scholarly journals FROM SCIENTIFIC STRUCTURALISM TO TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURALISM

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (135) ◽  
pp. 759-780
Author(s):  
Patricia Kauark-Leite ◽  
◽  
Ronaldo Penna Neves ◽  

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism (ESR) is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism (TS), an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nikita V. Golovko

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E. J. Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E. J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an opportunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.


Author(s):  
Bruno Borge

According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.


2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-337
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday ◽  

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.


2006 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Sándor Richter

The order and modalities of cross-member state redistribution as well as the net financial position of the member states are one of the most widely discussed aspects of European integration. The paper addresses selected issues in the current debate on the EU budget for the period 2007 to 2013 and introduces four scenarios. The first is identical to the European Commission's proposal; the second is based on reducing the budget to 1% of the EU's GNI, as proposed by the six net-payer countries, while maintaining the expenditure structure of the Commission's proposal. The next two scenarios represent radical reforms: one of them also features a '1% EU GNI'; however, the expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' are left unchanged and it is envisaged that the requisite cuts will be made in the expenditures earmarked for cohesion. The other reform scenario is different from the former one in that the cohesion-related expenditures are left unchanged and the expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' are reduced. After the comparison of the various scenarios, the allocation of transfers to the new member states in terms of the conditions prevailing in the different scenarios is analysed.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Galko ◽  

The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 117-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. W. Evans

ABSTRACTIn the vibrant current debate about European empires and their ideologies, one basic dichotomy still tends to be overlooked: that between, on the one hand, the plurality of modern empires of colonisation, commerce and settlement; and, on the other, the traditional claim to single and undividedimperiumso long embodied in the Roman Empire and its successor, the Holy Roman Empire, or (First) Reich. This paper examines the tensions between the two, as manifested in the theory and practice of Habsburg imperial rule. The Habsburgs, emperors of the Reich almost continuously through its last centuries, sought to build their own power-base within and beyond it. The first half of the paper examines how by the eighteenth century their ‘Monarchy’, subsisting alongside the Reich, dealt with the associated legacy of empire. After the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 the Habsburgs could pursue a free-standing Austrian ‘imperialism’, but it rested on an uneasy combination of old and new elements and was correspondingly vulnerable to challenge from abroad and censure at home. The second half of the article charts this aspect of Habsburg government through an age of international imperialism and its contribution to the collapse of the Dual Monarchy in 1918.


2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 784-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMIE KREPPEL

This article examines the influence of the European Parliament (EP) within the legislative process of the European Union. Although debate over the impact of the cooperation and co-decision I procedures continues, this article argues that, in part, the current theoretical debate is a false one that has caused many of the other important variables that affect EP legislative influence to be ignored. This article briefly revisits the current debate, then proceeds to an analysis of the success of more than 1,000 EP amendments under the cooperation and co-decision procedures. This evidence suggests that numerous other variables, such as internal EP unity and type of amendment made, have a significant impact on EP success, even controlling for procedure. In addition, this comparison points out some empirical differences between the two procedures that have been largely ignored in the theoretical debate but that nonetheless have a significant impact of EP success and merit further study.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roseane Santos Mesquita ◽  
Késia Dos Anjos Rocha

The present text bets on the power of reflections on a pedagogy guided by cosmoperception. It is a collective call for the enchanted ways of perceiving and relating to the other. “Ọrọ, nwa, ẹkọ”, the talk, the look, the education, insurgent forces that grow in the cracks, just like moss, alive, reborn. That is the way we think about education, as a living practice, turned to freedom. Freedom understood as a force that enables us to question certain hegemonic truths entrenched in our ways of being, thinking and producing knowledge. In dialogue with the criticisms on the decolonial thought and by authors and authoresses who are putting themselves into thinking about an epistemology from a diasporic place, from the edges of the world, we will try to problematize the effects of the epistemic erasures promoted by the colonial processes and how that has affected our educative practices. The look at the educational experience that happens in the sacred territory of candomblé, will be our starting point to think about politically and poetically transformative educational practices.


2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-68
Author(s):  
Gordana Djeric

This text is part of a research conducted under the working title "What do we talk about when we are silent and what are we silent about when we are talking? - premises for the anthropology of silence about the nearest past." In the first part the author investigates the meaning of silence in the Croatian and Serbian press right before and during Croatia's Operation Storm. The ratio between silence, suppression of information and forgetting, on the one hand, and social memory, on the other, has been elaborated in the final part of the text by following reports about the anniversaries of Operation Storm in both Croatian and Serbian publics. The starting point lies in the belief that the phenomenon of silence (and suppression of information), being an immanent part of each discourse, represents an important factor in the creation of social relationships and system of value models, that it has important communication and cognitive functions and that the performance character lies in its essence. In short, silence makes it possible to form the prevailing image about this event, even if it does not construct it indirectly - through speech. The author has elaborated on the meaning of silence in the context of Operation Storm partly because studies about the breakup of Yugoslavia frequently mention silence as a manipulation strategy employed by some of the sides in the conflict (or analysts dealing with Yugoslav topics), while not a single study systematically investigates the semantic of silence and suppression of information in these conflicts. Most importantly, taking into account the frequency of direct silence in the newspaper discourse and rhetoric strategies that point at silence indirectly from the context and discourse, the author focuses on the relationship between the event (situation) and silence. In order to shed light on the way in which Operation Storm is remembered, i.e. forgotten, in the stakeholders' publics and political imageries, she follows the dailies - Vecernje Novosti Politika, Danas (Belgrade) - Vecernji List, Jutarnji List, Magazin supplement of the Jutarnji List (Zagreb), as well as texts about Operation Storm in weeklies such as the NIN and Vreme of Belgrade or Globus of Zagreb in the period between August 2, 1995 and mid-August 2006.


Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.


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