A popperian approach to rational argumentation in applied ethics

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Bacchini
Keyword(s):  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Moral Claim ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Critical Questions ◽  
Moral Statement ◽  
Moral Position ◽  
Rational Argumentation ◽  
Is Ought Problem

As a consequence of Hume’s famous is-ought problem, it may seem that no rational justification of a moral statement can ever be inferentially provided, and no argument typically used in applied ethics would ever deserve the title of rational justification. This paper aims to propose a fallibilist, non-foundationalist account of rational justification of a moral standpoint based on rational argumentation. This account will be developed within a noncognitivist theory of morality — a framework that seems to constitute the most challenging context for a similar attempt. First, the paper shows how we can have a good rational justification of a moral claim also if its (necessary) moral premises are neither indubitable nor properly inferentially justified, as long as we adopt what is called a Popperian solution to the “problem of prescriptive basic statements”. Second, it argues that a good rational justification of a moral claim does not need to be deductively valid. Using the idea that implicit presumptions introduced by invalid inferences can be monitored by a number of related critical questions, the article distinguishes between fallacious and non-fallacious invalid arguments, and examines how a use of an invalid non-fallacious argument can count as a rational justification of a moral position in applied ethics. However, applied ethics must do its part, and must be explicitly based on rational argumentation.

scholarly journals Virtue and responsibility: Economic-ethical perspectives in the work of Etienne de Villiers

2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Piet J. Naude
Keyword(s):  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Economic Ethics ◽  
Theoretical Formulation ◽  
Critical Questions ◽  
Responsibility Ethics ◽  
Ethical View ◽  
Ethical Perspectives

This article was developed in six statements and attempted to reconstruct the basis for the�socio-economic ethics of Etienne de Villiers, as well as its ecclesio-centric nature and theoretical�formulation in virtue and responsibility ethics. There was reference to De Villiers�s shift from�an exclusive to an inclusive ethical view as a response to his interpretation of modernity and�secularism. Critical questions were raised as to the actual theological character of his ethics�and his re- interpretation of Weberian responsibility ethics. The article concluded with an�appreciative view on the applied ethics perspectives developed by De Villiers over the last�three decades.

Rationality and Judgment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Classical Model ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Rational Argumentation

Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this paper I respond to Brown’s and Govier’s criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.

Applied ethics in transpersonal and humanistic research.

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-135
Author(s):  
Hendrik Geldenhuys
Keyword(s):  
Applied Ethics

An Immanent Criticism of Urban Design in Montevideo

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Washington MORALES
Keyword(s):  
Urban Design ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
Applied Philosophy ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Philosophical Frameworks

The debate about the so called “excluding design” has been a focus for applied philosophy for several years. The structure of this debate is constituted by deontological and consequentialist’s applied ethics and as well as agonistic democratic approaches. This paper asks for the applicability of these points of view to the particular socio-political reality of Montevideo. Examining this reality closer, I hold that we cannot comprehend the recent aestheticization of the excluding design there through these contemporary philosophical frameworks. As an alternative philosophical procedure, I analyze the aestheticization of excluding design in Montevideo from Rahel Jaeggi’s immanent criticism. I hold that this process of aestheticization implies an ideological regressive “form of life”. And I also argue that the Uruguayan democracy is affected by this ideological regression. Nevertheless, because this aestheticization is not an exclusive Uruguayan phenomenon, this paper intends to open one direction in applied philosophy of urban design.

