Epistemic Structural Realism and Poincaré’s Philosophy of Science

AbstractIn Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.

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Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature

THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science ◽

10.1387/theoria.18969 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 33 (3) ◽

pp. 447

Author(s):

Bruno Borge

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Laws Of Nature ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Scientific Theories ◽

Epistemic Structural Realism ◽

The One

According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.

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Thomist vs. Scotist Perspectives on Ontic Structural Realism

International Philosophical Quarterly ◽

10.5840/ipq2020716154 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 60 (3) ◽

pp. 323-337

Author(s):

Travis Dumsday ◽

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Science Literature ◽

Ontic Structural Realism ◽

Metaphysics Of Science ◽

Important Player ◽

Epistemic Structural Realism

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.

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On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism

Synthese ◽

10.1023/b:synt.0000047712.39407.c3 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 142 (1) ◽

pp. 81-107 ◽

Cited By ~ 27

Author(s):

Matteo Morganti

Keyword(s):

Structural Realism ◽

Epistemic Structural Realism

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FROM SCIENTIFIC STRUCTURALISM TO TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURALISM

Kriterion Revista de Filosofia ◽

10.1590/0100-512x2016n13509pkl ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 57 (135) ◽

pp. 759-780

Author(s):

Patricia Kauark-Leite ◽

◽

Ronaldo Penna Neves ◽

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Transcendental Idealism ◽

The Other ◽

Current Debate ◽

Starting Point ◽

Realist Position ◽

Epistemic Structural Realism

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism (ESR) is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism (TS), an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.

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An ESR Framework for the Study of Consciousness

Entropy ◽

10.3390/e23010097 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 23 (1) ◽

pp. 97

Author(s):

Diana Stanciu

Keyword(s):

Conceptual Analysis ◽

Interdisciplinary Approach ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Scientific Models ◽

Mathematical Structures ◽

Ontological Question ◽

Philosophical Background ◽

Epistemic Structural Realism ◽

Interdisciplinary Study ◽

Integrated Information Theory

I will argue that, in an interdisciplinary study of consciousness, epistemic structural realism (ESR) can offer a feasible philosophical background for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena in neuroscience and cognitive science while also taking into account the mathematical structures involved in this type of research. Applying the ESR principles also to the study of the neurophysiological phenomena associated with free will (or rather conscious free choice) and with various alterations of consciousness (AOCs) generated by various pathologies such as epilepsy would add explanatory value to the matter. This interdisciplinary approach would be in tune with Quine’s well known idea that philosophy is not simple conceptual analysis but is continuous with science and actually represents an abstract branch of the empirical research. The ESR could thus resonate with scientific models of consciousness such as the global neuronal workspace model (inspired by the global workspace theory—GWT) and the integrated information theory (IIT) model. While structural realism has already been employed in physics or biology, its application as a meta-theory contextualising and relating various scientific findings on consciousness is new indeed. Out of the two variants: ontic structural realism (OSR) and epistemic structural realism (ESR), the latter can be considered more suitable for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena because it removes the pressure of the still unanswered ‘What is consciousness?’ ontological question and allows us to concentrate instead on the ‘What can we know about consciousness?’ epistemological question.

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Bingkai Kurus Realisme Struktural Epistemik

DISKURSUS - JURNAL FILSAFAT DAN TEOLOGI STF DRIYARKARA ◽

10.36383/diskursus.v12i2.102 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 153-190

Author(s):

Karlina Supelli

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Good Reason ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Mathematical Structure ◽

Physical World ◽

Scientific Theories ◽

Fundamental Properties ◽

Unobservable Entity ◽

Epistemic Access ◽

History Of

Abstrak: Di tengah-tengah perdebatan panjang antara realisme dan anti realisme dalam filsafat ilmu, realisme struktural (RS) diajukan sebagai gagasan yang terbaik dari keduanya. Versi epistemik RS (RSE) berpendapat bahwa kita memiliki alasan yang baik untuk percaya bahwa teori memiliki struktur yang tepat, yaitu bahwa wujud dan struktur yang dipostulatkan oleh teori betul-betul ada. Namun demikian, RSE tidak mengajukan dakuan epistemik menyangkut hakikat wujud yang melandasi struktur. Semua pengetahuan mengenai dunia fisis adalah pengetahuan tentang struktur. Dalam tulisan ini penulis memberi tinjauan tentang RSE dan beberapa argumen yang menolak RSE. Belajar dari sejarah fisika zarah, penulis akan memperlihatkan bahwa struktur menunjuk ke sifat-sifat mendasar yang dimiliki oleh komponen-komponennya dan dengan demikian menyediakan jalur epistemik bagi wujud yang relasi-relasinya mendefinisikan struktur. Meski demikian, struktur matematis sebuah teori hanya memungkinkan kita membangun pengetahuan tentang wujud-wujud yang tidak teramati sebagai “objek” dan bukan objek-objek partikular. Kata-kata Kunci: Realisme, anti-realisme, realisme struktural epistemik, argumen tanpa keajaiban, meta-induksi pesimistik, wujud takteramati. Abstract: In the lengthy debate between antirealism and realism in the philosophy of science, structural realism (SR) has been suggested as “the best of both worlds.” The epistemic version of SR (ESR) holds that we have good reason to believe that our most successful scientific theories are structurally correct—that the entities and structures postulated by a theory actually exist, and yet it makes no epistemic claim about the nature of the underlying entities. All that we can know is the structure of the physical world. In this article I present an overview of ESR and a number of arguments that have been brought up against it. Drawing lessons from the history of contemporary physics, I will show that “structure” points to the fundamental properties of its constituents and thus provides an epistemic access to the nature of those entities whose relations define structure in the first place. Nevertheless, the mathematical structure of a theory enables us only to construe knowledge of an unobservable entity as “object,” and not this or that particular object. Keywords: Realism, anti-realism, epistemic structural realism, no miracle argument, pesimistic meta-induction, unobservable entity.

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