SAY-complementizers and indexical shift in Poshkart Chuvash

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Knyazev
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Although SAY-complementizers have been extensively documented, the question of the forms used in this function and their specific properties has received less attention. The paper focuses on the complementizer tenine (an action nominalization of SAY), which is used with communicative reception verbs (‘hear’, ‘read’, etc.), in a dialect of Chuvash (Turkic). The main puzzle concerns the difference between tenine and the more general complementizer teze (the same-subject converb of SAY) with respect to the controller of shifted first person (namely, teze, but not tenine, disallows non-subject controllers). An account of this restriction based on three independent language-specific constraints is offered. An alternative account is discussed whereby tenine (and teze) are synchronically non-finite forms of SAY. The findings highlight the importance of the form of the complementizer as well as of the choice of controller for shifted 1st person in SAY-based complementation and extend the typological parameters of indexical shift.

Some Tears in Achilles Tatius (Achilles 6.7.3–7)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. O. Hutchinson
Keyword(s):  
Self Control ◽  
First Person ◽  
Achilles Tatius ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Mind

Another novelist provides in some respects a point in between Chariton and Heliodorus. His elaborate expatiation on tears and the lover put rhythm at the service of an intricate treatment of the mind and body, and a shrewd depiction of amorous self-control and manipulation. The first-person narrative adds a further stratum of sophistication to this handling of the speaker’s rival and enemy. Achilles Tatius demonstrates further, in contrast with Chariton, the range of possibilities for the exploitation of rhythm seen already in the difference of Chariton and Plutarch. Comparison with Heliodorus brings out Achilles’ elegance.

Introduction to the Special Issue on First-Person Methods in HCI

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Audrey Desjardins ◽  
Oscar Tomico ◽  
Andrés Lucero ◽  
Marta E. Cecchinato ◽  
Carman Neustaedter
Keyword(s):  
Human Computer Interaction ◽  
First Person ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Future Work ◽  
Computer Interaction

In this introduction to the special issue on First-Person Methods in (Human-Computer Interaction) HCI, we present a brief overview of first-person methods, their origin, and their use in Human-Computer Interaction. We also detail the difference between first-person methods, second-person, and third-person methods, as a way to guide the reader when engaging the special issue articles. We articulate our motivation for putting together this special issue: we wanted a collection of works that would allow HCI researchers to develop further, define, and outline practices, techniques and implications of first-person methods. We trace links between the articles in this special issue and conclude with questions and directions for future work in this methodological space: working with boundaries, risk, and accountability.

Knowledge without Observation

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-116
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Accurate Description ◽  
First Person ◽  
Blue Book ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Bodily Movements

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 28–32 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by relating Anscombe’s thesis that intentional action is known without observation to Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Blue Book of the knowledge of oneself “as subject” and Anscombe’s discussion in “The First Person” of unmediated self-knowledge. Following this, the chapter explores the difficulties that herself Anscombe raises for her thesis, and considers her reasons for thinking that the scope of an agent’s non-observational self-knowledge is not limited to her interior states or immediate bodily movements. Finally, it considers how the difficulties that Anscombe has raised are supposed to be addressed by her discussion of how descriptions of one’s intentional action can be contradicted, and of the difference between a list that has the role of an order and one whose role is to provide an accurate description of some facts.

The use of the Korean first person possessive pronoun nay vis-à-vis wuli

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-53
Author(s):  
Hye-Kyung Lee
Keyword(s):  
Social Mobility ◽  
Close Connection ◽  
First Person ◽  
Possessive Pronoun ◽  
Foreign Loan ◽  
Strongly Coupled ◽  
Loan Words ◽  
Kinship Term ◽  
Younger Generation ◽  
The Difference

