scholarly journals Iris Murdoch's Criticism of Traditional Views of the Moral Self: An Alternative Account of "seeing" the Others

Labyrinth ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Ana Lita
Keyword(s):  
Alternative View ◽  
Aesthetic Perception ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Crucial Point ◽  
Moral Self ◽  
Unconditional Love ◽  
Moral Sensibility ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Mere Existence ◽  
Aesthetic Sensibility

The main objective of this article is to reconstruct Iris Murdoch's criticism of the moral self as it was developed by liberalism, romanticism, existentialism and linguistic empiricism that interpreted the moral person as entangled either in a world of essences (Kant's view) or in a world of mere existence in which the interplay of both necessity and freedom is at stake. Thus what is missing from all these theories is a sufficient development of what it is to have a regard for others through aesthetic perception, which is the most important aspect of the moral self. At the difference of these conceptions Murdoch offers an alternative view, both to liberal ethics in the Kantian tradition and to contemporary ethics, as she argues that to have regard for others demands responsiveness which can also be explained in terms of aesthetic sensibility. Murdoch's ethics rests on an analogy between aesthetic sensibility and moral sensibility based upon the model of the artist's unconditional love for his characters, which she interprets as being a matter of seeing and loving others. The author's thesis is that love is the crucial point of Murdoch's conception of the moral self where the moral and aesthetical sensibility, as well cognition, intersect each other, because seeing others incorporates emotions of respect and compassion that characterize love and such seeing is cognitive love.

SAY-complementizers and indexical shift in Poshkart Chuvash

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Knyazev
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Although SAY-complementizers have been extensively documented, the question of the forms used in this function and their specific properties has received less attention. The paper focuses on the complementizer tenine (an action nominalization of SAY), which is used with communicative reception verbs (‘hear’, ‘read’, etc.), in a dialect of Chuvash (Turkic). The main puzzle concerns the difference between tenine and the more general complementizer teze (the same-subject converb of SAY) with respect to the controller of shifted first person (namely, teze, but not tenine, disallows non-subject controllers). An account of this restriction based on three independent language-specific constraints is offered. An alternative account is discussed whereby tenine (and teze) are synchronically non-finite forms of SAY. The findings highlight the importance of the form of the complementizer as well as of the choice of controller for shifted 1st person in SAY-based complementation and extend the typological parameters of indexical shift.

A Theory of Background Conditions

2018 ◽  
pp. 23-87
Author(s):  
Bradford Skow
Keyword(s):  
Alternative View ◽  
Background Condition ◽  
Common View ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Difference

The common view about background conditions is that the difference between causes and background conditions is pragmatic, drawn in language not the world. This chapter defends an alternative view, on which the difference is metaphysical, drawn in the world not in language. This alternative says that something is a background condition to C’s causing E iff it is a state (rather than an event) that is a reason why C caused E. This theory is used to answer the question of what it is to manifest a disposition; briefly, something manifests a disposition to M in C if its having that disposition is a background condition to the Cing causing the Ming.

Friendship

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neera K. Badhwar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Moral Self ◽  
Unconditional Love ◽  
Instrumental Value ◽  
A Value ◽  
Personal Relations ◽  
Self Sufficiency

Philosophical interest in friendship has revived after a long eclipse. This is due largely to a renewed interest in ancient moral philosophy, in the role of emotion in morality, and in the ethical dimensions of personal relations in general. Questions about friendship are concerned with issues such as whether it is only an instrumental value (a means to other values), or also an intrinsic value – a value in its own right; whether it is a mark of psychological and moral self-sufficiency, or rather of deficiency; and how friendship-love differs from the unconditional love of agapē. Other issues at stake include how – if at all – friendship is related to justice; whether the particularist, partialist perspective of friendship can be reconciled with the universalist, impartialist perspective of morality; and whether friendship is morally neutral.

