Research on Trust Relation in Logistics Enterprises Strategic Alliance Based on Evolutionary Game

ICLEM 2010 ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hengquan Zhang ◽  
Zhe Kai ◽  
Jiyao Xu
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Trust Relation ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of Chinese cross border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology in supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Technical Ability ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.

scholarly journals System dynamics mechanism of cross-regional collaborative dispatch of emergency supplies based on multi-agent game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Qiu ◽  
Meng Shi ◽  
Xinna Zhao ◽  
Yongping Jing
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Specific Area ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Emergency Rescue ◽  
Emergency Logistics ◽  
Complexity Problem ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
The Face ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Multiple Variables

AbstractThe cross-regional coordinated dispatch of emergency supplies is a complex issue involving multiple topics, which covers multiple relationships and is affected by multiple variables. In the face of severe emergencies, relief supplies inside a specific area are far from meeting the explosive demand for emergency supplies. Besides, the supply of emergency materials and the disaster areas often have a spatial mismatch. Considering the attributes of externalities and public goods of emergency rescue, there are many obstacles for Local administration of emergency (LAE) and emergency logistics enterprises (ELE) spontaneously carrying out emergency supplies across regions. To solve this complexity problem, this research abstracts higher-level administration of emergency (HAE), LAE and ELE as the main stakeholders, with which a tripartite evolutionary game (ETG) model and a system dynamic (SD) model are constructed to analyze the dynamic mechanism of the complex system and to carry out the numerical simulation of the three-party game process. All the analyses and tests in this study have proved that the strong supervision of HAE has a decisive impact on the realization of cross-regional coordinated dispatch of emergency supplies, and the financial rewards and punishments imposed by HAE on other entities can accelerate or delay the achievement of the equilibrium strategy. However, when HAE chooses not to regulate, the cooperation willingness of LAE affects a lot that all the stakeholders will eventually reach equilibrium at (1,1,1) only if LAE chooses to actively carry out cross-regional coordinated dispatch of emergency supplies.

Low-Carbon Selection Decision for Logistics Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game under the Supervision of Government

2011 ◽  
Vol 219-220 ◽  
pp. 736-741
Author(s):  
Ye Zhou ◽  
Hui He ◽  
Yan Feng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Global Climate Warming ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Supervision Strategies ◽  
Emission Of Greenhouse Gases

The emission of greenhouse gases leading to global climate warming has caused widespread concern on the part of governments worldwide. As one of the main sources of carbon emissions, modern logistics occupies a unique position for energy saving. But as economic entities, logistics enterprises have no real incentive to implement low-carbon logistics operations, which needs government to stimulate logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategy through regulations. Constructed an Evolutionary Game Model for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon selection decision under the supervision of the government, analyzed the effcts of different regulative parameters on the implementation of low-carbon strategy in logistics business. The results show that government's regulation and strategies play a crucial role in carrying out the low-carbon strategy. Finally, according to different evolution conditions and conclusions, it proposes appropriate supervision strategies for government to promote logistics enterprises to put the low-carbon strategy into effect.

The Application of MATLAB Simulation Technology on Evolutionary Game Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1619-1621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Te Zhu ◽  
Cheng Hao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Engineering Analysis ◽  
Matlab Simulation ◽  
Simulation Technology ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Analysis And Design ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

System simulation software MATLAB is developed by the United States Mays Walker Corporation (Mathwork) for the study of engineering analysis and design process. On the basis of discussion on MATLAB simulation software, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model, and take the evolutionary game model between logistics enterprises and SMEs as an example , Showing the application of MATLAB simulation technology on evolutionary game.

scholarly journals Analysis on Evolutionary Stability Strategies of Carbon Emission of Logistics Enterprises Based on Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Wu ◽  
Peng Liu ◽  
Qi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
The Government

In view of the problem of high carbon emissions of logistics enterprises, the government’s carbon tax policy, consumers’ willingness to purchase low-carbon services, and the carbon emission reduction behavior of logistics enterprises, the evolutionary game model between the government, consumers, and logistics enterprises is established by using the theory and method of evolutionary game, and the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the three parties under different parameters are analyzed. The research results show the following. (1) When setting the carbon tax rate, the government can ignore the impact on consumers and give more consideration to the influencing factors of logistics enterprises, which is conducive to the formulation of carbon emission reduction policies for logistics enterprises. (2) When the government sets a lower carbon tax rate, it can not only promote the carbon emission reduction of logistics enterprises but also be conducive to government supervision. (3) The evolution direction of the government’s final decision will not change due to the size of Y and Z. The government’s final decision is to adopt a regulatory strategy. The study provides theoretical guidance for the government to formulate carbon tax policies, guides consumers to purchase low-carbon services, and promotes carbon emission reduction in logistics enterprises.

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