scholarly journals Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 936-941 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Bear ◽  
David G. Rand

Humans often cooperate with strangers, despite the costs involved. A long tradition of theoretical modeling has sought ultimate evolutionary explanations for this seemingly altruistic behavior. More recently, an entirely separate body of experimental work has begun to investigate cooperation’s proximate cognitive underpinnings using a dual-process framework: Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does self-interested deliberation restrain an intuitive desire to cooperate? Integrating these ultimate and proximate approaches, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game-theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play prisoner’s dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. They can either respond by using a generalized intuition, which is not sensitive to whether the game is one-shot or reciprocal, or pay a (stochastically varying) cost to deliberate and tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that, depending on the level of reciprocity and assortment, selection favors one of two strategies: intuitive defectors who never deliberate, or dual-process agents who intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in one-shot games. Critically, selection never favors agents who use deliberation to override selfish impulses: Deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation with strangers. Thus, by introducing a formal theoretical framework for exploring cooperation through a dual-process lens, we provide a clear answer regarding the role of deliberation in cooperation based on evolutionary modeling, help to organize a growing body of sometimes-conflicting empirical results, and shed light on the nature of human cognition and social decision making.

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. e1600992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Soutschek ◽  
Christian C. Ruff ◽  
Tina Strombach ◽  
Tobias Kalenscher ◽  
Philippe N. Tobler

Neurobiological models of self-control predominantly focus on the role of prefrontal brain mechanisms involved in emotion regulation and impulse control. We provide evidence for an entirely different neural mechanism that promotes self-control by overcoming bias for the present self, a mechanism previously thought to be mainly important for interpersonal decision-making. In two separate studies, we show that disruptive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the temporo-parietal junction—a brain region involved in overcoming one’s self-centered perspective—increases the discounting of delayed and prosocial rewards. This effect of TMS on temporal and social discounting is accompanied by deficits in perspective-taking and does not reflect altered spatial reorienting and number recognition. Our findings substantiate a fundamental commonality between the domains of self-control and social decision-making and highlight a novel aspect of the neurocognitive processes involved in self-control.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-611
Author(s):  
Scott Wolford ◽  
Moonhawk Kim

What is the role of trade policy in military alliances? We analyze and test a game-theoretic model of economic and security cooperation in which allies hold different interests across the security and commercial aspects of the relationship. In equilibrium, allies with little market power who are valuable politically to larger states engage in sociallysuboptimal protectionism, as their allies’ threats of retaliation are incredible. Stable cooperation emerges in the form of unretaliated protection rather than mutually low trade barriers. We test the model’s implications against a dyadic data set of antidumping petitions from 1980 to 2013 and find that larger allies are more likely to tolerate protectionism by smaller allies by denying domestic petitions to retaliate against dumping measures by the latter.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Trong Nghia ◽  
Svein Ottar Olsen ◽  
Nguyen Thi Mai Trang

PurposeAdopting the duality approach, this study aims to examine cognitive and affective associations between shopping values, impulse buying tendencies and consumer shopping well-being. In addition, the study also aims to test the moderating role of self-control and compare the proposed relationships across the offline and online shopping contexts.Design/methodology/approachA survey dataset was collected from a sample of 529 offline and online consumers in Vietnam. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was employed to test the proposed relationships among the studied constructs.FindingsThe consequence of impulse buying is positive and affect-based. In addition, the positive associations between shopping values and impulse buying via dual process are validated and moderated by self-control. In addition, the association between cognitive impulse buying and shopping well-being is stronger in the online shopping context, whereas hedonic value has more influence on affective impulse buying in the offline shopping context. All other relationships are not statistically different across the two shopping contexts.Originality/valueThis study introduces an appropriate theoretical framework for studying impulse buying—the duality approach. Second, the research validates the dual process and positive consequence of impulse buying. Third, self-control's moderating role is validated, whereas the studied associations are initially compared across shopping contexts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1251-1277 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Hollyer ◽  
B. Peter Rosendorff ◽  
James Raymond Vreeland

Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 1726
Author(s):  
Lingfei Cai ◽  
Xuan Shi ◽  
Jingrong Zhu

With the rising awareness of environmental responsibility in industrial production, a series of recovery strategies have been developed and play different roles in achieving sustainability. In this study, we examine when quality recovery, low-end recovery, and hybrid recovery result in a win-win outcome where both profitability and environmental performance can be improved for a durable product manufacturer. We develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the manufacturer’s payoffs under different recovery strategies. A secondary market where used products can be resold among consumers is also considered. We obtain the results by comparing the profitability and environmental impact under each recovery strategy. Hybrid recovery causes both synergy and a contradiction effect between quality and low-end recovery. It always improves the win-win outcome of low-end recovery and it can also improve the win-win outcome of quality recovery under a high recovery standard when the recovered value is not too high. The technology improvement only achieves environmental sustainability under sufficient stringent recovery standard, otherwise, it may backfire and deteriorate the environment. We offer insights for the policymaker to understand the role of the recovery standard in achieving the win-win outcome and the importance of setting a proper recovery standard in achieving environmental sustainability.


Author(s):  
Zhaohui (Zoey) Jiang ◽  
Yan Huang ◽  
Damian R. Beil

Problem definition: This paper studies the role of seekers’ problem specification in crowdsourcing contests for design problems. Academic/practical relevance: Platforms hosting design contests offer detailed guidance for seekers to specify their problems when launching a contest. Yet problem specification in such crowdsourcing contests is something the theoretical and empirical literature has largely overlooked. We aim to fill this gap by offering an empirically validated model to generate insights for the provision of information at contest launch. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model featuring different types of information (categorized as “conceptual objectives” or “execution guidelines”) in problem specifications and assess their impact on design processes and submission qualities. Real-world data are used to empirically test hypotheses and policy recommendations generated from the model, and a quasi-natural experiment provides further empirical validation. Results: We show theoretically and verify empirically that with more conceptual objectives disclosed in the problem specification, the number of participants in a contest eventually decreases; with more execution guidelines in the problem specification, the trial effort provision by each participant increases; and the best solution quality always increases with more execution guidelines but eventually decreases with more conceptual objectives. Managerial implications: To maximize the best solution quality in crowdsourced design problems, seekers should always provide more execution guidelines and only a moderate number of conceptual objectives.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sajeesh Sajeesh ◽  
Sang-Young Song

AbstractThis paper uses a game-theoretic model to examine the role of reference price for firms that vary in their quality positioning in competing for customers. Reference prices provide consumers with additional components of utility. Building on previous research on the impact of consumer decision making on firm strategies, we focus on how firms choose their positioning when consumer utility is driven not only by acquisition utility but also by the transaction utility associated with the purchase and how this, in turn, affects firms’ pricing decisions and profits. Considering a competition between two firms, this paper shows that the firm with higher product quality provides greater discounts to consumers. We also show that when firms are allowed to set a high ‘regular’ price, product differentiation is greater between the firms, and price competition is less intense. Furthermore, under some conditions, the profits of both firms can be higher than the benchmark case (when the effects of transaction utility are ignored).


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