The law and human nature.

1940 ◽  
pp. 894-925
Author(s):  
E. L. Thorndike
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-132
Author(s):  
Sonja Schillings

Pollution, this article suggests, challenges the fundamental structural premises of contemporary state institutions such as the law. These institutions are based on the premise of human exceptionalism via the construction of a human-nature divide. This divide only allows one point of connection between human and nature: the human ability to absorb nature as property. Such metaphorical understandings of absorption become a problem as soon as the physical human body is faced with a situation in which we constantly absorb pollution (e.g. nitrogen oxides, microplastic, ionizing radiation, but also other life forms such as airborne viruses). As a result, contemporary institutions are ill-equipped to deal with pollution as a central element of the contemporary human condition. This article suggests that comics are a model for rethinking these categorical issues productively and sustainably. By using visual elements, comics have already been able to reframe and recontextualize categorical premises such as the human-nature divide that otherwise tend to be reproduced in critical theory and the law. To make this point for the potential of a new categorical language that centrally draws on visual elements in text, the article uses two central examples from Japan and Germany: Osamu Tezuka's story "Space Snow Leopard" from the Astro Boy series, and Chlodwig Poth's short comic "Jörg the Limelight Hog."


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Gibtiah Gibtiah ◽  
Yusida Fitriati

<p>Abstract: Social life is one of human nature that has innate.<br />One characteristic of social life is the constant change in the<br />community. There is no society ever stop at a certain point of all<br />time, but constantly changing and moving forward. Changes<br />that occur sooner or later be able to change the joints staple of<br />people's lives. This paper explores social change and renewal of<br />Islamic law by using the method of determination of the law<br />“sadd al dzari’ah”.</p><p><br />ملخص: الحیاة الاجتماعیة ھي واحدة من طبیعة الإنسان الذي لدیھ الفطریة . واحدة<br />من سمات الحیاة الاجتماعیة ھي التغییر المستمر في المجتمع. لا یوجد أي مجتمع<br />تتوقف أبدا عند نقطة معینة في كل العصور، ولكن تتغیر باستمرار، و تتحرك إلى الأمام<br />. التغیرات التي تحدث عاجلا أو آجلا تكون قادرة على تغییر الأساسیة مفاصل حیاة<br />الناس. وتبحث ھذه الورقة التغییر الاجتماعي والتجدید في الشریعة الإسلامیة باستخدام<br />طریقة تحدید القانون.</p><p>Kata kunci : metode penggalian hukum, sadd al-dzari’ah</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 123-151
Author(s):  
Janusz Lemański

Deut 22:5 marks the single instance of a prohibition of transvestitism in the Bible, and in its whole cultural milieu. The context in which it is situated suggests that it may have been inserted there as an addition, after the Babylonian captivity. That helps to narrow down the range of speculations as to the original Sitz im Leben of the law, and enables us to read it most of all within the canonical framework of the entirety of the Pentateuch. Hence, the precept pertains mainly to the principle of division of the human nature into the two sexes (Gen 1–2), the principle of retaining the order of creation (by not mixing kinds; Lev 19:19; Deut 22:9–11), and of keeping the procreational power, referred to here predominantly to masculinity (Gen 5:1–3; cf. Gen 1:28; 9:1.7).


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Nikolaievitch Tarassov

Based on the fundamental concepts of the "mystery of man" and Christian realism, the "law of the Ego" and the "law of love" for Dostoevsky's creative consciousness, the article examines the one-sidedness of biologizing and socializing concepts of human nature since the Enlightenment and their connection with entropic processes in the spiritual and moral world of people and declining trends in the course of history. It is shown how the spiritual laws of life, which are leaving the field of view of rationalistic and pragmatic consciousness, transform social-progressive design and planning, and introduce nihilistic elements into them. It is emphasized that the methodology of Christian realism is universal, that it connects the "mystery of man" with the mystery of history, and becomes one of the main principles for assessing the hierarchy of values in various ideological and social systems.