Providing the Missing Link: Law after Latour’s Passage

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serge Gutwirth
Keyword(s):  
Gilles Deleuze ◽  
The Political ◽  
Crucial Point ◽  
Trade Associations ◽  
Missing Link ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Isabelle Stengers ◽  
Signal Operations ◽  
Philosophical Intervention

A decisive philosophical intervention pitched at the level of law’s ontology, Gutwirth’s ‘Providing the Missing Link’ renders the difference between law as an institution or a body of norms and law as a mode of existence or value a crucial point of passage for any future philosophy of law. The first, Gutwirth argues, isn’t really law at all, but a political and organisational phenomenon easily confused with other norms and normative systems, from the rules of sporting groups or trade associations to ethical codes. The second is a far narrower concept keyed to the production of novel solutions under a particular kind of constraint and has nothing to do with the establishment of standards to be followed. Gutwirth’s finely tuned theorisation of law, which resonates with the work of Isabelle Stengers and Gilles Deleuze, sounds a laudable alarum designed to compel legal theorists to disencumber law of the formidable demands of the Rechtsstaat, while holding firmly to the evasive thread of legal enunciation. For Gutwirth, statements in the key of [LAW] require, as an absolute condition, the ‘anticipat[ion of] how and what a judge or court would decide’, and we are all jurists engaged in the practice of law, or at the least, we ‘speak legally’ and not merely ‘about law’, insofar as we projectively reason on the basis of that anticipation. The passage of law depends on this anticipatory structure, from which Gutwirth derives the signal operations of law (qualification, hesitation, imputation and so on), which work in essentially the same way as they did for the Romans. Law alone, he concludes – even after it has been unburdened of the political, economic, moral and other duties recklessly imposed on it – remains ‘the rightful and ultimate provider of stability and security’, as the loops of its unique temporality ensure that a resolution to any controversy can indeed be fashioned, even where every other mode fails.

On introducing parametric phonetics

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 34-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Tench
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Speech Sounds ◽  
Parametric Approach ◽  
Single Segment ◽  
Postgraduate Level ◽  
Continuous Activity ◽  
The Difference

The term parametric is a convenient term to use to refer to a view of the study of speech sounds in which the continuous activity of the organs of speech in the production of a stretch of speech is highlighted. Parametric phonetics offers an alternative view to the more familiar segmental or postural view, in which the state of the organs of speech for a particular single segment at a particular instance is investigated. The difference between the two approaches may also be referred to as dynamic and static, respectively; the dynamic parametric view draws attention to the movement of the organs of speech, whereas the static segmental or postural view draws attention to the position or posture of the organs of speech at a given moment. In my view, the two approaches do not contradict each other; they complement each other, both being theoretically acceptable. In this paper I am concerned with introducing the parametric approach into conventional phonetics courses at first degree and postgraduate level.

scholarly journals The missing link? Testing a schema account of unitization

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roni Tibon ◽  
Andrea Greve ◽  
Richard Henson
Keyword(s):  
Initial Study ◽  
Test Phase ◽  
Study Phase ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Final Test ◽  
Sentence Condition ◽  
New Information ◽  
Phase Memory ◽  
The Difference ◽  
New Item

Unitization refers to the creation of a new unit from previously distinct items. The concept of unitization has been used to explain how novel pairings between items can be remembered without requiring recollection, by virtue of new, item-like representations that enable familiarity-based retrieval. We tested an alternative account of unitization – a schema account – which suggests that associations between items can be rapidly assimilated into a schema. We used a common operationalization of “unitization” as the difference between two unrelated words being linked by a definition, relative to two words being linked by a sentence, during an initial study phase. During the following relearning phase, a studied word was re-paired with a new word, either related or unrelated to the original associate from study. In a final test phase, memory for the Relearned associations was tested. We hypothesized that, if unitized representations act like schemas, then we would observe some generalization to related words, such that memory would be better in the definition than sentence condition for related words, but not for unrelated words. Contrary to the schema hypothesis, evidence favoured the null hypothesis of no difference between definition and sentence conditions for related words (Experiment 1), even when each cue was associated with multiple associates, indicating that the associations can be generalized (Experiment 2), or when the schematic information was explicitly re-activated during Relearning (Experiment 3). These results suggest that unitized associations do not generalize to accommodate new information, and therefore provide evidence against the schema account.

