Donald Trump and Post-Pivot Asia: The Implications of a “Transactional” Approach to Foreign Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Beeson
2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-363
Author(s):  
Feliciano De Sá Guimarães ◽  
Irma Dutra De Oliveira E Silva

Abstract In the last two decades, far-right populists have formed governments all over the world. However, systematic analyses on how far-right leaders recreate their countries' foreign policy identity are still underdeveloped. In this article, we analyse how far-right populist leaders use their conservative identity-set to align with other right-wing governments and how they use the same conservative repertoire to deal with ideological rivals. More precisely, we argue that these leaders tend to overemphasize a deep conservative identity-set towards other far-right populist governments, something we call ‘thick conservative identity’. This profoundly conservative identity-set is composed of three national role conceptions: anti-globalism, nationalism and anti-foe. However, they do not repeat this identity-set towards ideological rivals, preferring to use a more nuanced and contradictory one, something we call ‘thin conservative identity’. The trigger of such difference is the anticipated mutual expectation of conservatism between Ego and Alter, in which Ego mimics Alter's deep conservatism. We use Jair Bolsonaro's alignment with Donald Trump and Bolsonaro's relationship with China as illustrative cases. We use the main concepts of role theory to understand both how conservative alignments are created and how far-right governments deal with ideological rivals.


Author(s):  
M. Share

On April 30 the United States and the World marked the 100th day in office of Donald Trump as President of the United States. The first 100 days are considered as a key indicator of the fortunes for a new President’s program. This article briefly reviews the 2016 campaign and election, the 11 week transition period, his first 100 days, a brief examination of both American-Russian relations and Sino-American relations, and lastly, what the future bodes for each under a Trump Presidency. The 100 Day period has been chaotic, shifting, and at times incoherent. He has made 180 degree shifts toward many major issues, including Russia and China, which has only confused numerous world leaders, including Presidents Putin and Xi. There has been a definite disconnection between what Trump says about Russia, and what his advisors and cabinet officials say. So far Trump has conducted a highly personalized and transactional foreign policy. All is up for negotiation at this a huge turning point in American foreign policy, the greatest one since 1945. Given all the world’s instabilities today, a rapprochement between the United States and Russia is a truly worthwhile objective, and should be strongly pursued.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-141
Author(s):  
Hasbi Aswar

A speech from the President of United States, Donald Trump, who explicitly state Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel triggering debate that threatens harmonization of the Middle East. Disagreement appear from South East Asia state up to European state regarding to Trump’s statement, which turn into United States foreign policy. Trump’s statement described as the main reason of increasing tension Palestinian – Israel conflict. This essay argues that The US policy toward Jerusalem was merely influenced by domestic politics in the sense that to satisfy Trump`s main voters of the Republican Party that is Evangelical Christian base.


Author(s):  
Gregory J. Moore

The conclusion argues that the time is right for a reappraisal and renewal of interest in Niebuhr’s approach to IR and U.S. foreign policy. It reviews the importance of dialectics to his work, and from a Niebuhrian perspective, comments on Putin’s Russia, the politics of Donald Trump, and the rise of the post-truth era. One of the most important aspects of Niebuhr’s contributions to IR was his recognition of the importance of dialectics. Dialectics found its way into much of Niebuhr’s writing, from his views on human nature to his views on the potential for realizing a peaceful, mutually tolerable global community, which he concluded was the “final possibility and impossibility of human life” and “will be in actuality the perpetual problem as well as the constant fulfillment of human hopes.”


Author(s):  
Kevin Narizny

Nearly everything a state does has distributional consequences, including grand strategy. Societal groups with different stakes in the international economy and defense spending often have conflicting strategic priorities, and these groups pursue their parochial interests by supporting the nomination and election of like-minded politicians. Thus, grand strategy is a product of political economy. An overview of American foreign policy over the last several decades illustrates this logic. In the 1980s, the Democratic and Republican coalitions had conflicting interests over the international economy, so the two parties diverged on grand strategy. The recovery of the Rust Belt in the 1990s and 2000s, however, brought increasing convergence. Political discourse over foreign policy was fiercely partisan, but, with the notable exception of George W. Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, the two parties shared essentially the same view of America’s role in the world. The disastrous outcome in Iraq led the Bush administration back to the middle ground in its second term, and Obama followed the same course. In contrast, the election of Donald Trump augurs change. Trump’s electoral coalition consists of a different balance of interests in the international economy than that of past Republican presidents, so he is likely to pursue different strategic priorities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 433-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles M. Evers ◽  
Aleksandr Fisher ◽  
Steven D. Schaaf

Does President Trump face domestic costs for foreign policy inconsistency? Will co-partisans and opposition-partisans equally punish Donald Trump for issuing flippant international threats and backing down? While the president said he could “stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody” without losing voters, the literature consistently shows that individuals, regardless of partisanship, disapprove of leaders who jeopardize the country’s reputation for credibility and resolve. Given the atypical nature of the Trump presidency, and the severe partisan polarization surrounding it, we investigate whether the logic of audience costs still applies in the Trump era. Using a unique experiment fielded during the 2016 presidential transition, we show that Republicans and Democrats impose equal audience costs on President Trump. And by varying the leader’s identity, between Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and “The President,” we demonstrate that the public adheres to a non-partisan logic in punishing leaders who renege on threats. Yet we also find Presidents Trump and Obama can reduce the magnitude of audience costs by justifying backing down as being “in America’s interest.” Even Democrats, despite their doubts of Donald Trump’s credibility, accept such justifications. Our findings encourage further exploration of partisan cues, leader-level attributes, and leader-level reputations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Wojczewski

Abstract Employing a discursive understanding of populism and combing it with insights of poststructuralist international relations theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis, this article examines the conceptual links between foreign policy and populist forms of identity construction, as well as the ideological force that populism can unfold in the realm of foreign policy. It conceptualizes populism and foreign policy as distinct discourses that constitute collective identities by relating Self and Other. Identifying different modes of Othering, the article illustrates its arguments with a case study on the United States under Donald Trump and shows how the Trumpian discourse has used foreign policy as a platform for the (re)production of a populist-nationalist electoral coalition. Unlike common conceptions of populism as an ideology that misrepresents reality, the article argues that the discourse develops its ideological appeal by obscuring the discursive construction of social reality and thereby promising to satisfy the subject's desire for a complete and secure identity.


Significance President-elect Donald Trump plans to expand military spending as part of his "America First" foreign policy but has so far offered few details of how this expansion will be financed. The new budget will have significant commercial implications for private entities involved in US defence procurements and for Washington’s force posture abroad. Impacts Trump may focus on increasing US-based missile defence capabilities instead of regionally focused systems based overseas. Political complications over NATO deployments may ensue if US spending outstrips that of its allies. Expansion of the nuclear arsenal beyond current modernisation plans could spark an arms race with Washington’s rivals.


Subject Russia's new foreign policy document. Significance A new foreign policy concept presents Russia as a nation facing a range of security threats but nevertheless willing to play a global role in a multipolar, chaotic and unpredictable world. Replacing the 2013 foreign policy concept, the document also attempts to assuage fears of Russian expansionist intent. Impacts Assumptions about the United States may change rapidly under President Donald Trump. Moscow will strengthen its foothold in Syria as a bargaining chip with the West and to show its resolve not to back down under pressure. Russia will refuse to relax control over Ukraine's eastern regions. Asian policy will consist partly of courting China and partly of seeking alliances to counterbalance this. Economic cooperation with Japan will be constrained by lack of a near-term deal on territorial issues.


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