Androids in the Enlightenment: Mechanics, Artisans, and Cultures of the Self

2015 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-409
Author(s):  
Dániel Margócsy
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 657-660
Author(s):  
Mary Gergen
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  

Author(s):  
Mark Byers

This concluding chapter charts the continuing significance of the early postwar moment in Olson’s later work, particularly The Maximus Poems. The philosophical and political concerns of the American avant-garde between 1946 and 1951 play out across The Maximus Poems just as they inform later American art practices. The search of the early postwar American independent left for a source of political action rooted in the embodied individual is seen, on the one hand, to have been personified in the figure of Maximus. At the same time, Maximus’s radical ‘practice of the self’ charts a sophisticated alternative to the Enlightenment humanist subject widely critiqued in the United States in the immediate postwar period.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 315
Author(s):  
Alan Kenneth Schwerin

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p315Hume’s Treatise, with its celebrated bundle theory of the self, is a significant contribution to the embryonic Newtonian experimental philosophy of the enlightenment. But the theory is inadequate as it stands, as the appendix to the Treatise makes clear. For this account of the self, apparently, rests on contradictory principles — propositions, fortunately, that can be reconciled, according to Hume. My paper is a critical exploration of Hume’s argument for this intriguing suggestion.


2020 ◽  
pp. 56-71
Author(s):  
Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei

This chapter shows the inheritance by existentialism of ideas from the philosophical tradition. Socrates serves for Kierkegaard and Marcel as a model for the authentic practice of philosophy and for initiating interior reflection of the self. Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus debated Stoicism’s understanding of freedom from external circumstances. Husserl and Heidegger interpreted Augustine’s conception of time, while Heidegger along with Beauvoir adapted, in a secular context, features of his conception of religious conversion. Augustine, Shakespeare, and Montaigne explored inner reflection and the nature of the self which came to be critically echoed in existentialist conceptions. The Enlightenment generated a philosophy of human freedom, defending the rational autonomy of the individual. Critical engagement of these ideas is shown to have shaped existentialist conceptions of authenticity, subjectivity, inwardness, freedom, and responsibility.


2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
LORRAINE DASTON

Since the Enlightenment, the history of science has been enlisted to show the unity and distinctiveness of Europe. This paper, written on the occasion of the award of the 2005 Erasmus Prize to historians of science Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin, traces the intertwined narratives of the history of science and European modernity from the 18th century to the present. Whether understood as triumph or tragedy (and there have been eloquent proponents of both views), the Scientific Revolution has been portrayed as Europe's decisive break with tradition – the first such break in world history and the model for all subsequent epics of modernization in other cultures. The paper concludes with reflections on how a new history of science, exemplified in the work of Shapin and Schaffer, may transform the self-image of Europe and conceptions of truth itself.


2017 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 111-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz L. Fillafer

The Enlightenment seems out of kilter. Until fairly recently, its trajectories were beguilingly simple and straightforward. Devised by Western metropolitan masterminds, the Enlightenment was piously appropriated by their latter-day apprentices in Central and Eastern Europe. This process of benign percolation made modern science, political liberty, and religious toleration trickle down to East-Central Europe. The self-orientalizing of nineteenth-century Central European intellectuals reinforced this impression, making concepts that were ostensibly authentic and pristine at their “Western” sources seem garbled and skewed once appropriated in their region.


PMLA ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1106-1115
Author(s):  
Jack Undank

Vauvenargues describes both the social and philosophical world as a battleground of conflicting interests, thereby extending the premises of Classical ego psychology into the Enlightenment. His heroes, political and philosophical, may be seen as seeking a new kind of peace in their triumph over men and systems metaphorically portrayed as rigid, blind, and imprisoned within their own egocentricity. His ideal philosopher reconciles all conflicting views in an overarching system of truth. Ultimately this system rests not so much on principles of logic as on the personal qualities of the thinker, his “pénétration,” “profondeur,” and “étendue d'esprit,” his ability to transcend the self. In the partially Spinozistic, partially rococo, and eminently conciliatory vision vouchsafed the true philosopher, variety submits to organic order, concepts and people maintain their autonomy, yet grow interrelated. Apparent contradictions vanish in the fullness of truth. Vauvenargues's early works suffer from his inability to articulate this vision within conventional, discursive forms. In the posthumous Caractères, he invents a new technique, the “définition,” which strikingly parallels the idiom of contemporary fictional realism. By capturing visible phenomena and exposing their paradoxically contrasting inner mechanisms, Vauvenargues reveals both the method and the nature of the truth he repeatedly struggled to express.


Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald de Sousa
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  

This is a Big Book from one of Canada's preeminent philosophers. It aims at nothing less than to define what characterizes modernity, and then to tell us what is wrong with it. Like many a Big Book, it is predictably full of interesting things, and equally predictably disappointing, not to say feeble, in some of the central theses for which it argues. But then what more, in philosophy, can we really expect? It's what we tell our students: you don't have to be right, and you don't have to make me agree with you, but you do have to produce interesting arguments and show that you have thought seriously about the issues.


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