scholarly journals Pricing strategy of closed loop supply chain considering different CSR investment modes

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09005
Author(s):  
Yingluo Yan ◽  
Fengmin Yao

More and more companies are beginning to realize that incorporating corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainable development into supply chain strategies and operations can bring them more competitive advantages. In the case that the manufacturer or retailer performs CSR through profit donation, the pricing decision-making problem of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with dominant retailer under different CSR investment modes is studied. The decision-making models of CLSC under the manufacturer’s and retailer’s CSR investment mode are constructed respectively. The conditions for enterprises to fulfil CSR through profit donation and the influence of different CSR investment modes on the pricing of new products and recycling of waste products are discussed. The research shows that no matter what kind of CSR investment mode, only when the consumers are more sensitive to the CSR investment of enterprises, the manufacturer and retailer will fulfil the CSR through profit donation. The CSR investment mode of the manufacturer is more beneficial to consumers, environment, CLSC members and whole system. No matter whether the dominant retailer carries out CSR investment or not, she always obtains more channel profits than the manufacturer.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 2045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liping Song ◽  
Yingluo Yan ◽  
Fengmin Yao

In addition to pursuing profits, more and more international enterprises are beginning to pay attention to environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). How to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more CSR and maintain the sustainable development of society has become an urgent task for managers and researchers. Under this background, this paper considers the recycling of used products for environmental sustainability and takes into account profit donation as a CSR investment. Aiming at the decision-making of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a dominant retailer when considering government subsidies and CSR investment, and based on the Stackelberg Game analysis technology, we formulate three distinct donation (CSR investment) models; the centralized system’s donation model, the manufacturer’s donation model, and the retailer’s donation model, and by doing system comparisons and numerical examples to analyze the impact of government subsidy and CSR investment on new product pricing and waste product recovery from the perspectives of government, environment and CLSC system. The results show that government subsidy is not only conducive to expanding market demand and increasing waste recycling rates, but also to improving CSR investment levels. Under the two decentralized decision-making models, regardless of whether the dominant retailer makes CSR investment, she can always get more channel profits than the manufacturer. From the view of environmental, economic, and social perspectives, the manufacturer makes CSR investment a better choice, and at this time the government has the best effect of implementing subsidy. Finally, based on the principle of cost sharing, a CSR cost sharing contract which can realize the coordination of CLSC is designed to solve the channel conflict and optimize the decision-making. Counterintuitively, the dominant retailer can gain more profits when it bears more cost in the CSR cost sharing contract.


2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02086
Author(s):  
Yi Liu ◽  
Yanting Huang

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer based on different corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors. In addition, the advertising investment and government’s reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) are also taken in account. To explore the impact of CSR behaviors on supply chain, we developed three models: (1) Only the manufacturer undertakes CSR (model M); (2) only the retailer undertakes CSR (model R); (3) the manufacturer and the retailer share CSR (model MR). By analyzing the results, we found that: (1) The advertising investment level and waste products return rate both increase with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR when there is only retailer undertakes CSR and when the manufacturer and retailer share CSR, and remain unchanged when there is only the manufacturer undertakes CSR; (2) the overall social welfare increases with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR no matter which member undertakes CSR, and reaches the highest when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR; (3) it is the most conductive for the performance of the closedloop supply chain when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Leqi Hua ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Yan Wu

AbstractThis paper studies the closed-loop supply chain decision problem in which the original manufacturer allows the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture under patent protection. In the two cycle mode, the authors discuss the pricing decision problem of the original manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party remanufacturer in centralized and decentralized decision-making cases. The authors obtain the optimal sale price and wholesale price of new products and remanufactured products in two cases, and the optimal recycling rate of used products in centralized decision-making case. Finally, the authors carry out the corresponding numerical simulation of the pricing decision.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenxue Ran ◽  
Fan Chen ◽  
Qianni Wu ◽  
Sen Liu

The recycling of waste products can sharply save manufacturing cost and improve the economic efficiency and corporate-reputation. It also has a great effect on the environment and resources protection. In the management of the closed-loop supply chain, the recycling of waste products and decision-making on pricing often directly affect the supply and demand of products and the operation efficiency of supply chain. Therefore, first we take waste glass bottles as an example and establish a mathematical model to solve the profit of manufacturers and retailers solely. Then, we analyzed whole supply chain profit under a dual-channel recycling condition which is directly recycled by consumers or by retailers. Finally, we concluded that no matter what product’s price, quality, profit, or operational efficiency of supply chain is, the overall recycling is better than the single node recycling model. Based on the analysis, we developed a new model to coordinate the profit of manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract. A numerical study shows that this approach is applicable and effective.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8398
Author(s):  
Juan Pedro Sepúlveda-Rojas ◽  
Rodrigo Ternero

Purpose: This article analyzes the value of information and coordination in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) and discusses the benefits of a global or local optimization approach and the impact of uncertainty. Methodology: A theoretical dyadic closed loop supply chain is analyzed where the manufacturer re-manufactures products returned by customers, producing “as good as new products” for the retailer. Twelve coordination scenarios were analyzed. For the definition of these scenarios, a framework based on two criteria was proposed: value of information and perimeter of decision making. Findings: Information on returns leads to lower costs than information on demand. In the presence of complete or partial coordination between the actors in the supply chain, it is preferable to have low product return rates. However, if we are in the complete absence of coordination, high rates of return are more convenient as they function as a buffer against uncertainties. The perimeter of decision making (global or local optimization) does not significantly improve the supply chain performance in relation to its costs. Only the exchange of information improves its performance. Therefore, companies should make efforts to exchange information, first, on their lot sizes, then on their returns and finally, on the customer demand. Originality: The novelty of our work relies on an analysis of the closed loop supply chain performance with the simultaneous presence of information, coordination, and uncertainty.


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