Abstract This paper takes a corpus-driven approach to the Korean first person possessive pronoun nay with reference to its plural counterpart wuli. The examination of the frequent noun collocates of the two pronouns in Sejong Corpus reveals the close connection between nay and inalienable entities as well as persons lower than the speaker. Meanwhile, wuli is strongly coupled with places or organizations alongside persons higher than the speaker. Pragmatic principles account for the difference between the kinship term collocates of the two pronouns, such as Horn’s (1984; 1989) R-principle or Levinson’s (2000) M-principle. The non-prototypical singular use of wuli triggers a pragmatic effect of expressing, for example, affection. The frequent collocation of nay with foreign/loan nouns is a reflection of the tendency that people more interested in social mobility (younger generation and women) are more ready to employ nay rather than the singular wuli and to accept foreign/loan words. The meaning of nay emerging from its interaction with noun collocates is that it is closely connected with being inalienable, private, or unshared. Meanwhile, the singular meaning of wuli is pragmatically derived, which is construed as being grouped, deferent, or general.

scholarly journals Alterity and Poetry: The Ṛgveda and the Invention of Indian Theatre

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-89
Author(s):  
Silvia D’Intino
Keyword(s):  
Small Group ◽  
First Person ◽  
Indian Literature ◽  
Personal Pronouns ◽  
Ancient India ◽  
Fundamental Structure ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Indian Theatre ◽  
Shed Light

Ancient Indian literature, poetry and prose, shows different forms of dialogue that have been regarded as the first vestiges of a dramatic art in India. In the Ṛgveda, dialogue appears to be more than a genre, what gives a fundamental structure to the hymns. The study of the ṛṣis’ style and the formal peculiarities of Vedic poetry may shed light on a deep filiation. Among these peculiarities, we will focus on the use of personal pronouns, namely the first person singular. In a small group of Varuṇa hymns attributed to Vasiṣṭha (ṚV VII 86–89), the remarkable conception of the speaking ‘I’, different from the poet himself, different from the lyric ‘I’, sheds light on the distancing effect operated by the Vedic poet, on the difference between subject and persona as a main feature of his art, thus anticipating the emergence of the character, and secretly contributing to the invention of theatre in ancient India.

scholarly journals Folk Intuitions and the Conditional Ability to Do Otherwise

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Siyuan Yin ◽  
Rose Graves
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
First Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Folk Intuitions ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

In a series of three pre-registered studies, we explored (a) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about deterministic scenarios, (b) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about neurodeterministic scenarios (that is, scenarios where the determinism is described at the neurological level), (c) the difference between people’s intuitions about neutral scenarios (e.g., walking a dog in the park) and their intuitions about negatively valenced scenarios (e.g., murdering a stranger), and (d) the difference between people’s intuitions about free will and responsibility in response to first-person scenarios and third-person scenarios. We predicted that once we focused participants’ attention on the two different abilities to do otherwise available to agents in indeterministic and deterministic scenarios, their intuitions would support natural incompatibilism—the view that laypersons judge that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. This prediction was borne out by our findings.

scholarly journals The missing link? Testing a schema account of unitization

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roni Tibon ◽  
Andrea Greve ◽  
Richard Henson
Keyword(s):  
Initial Study ◽  
Test Phase ◽  
Study Phase ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Final Test ◽  
Sentence Condition ◽  
New Information ◽  
Phase Memory ◽  
The Difference ◽  
New Item

Unitization refers to the creation of a new unit from previously distinct items. The concept of unitization has been used to explain how novel pairings between items can be remembered without requiring recollection, by virtue of new, item-like representations that enable familiarity-based retrieval. We tested an alternative account of unitization – a schema account – which suggests that associations between items can be rapidly assimilated into a schema. We used a common operationalization of “unitization” as the difference between two unrelated words being linked by a definition, relative to two words being linked by a sentence, during an initial study phase. During the following relearning phase, a studied word was re-paired with a new word, either related or unrelated to the original associate from study. In a final test phase, memory for the Relearned associations was tested. We hypothesized that, if unitized representations act like schemas, then we would observe some generalization to related words, such that memory would be better in the definition than sentence condition for related words, but not for unrelated words. Contrary to the schema hypothesis, evidence favoured the null hypothesis of no difference between definition and sentence conditions for related words (Experiment 1), even when each cue was associated with multiple associates, indicating that the associations can be generalized (Experiment 2), or when the schematic information was explicitly re-activated during Relearning (Experiment 3). These results suggest that unitized associations do not generalize to accommodate new information, and therefore provide evidence against the schema account.