This volume makes a contribution to the field of neurolaw by investigating issues raised by the development, use, and regulation of neurointerventions. The broad range of topics covered in these chapters reflects neurolaw’s growing social import, and its rapid expansion as an academic field of inquiry. Some authors investigate the criminal justice system’s use of neurointerventions to make accused defendants fit for trial, to help reform convicted offenders, or to make condemned inmates sane enough for execution, while others interrogate the use, regulation, and social impact of cognitive enhancement medications and devices. Issues raised by neurointervention-based gay conversion “therapy”, the efficacy and safety of specific neurointervention methods, the legitimacy of their use and regulation, and their implications for authenticity, identity, and responsibility are among the other topics investigated. The focus on neurointerventions also highlights tacit assumptions about human nature that have important implications for jurisprudence. For all we know, at present such things as people’s capacity to feel pain, their sexuality, and the dictates of their conscience, are unalterable. But neurointerventions could hypothetically turn such constants into variables. The increasing malleability of human nature means that analytic jurisprudential claims (true in virtue of meanings of jurisprudential concepts) must be distinguished from synthetic jurisprudential claims (contingent on what humans are actually like). Looking at the law through the lens of neurointerventions thus also highlights the growing need for a new distinction—between analytic jurisprudence and synthetic jurisprudence—to tackle issues that increasingly malleable humans will face when they encounter novel opportunities and challenges.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toma Strle ◽  
Olga Markič ◽  

In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into the law, and the growing acceptance of and trust in neuroscience’s mechanistic and reductionistic explanations of the human mind. We then present and discuss some studies that show how nudging peoples’ beliefs about matters related to human agency (such as free will, decision-making, or self-control) towards a more deterministic, mechanistic and/or reductionistic conception, exerts an influence on their very actions, mentality, and brain processes. We suggest that the neuroscientific view of the human mind exerts an influence on the very cognitive phenomena neuroscience falsely believes to be studying objectively. This holds especially when we consider the systematic integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law. For, such an integration acts as a reinforcement of the public’s and legal decision-makers’ endorsement of and trust in neuroscience’s view of human nature that further changes how people think and act. Such looping effects of neurolaw are probably inevitable. Accordingly, we should be aware of the scope of neuroscientific explanations and be careful not to overstate neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-164
Author(s):  
Loredana VLAD ◽  

People are considered bio-psycho-social beings. From the beginning of mankind, violence as part of human nature has manifested itself in relation to the other through the crime committed by Cain against his brother Abel. As time passed, it was found that a form of protection is needed to prolong the life of the individual, and thus by accepting the "social contract", man gave up his natural state in which freedom was absolute, in order to obey the law. In this paper I will bring to the fore a series of considerations with a focus on violence, emphasizing the idea of the vice of consent.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This chapter comments on Christine Korsgaard's views on reason, humanity, and moral law in the context of her ethics. In particular, it examines Korsgaard's response to the question inspired by Thomas Hobbes' second argument, the one about the sovereign: how can the subject be responsible to a law that it makes and can therefore unmake? Korsgaard's ethics descends from Immanuel Kant, but it contrasts in important ways with Kant's ethics. Korsgaard's subject is unequivocally the author of the law that binds it, for its law is the law of its practical identity, and the subject itself “constructs” that identity. In the case of the Kantian subject, we can say that it both is and is not the author of the law that binds it. The chapter considers Korsgaard's claim that morality is grounded in human nature, along with her position on the problem of normativity and on obligation.


Philosophy ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 43 (163) ◽  
pp. 38-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. R. Lough

A law, say, prohibits homosexual conduct or punishes the prostitute for plying her trade. According to some it is a bad law, according to others a necessary one. Those who argue that it is a bad law do so on a variety of grounds—that it is sheer folly to try to change human nature by law, that such legislation can only be effective at the price of the right to privacy, that the punishment of acts arising from compelling desires is cruel and excessive, that the law has no business meddling in what people do to others with their consent. Those who argue that it is a necessary law do so on one ground, that the act in question is immoral, and that what is wrong must be punished, lest the law itself fall into disrepute by failing to carry out a consistent campaign against wrong-doing.


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