international law, and, for that matter, of people the world over who are concerned with promoting a more peaceful and less lawless world, to give their critical but constructive support to the strengthening of the institutions of international adjudication, and especially the only universal such institution, the International Court of Justice." S.M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law-Selected Writings of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (1994)


Author(s):  
L. C. Green

Traditionally, international law has come to be regarded as consensual in nature, depending for its authority upon the recognition and acceptance of those entities which it seeks to bind. This view was accepted by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the S.S. Lotus: “The rules of law binding upon States emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.” Article 38 of the Statute of the World Court, when listing the “sources” of international law, also acknowledges its consensual basis. In its substantive portion the article refers to conventions “establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States.” It then refers to custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” which has been explained by the International Court of Justice in the Asylum Case: “The Party which relies on a custom … must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. [It] must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the [one] State … and a duty incumbent on the [other] State.”


2003 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon de Smet

AbstractThis article investigates the law of Head of State immunity in the United States in light of the recent decision by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case (DRC v. Belgium). It does so by analyzing the U.S. law and comparing it with the customary international law on Head of State immunity as laid out by the world court. The article demonstrates that there are two competing strands in the recent jurisprudence of U.S. courts, neither of which is in conformity with international law. The reasons for this discrepancy are examined and explained in light of the underlying debate about the role of customary international law in the U.S. constitutional system. In conclusion, the author suggests that the best solution to the current dilemma is for the U.S. courts to apply the rules on Head of State immunity as explained by the world court and avoid as much as possible interference by the executive.


Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Diamond ◽  
Kabir A. N. Duggal

Abstract Individuals have long occupied a precarious position within international law. Historically, conceived as the relation between states, international law rarely saw a need to consider individual claims; it was, instead, the role of states to bring claims on behalf of their nationals. As international law has become increasingly fragmented, however, globalization has thrust the individual onto the international legal plane. Within this landscape, we briefly consider individuals’ claims across three separate international regimes: (i) the International Court of Justice, (ii) investment treaties, and (iii) the World Trade Organization. We find that barriers for individuals’ recognition as rights holders persist across each. First, jurisdictional barriers remain fundamentally problematic for recognizing individuals’ claims. Second, the longstanding focus on treaty interpretation techniques has yielded little, if any, demonstrable impact on recognizing individuals’ rights. Third, mere reliance on reflecting human rights values, rather than specific and concrete structural reforms, has proven incompatible with realizing individuals’ rights within these three systems. Individuals qua rights holders have, rather acutely, recently experienced deeply troubling human rights violations on several fronts. Fundamentally, international law must protect human rights. This moment invites us to consider the systems on the international legal plane for individuals to seek such remedy and what barriers must be addressed to further such efforts.


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