Marmor on Meaning, Interpretation, and Legislative Intention

Legal Theory ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Goldsworthy
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Legal Interpretation ◽  
Practical Consequence ◽  
Official View ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Meaning Interpretation

In his recent bookInterpretation and Legal Theory, Andrei Marmor makes a number of claims about meaning and interpretation, both in general and in law, which I will argue are mistaken. Actually, there is some confusion in his book between what I take to be his “official” view of the nature of meaning and interpretation, and a very different view which keeps surfacing despite his official rejection of it. I will argue that this alternative, rejected view, when properly developed, is more plausible than his official view, and that the difference between them is of considerable practical consequence for legal interpretation. What is at stake is the role of legislative intention. The alternative view denies Marmor's claim that the meaning of a statute is conceptually independent of the intention or purpose which the legislature had in enacting it. It should be said at the outset that I will focus on just three of the eight chapters in Marmor's book, which contains many virtues that are untouched by my critique.

scholarly journals Problematizzazione, contesa e rivalutazione del bello nell’arte, tra relativismo filosofico, pratica artistica e senso comune

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Vitale
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Expressive Language ◽  
The Other ◽  
Aesthetic Perception ◽  
Aesthetic Value ◽  
Metaphysical Foundation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Eventual Return ◽  
The Difference

Aesthetic perception is today a confused and controversial experience. In common sense relativistic conception of beauty, coexists with the consideration of the so-called “masterpieces” as works in which there is a stable aesthetic value. Philosophical and scientific relativism seems to have definitively set aside the conception of beauty not only as a universal value, but also as the essence of art, as it is counted among those universal metaphysical values, which have long been questioned. But some philosophers, such as Severino, say the opposite. Today seems to be a tendency to rediscover beauty above all in art, as a contemplative perception. Would the eventual return of art to beauty mean a return to universal metaphysical values? The difference between Kantian adherent beauty and free beauty is analyzed. The first is linked to metaphysical values, as an expression of an idea. The second, free beauty, on the other hand, has no metaphysical characteristics because it is not linked to a concept, therefore an expression of empirical harmonies. But also with regard to free beauty, the Kantian idea that sentiment can perceive its universality as an intersubjective value, is today difficult to accept both theoretically and empirically. This happens because today sentiment is no longer cultivated in the perception of beauty through canons, which are also disqualified for the pretense of universality in determined forms. Here, too, a distinction must be made between classical anthropometric canons and archaic non-naturalistic canons. We discover that the former are affected by a metaphysical foundation, while the latter reveal a different structure with other functions. According to Florenskij, the canon is not oppressive but liberating. On these suggestions and on empirical evidence we theorize that the (non-naturalistic) canon constitutes a guide for the recognition of a polyvalence of expressive language in which feeling coordinates with the other functions of consciousness, leading to transcend language itself in a non-metaphysical dimension. This suggests that this polyvalent structure that emerges from the canons is associated with beauty, as aimed at its realization.

scholarly journals Explaining Reasons

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrike Heuer
Keyword(s):  
Close Relation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Conceptual Link

The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide reasons. It is other properties that do. There are, however, at least three versions of the account which differ in their understanding of those “other properties.” The first two versions both assume that non-normative properties provide reasons, the difference being that the second allows that normative properties also provide reasons. Both run into difficulties, which I explain, in trying to defend the claim that non-normative properties provide reasons for action. The third version of the buck-passing account which explains being of value in terms of more specific evaluative properties that are reason-providing remains unpersuasive as well. Once we understand the relation between general and specific properties as a difference in degree, there is no space for a reduction of the one kind of properties to the other. In section II I sketch an alternative account of the relation between reasons and values, which is based on a thesis that I call the Conceptual Link and the claim that values are not just co-extensive with reasons, but explain them.

Diglossia and language ideology Petrarch on linguistic variation and differentiation

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-51
Author(s):  
Marco Spreafico
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Language Ideology ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
National Language ◽  
Attitudes And Beliefs ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Prevailing View ◽  
Previous Scholarship ◽  
Modern Perspective

Summary Petrarch’s metalinguistic observations are scattered throughout his work, rare and for the most part elliptical. The present article closely examines Petrarch’s statements about language to arrive at an alternative interpretation to that of previous scholarship. We analyse the ideas, attitudes and beliefs that inform Petrarch’s conception of the difference between Latin and the vernacular languages. The first section provides a critique of the now prevailing view on Petrarch’s metalinguistic thinking. Mirko Tavoni and Silvia Rizzo hypothesize that Petrarch ‘was not conscious of being bilingual’, since he considered Latin and vernaculars as different stylistic varieties of one and the same language. In the remaining two sections we propose an alternative account. Comparing statements made by contemporaries of Petrarch and investigating their origin and rationale, we suggest that Petrarch’s conception and practice cannot be accounted for within a modern perspective of national language and are better captured by the notion of diglossia, in which two linguistic varieties are delimited by the contexts of their use.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document