Public Opinion, Public Support, and Counter-Attitudinal Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court

2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 298-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda C. Bryan ◽  
Christopher D. Kromphardt
2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda C. Bryan

Arguably the most influential power the U.S. Supreme Court has is the power to choose which cases to decide. This power allows the nation’s only unelected branch of government to choose either to weigh in on key political controversies or avoid them completely. Here, I take one of the first case-level looks at the role of public opinion in the Court’s agenda-setting process. I argue justices vote to hear cases when they are likely to agree with public opinion on the outcome and eschew cases when they are out of step with the American people. However, the effect of public opinion depends on the political environment, especially on the level of public support the Court enjoys, the salience of the issue, and the case’s legal importance.


Author(s):  
James L. Gibson ◽  
Michael J. Nelson

We have investigated the differences in support for the U.S. Supreme Court among black, Hispanic, and white Americans, catalogued the variation in African Americans’ group attachments and experiences with legal authorities, and examined how those latter two factors shape individuals’ support for the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court’s decisions, and for their local legal system. We take this opportunity to weave our findings together, taking stock of what we have learned from our analyses and what seem like fruitful paths for future research. In the process, we revisit Positivity Theory. We present a modified version of the theory that we hope will guide future inquiry on public support for courts, both in the United States and abroad.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1139-1153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory A. Caldeira

I show the intimate connection between the actions of the justices and support for the Supreme Court during one of the most critical periods of U.S. political history, the four months of 1937 during which Franklin D. Roosevelt sought legislation to “pack” the high bench with friendly personnel. Over the period from 3 February through 10 June 1937, the Gallup Poll queried national samples on 18 separate occasions about FDR's plan. These observations constitute the core of my analyses. I demonstrate the crucial influence of judicial behavior and the mass media in shaping public opinion toward the Supreme Court. This research illuminates the dynamics of public support for the justices, contributes to a clearer understanding of an important historical episode, shows the considerable impact of the mass media on public attitudes toward the Court, and adds more evidence on the role of political events in the making of public opinion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 380-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Wedeking ◽  
Michael A. Zilis

Elite rhetoric is an important aspect of democracy, and understanding why elites alter their rhetorical tone is vital to understanding the nature of public–elite interaction. In this paper, we identify the conditions under which insulated elites respond to public opinion by changing the amount of disagreeable rhetoric they emphasize. We examine Supreme Court opinions and theorize that the majority limits the use of disagreeable rhetoric—language with harsh, unpleasant, or negative connotations—in salient cases with the intention of dulling public opposition to rulings. We test our expectations on two levels, the first using a broad measure of public mood on a large sample of cases and the second using a small sample with issue-specific public opinion measures. We find that as public opinion diverges from the Court, the majority tones down its disagreeable rhetoric, but only in salient cases.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 600-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles T. Armaly

Although public support for the U.S. Supreme Court is generally stable, various cues and heuristics affect how individuals derive political opinions. And while the Court is capable of conferring support on its own decisions, information from extra-judicial sources—such as presidential candidates—may have a potentially (de)legitimizing influence on individuals and their attitudes. Using a survey experimental design, I manipulate the source of negative statements about the judiciary to determine whether extra-judicial actors are capable of altering support for the Court and, if so, whether it is via ideological updating or is a purely affective response. I find that political actors unrelated to the Court are capable of producing change in attitudes and that those changes are affective. Those positive toward the cue source decrease their level of support upon hearing indicting statements, and vice versa, but individuals do not alter their perceived ideological distance from the Court. This finding has implications for the stability of the support on which the Court relies to expect compliance with its rulings, as well as how affective attachments to groups and their representatives influence institutional loyalty.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd A. Collins ◽  
Christopher A. Cooper

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316802110530
Author(s):  
Miles T Armaly ◽  
Adam M Enders

Although the U.S. Supreme Court goes to great lengths to avoid the “political thicket,” it is sometimes unwittingly pulled in. We employ several experimental treatments—each of which is composed of real behaviors that took place during the Trump impeachment trial—to understand the impact of the trial on attitudes about the Court. We find that Chief Justice Roberts’ presence and behaviors during the trial failed to legitimize the proceeding and may have even harmed views of the Court. Treatments involving Roberts’ actions decreased willingness to accept Court decisions and, in some cases, negatively impacted perceived legitimacy. We also find that criticisms of the Chief Justice by Senators decreased decision acceptance. These findings clarify both the bounds of the institution’s legitimizing power and the tenuous nature of public support in times of greater Court politicization by outside actors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (03) ◽  
pp. 752-770
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Berk

While the boundaries between child, adolescent, and adult are difficult to define, there is a consensus that children and adults are different in kind. Extreme acts of violence put pressure on that consensus. Children that kill, for many, create a kind of border problem for juvenile justice. That public opinion tends to align with the general claim that children who break the law should be given a break belies a deeper set of confusions. On what grounds should a seventeen-year-old that kills be treated more leniently than his eighteen-year-old counterpart? For the U.S. Supreme Court majority, the solution is to root its doctrine in a scientifically supported “developmental approach.” This article argues that this approach is philosophically confused. One must abandon, or significantly amend, that dominant understanding to explain how a principled concern with proportional punishment simultaneously justifies and limits the legal response to children that kill. The final pages sketch an alternative account that may be able to address the shortcomings of appeals to development. To punish children as adults, I suggest, is an attempt to reap the benefits of paternalism without bearing the accompanying political, social, and moral costs.


Author(s):  
Jaclyn Kaslovsky ◽  
Jon C. Rogowski ◽  
Andrew R. Stone

Abstract Though the demographic characteristics of judicial nominees in the United States have gained increased political attention in recent years, relatively little is known about how they affect public opinion toward judicial nominees and courts. We evaluate these relationships in the context of race and gender using a conjoint experiment conducted during a recent vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court. We find consistent evidence that Americans are more supportive of coracial nominees, particularly among white Republicans and Black Democrats, but no evidence of a similar effect on the basis of gender. Our results have important implications for theories of descriptive representation and suggest limits to its use as a means for generating political support for judicial nominees.


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