A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): the Multi-stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

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The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽

10.3390/math9121443 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 9 (12) ◽

pp. 1443

Author(s):

Zhiyuan Dong ◽

Ai-Guo Wu

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Quantum Game ◽

Final State ◽

The Game Theory ◽

Initial States ◽

Quantum Strategy ◽

Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

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Multi-Robot Searching using Game-Theory Based Approach

International Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems ◽

10.5772/6232 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 5 (4) ◽

pp. 44 ◽

Cited By ~ 17

Author(s):

Yan Meng

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Dynamic Programming ◽

Utility Function ◽

Real Time ◽

Dynamic Environment ◽

Equilibrium Solutions ◽

Strategy Equilibrium ◽

The Game Theory ◽

Target Searching ◽

Multi Robot

This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.

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Comparative Models of Capitalism in the Areas of Financial System and Corporate Governance – the Diversity of Capitalism Approach Perspective

International Journal of Management and Economics ◽

10.1515/ijme-2016-0027 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 52 (1) ◽

pp. 59-76

Author(s):

Paweł Pisany

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Corporate Governance ◽

Financial Systems ◽

Financial Reforms ◽

Institutional Complementarity ◽

Capital Markets Union ◽

Theory Application ◽

The Eu ◽

Regulatory Challenges

Abstract This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable’s core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author’s own “institutional game.” Finally, we assess Amable’s achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable’s methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker’s horizons and promote consistent solutions.

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Deterring the development and use of nuclear weapons: a multi-level modeling approach

The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation Applications Methodology Technology ◽

10.1177/1548512917706768 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 15 (4) ◽

pp. 483-493

Author(s):

Kathleen M Carley ◽

Geoffrey P Morgan ◽

Michael J Lanham

Keyword(s):

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Dynamic Network ◽

Pacific Rim ◽

Country Level ◽

Dynamic Network Model ◽

The Pacific ◽

Stakeholder Model ◽

Using Data ◽

Multi Stakeholder ◽

The Impact

We describe a multi-country, multi-stakeholder model for the accrual and use of nuclear weapons and illustrate the model’s value for addressing nuclear weapon proliferation issues using a historic Pacific Rim scenario. We instantiate the agent-based dynamic network model for information and belief diffusion using data from subject matter experts and data mined from open source news documents. We present the techniques that supported model instantiation. A key feature of this model and these techniques is enabling rapid model re-use through the ability to instantiate at two levels: generically and for specific cases. We demonstrate these generic and specific cases using a scenario regarding North Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons and the resulting impact on the Pacific Rim circa 2014, that is, prior to the fourth and fifth nuclear weapons tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A key feature of this model is that it uses two levels of network interaction, the country level and the stakeholder level, thus supporting the inclusion of non-state actors and the assessment of complex scenarios. Using this model, we conducted virtual experiments in which we assessed the impact of alternative courses of action on the overall force posture and desire to develop and use nuclear weapons.

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Corporate governance in Poland

Corporate Ownership and Control ◽

10.22495/cocv7i2c3p5 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 387-394 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Tom Mortimer

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Future Development ◽

Traditional Approach ◽

Hybrid Approach ◽

The State ◽

The Future ◽

Stakeholder Model ◽

State Models

This article considers the traditional approach to the ’state’ Models of corporate governance, namely shareholder Model and stakeholder Model. It then considers the extent to which developments in a recent accession EU country, Poland, reflects either of these Models or adopts a hybrid approach. It then offers proposals for the future development of corporate governance within Poland.

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