On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism

Synthese ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 142 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Morganti
Author(s):  
Bruno Borge

According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.


2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-337
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday ◽  

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.


2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (135) ◽  
pp. 759-780
Author(s):  
Patricia Kauark-Leite ◽  
◽  
Ronaldo Penna Neves ◽  

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism (ESR) is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism (TS), an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Diana Stanciu

I will argue that, in an interdisciplinary study of consciousness, epistemic structural realism (ESR) can offer a feasible philosophical background for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena in neuroscience and cognitive science while also taking into account the mathematical structures involved in this type of research. Applying the ESR principles also to the study of the neurophysiological phenomena associated with free will (or rather conscious free choice) and with various alterations of consciousness (AOCs) generated by various pathologies such as epilepsy would add explanatory value to the matter. This interdisciplinary approach would be in tune with Quine’s well known idea that philosophy is not simple conceptual analysis but is continuous with science and actually represents an abstract branch of the empirical research. The ESR could thus resonate with scientific models of consciousness such as the global neuronal workspace model (inspired by the global workspace theory—GWT) and the integrated information theory (IIT) model. While structural realism has already been employed in physics or biology, its application as a meta-theory contextualising and relating various scientific findings on consciousness is new indeed. Out of the two variants: ontic structural realism (OSR) and epistemic structural realism (ESR), the latter can be considered more suitable for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena because it removes the pressure of the still unanswered ‘What is consciousness?’ ontological question and allows us to concentrate instead on the ‘What can we know about consciousness?’ epistemological question.


Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Oldofredi

AbstractThe present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.


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