scholarly journals The first-person perspective description error in naturalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-415
Author(s):  
Diana E. Gasparyan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Work Strategies ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Radical Naturalism ◽  
Third Person Perspective

In this article, it is shown that in some theories defending the non-reductive nature of the firstperson perspective it is possible to find a very inconsistent attitude. Such theories are associated by the author to a so-called moderate naturalism. The article demonstrates the difference between moderate and radical naturalism. Radical naturalism completely abandons the idea of subjectivity as unobservable from a third-person perspective. On the contrary, moderate naturalism defends the irreducibility of subjectivity, but believes subjectivity to be a part of the nature. As a case of moderate naturalism, the article considers the approaches of Lynne Baker and Thomas Metzinger. Exemplifying these approaches to the first-person perspective, it is shown that in the case of certain work strategies focused on the first-person perspective, it is possible that a so-called description error may appear, by which a description error of subjectivity — when it is placed in the world as a part of nature, existing according to its laws — is understood. The logic of this error points to one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s statements about the incorrect placement of the eye in the perspective of the eye view itself. If the first-person perspective is introduced as a point of view (or a point of observation), then its subsequent shift to the observation result area leads to description error. If there is no observation, as well as no viewpoint, we lose the very idea of first-person perspective and actually take the position of radical naturalism.

scholarly journals Iris Murdoch's Criticism of Traditional Views of the Moral Self: An Alternative Account of "seeing" the Others

Labyrinth ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Ana Lita
Keyword(s):  
Alternative View ◽  
Aesthetic Perception ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Crucial Point ◽  
Moral Self ◽  
Unconditional Love ◽  
Moral Sensibility ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Mere Existence ◽  
Aesthetic Sensibility

The main objective of this article is to reconstruct Iris Murdoch's criticism of the moral self as it was developed by liberalism, romanticism, existentialism and linguistic empiricism that interpreted the moral person as entangled either in a world of essences (Kant's view) or in a world of mere existence in which the interplay of both necessity and freedom is at stake. Thus what is missing from all these theories is a sufficient development of what it is to have a regard for others through aesthetic perception, which is the most important aspect of the moral self. At the difference of these conceptions Murdoch offers an alternative view, both to liberal ethics in the Kantian tradition and to contemporary ethics, as she argues that to have regard for others demands responsiveness which can also be explained in terms of aesthetic sensibility. Murdoch's ethics rests on an analogy between aesthetic sensibility and moral sensibility based upon the model of the artist's unconditional love for his characters, which she interprets as being a matter of seeing and loving others. The author's thesis is that love is the crucial point of Murdoch's conception of the moral self where the moral and aesthetical sensibility, as well cognition, intersect each other, because seeing others incorporates emotions of respect and compassion that characterize love and such seeing is cognitive love.

Expressing i think that in Polish

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-253
Author(s):  
Iwona Kokorniak ◽  
Alicja Jajko-Siwek
Keyword(s):  
Formal Semantic ◽  
Linguistic Variation ◽  
First Person ◽  
Thinking Process ◽  
Present Tense ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Linguistic Usage

Abstract The paper investigates how four Polish mental predicates, signalling the subject’s of conception thinking process and representing the i think that conceptualisation, differ in usage and what motivates the difference. The verbs’ first person singular present tense forms, in an objective way, signal the speaker’s, i.e. the subject’s of conception, thoughts about the (ir)reality stored in their mind, whereas the content of clause complementation subjectively reveals the object of conception, namely the realm of one’s thoughts. A quantitative corpus-driven analysis implemented in the study presents how formal, semantic and extra-linguistic ‘usage features’ of the complementation interact with the verbs. The findings suggest that the i think that conceptualisation shows linguistic variation in Polish dependent on the temporal realm of the situation described in the complementation, the topic of discourse, and the evaluation of the event described.

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