Putting the Madhyamaka Trick in Context: A Contextualist Reading of Huntington’s Interpretation of Madhyamaka

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-124
Author(s):  
Michael Dorfman
Keyword(s):  
Fifteenth Century ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
The Body ◽  
Rational Analysis ◽  
At Command ◽  
Rational Argumentation ◽  
Logical Fallacies ◽  
Key Terms

In a series of works published over a period of twenty five years, C.W. Huntington, Jr. has developed a provocative and radical reading of Madhyamaka (particularly Early Indian Madhyamaka) inspired by ‘the insights of post- Wittgensteinian pragmatism and deconstruction’ (1993, 9). This article examines the body of Huntington’s work through the filter of his seminal 2007 publication, ‘The Nature of the M?dhyamika Trick’, a polemic aimed at a quartet of other recent commentators on Madhyamaka (Robinson, Hayes, Tillemans and Garfield) who attempt ‘to read N?g?rjuna through the lens of modern symbolic logic’ (2007, 103), a project which is the ‘end result of a long and complex scholastic enterprise … [which] can be traced backwards from contemporary academic discourse to fifteenth century Tibet, and from there into India’ (2007, 111) and which Huntington sees as distorting the Madhyamaka project which was not aimed at ‘command[ing] assent to a set of rationally grounded doctrines, tenets, or true conclusions’ (2007, 129). This article begins by explicating some disparate strands found in Huntington’s work, which I connect under a radicalized notion of ‘context’. These strands consist of a contextualist/pragmatic theory of truth (as opposed to a correspondence theory of truth), a contextualist epistemology (as opposed to one relying on foundationalist epistemic warrants), and a contextualist ontology where entities are viewed as necessarily relational (as opposed to possessing a context-independent essence.) I then use these linked theories to find fault with Huntington’s own readings of Candrak?rti and N?g?rjuna, arguing that Huntington misreads the semantic context of certain key terms (tarka, d???i, pak?a and pratijñ?) and fails to follow the implications of N?g?rjuna and Candrak?rti’s reliance on the role of the pram??as in constituting conventional reality. Thus, I find that Huntington’s imputation of a rejection of logic and rational argumentation to N?g?rjuna and Candrak?rti is unwarranted. Finally, I offer alternate readings of the four contemporary commentators selected by Huntington, using the conceptual apparatus developed earlier to dismiss Robinson’s and Hayes’s view of N?g?rjuna as a charlatan relying on logical fallacies, and to find common ground between Huntington’s project and the view of N?g?rjuna developed by Tillemans and Garfield as a thinker committed using reason to reach, through rational analysis, ‘the limits of thought.’

Leadership, morality and ethics: Developing a practical model for moral decision-making

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred W. Kaszniak ◽  
Cynda H. Rushton ◽  
Joan Halifax
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Contemplative Science ◽  
Practical Model

The present paper is the product of collaboration between a neuroscientist, an ethicist, and a contemplative exploring issues around leadership, morality, and ethics. It is an exploration on how people in roles of responsibility can better understand how to engage in discernment processes with more awareness and a deeper sense of responsibility for others and themselves. It draws upon recent research and scholarship in neuroscience, contemplative science, and applied ethics to develop a practical understanding of how moral decision-making works and is essential in this time when there can seem to be an increasing moral vacuum in leadership.

Computer Ethics as a Field of Applied Ethics

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-70
Author(s):  
Herman T. Tavani
Keyword(s):  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Computer Ethics

Das tue ich nicht, weil es nicht Pflicht ist. Das Argument der Supererogation und sein Unanständigkeitsproblem

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-104
Author(s):  
Marie-Luise Raters
Keyword(s):  
American Literature ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Double Effect ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Anglo American

Most arguments of Applied Ethics (e.g.slippery slope argument, argument of double effect) are well analyzed. An exception is the argument 'I do not do this because it is not my duty'. It makes sense to call the argument the 'argument of supererogation' (ASE): Since J. Urmson's essay Saints and Heroes of 1958, those actions are called 'supererogations' which (despite of their moral value) are not supposed to be duties. The argument is widely used not only in Applied Ethics, but also in ordinary moral everyday life. Nevertheless, there is a need of investigation because it has an indecency-problem. The argument is convincing if an actor does not want to risk his life. It seems indecent, however, if an actor refuses a simple favor or a service of friendship with the 'argument of super-erogation', although they both constitute no duties. This paper reconstructs the 'argument of supererogation' as a syllogism. It analyzes its formal structure by benefitting from current Anglo-American literature on supererogation. The overall aim of this paper is to solve the problem of indecency.

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