scholarly journals Committee autonomy in parliamentary systems – coalition logic or congressional rationales?

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim A. Mickler
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Parliamentary Systems

scholarly journals Negativity and Political Behavior: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Negative Voting in Contemporary Democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110001
Author(s):  
Diego Garzia ◽  
Frederico Ferreira da Silva
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Negative Attitudes ◽  
Affective Component ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Rational Component

Recent developments in Western societies have motivated a growing consideration of the role of negativity in public opinion and political behavior research. In this article, we review the scant (and largely disconnected) scientific literature on negativity and political behavior, merging contributions from social psychology, public opinion, and electoral research, with a view on developing an integrated theoretical framework for the study of negative voting in contemporary democracies. We highlight that the tendency toward negative voting is driven by three partly overlapping components, namely, (1) an instrumental–rational component characterized by retrospective performance evaluations and rationalization mechanisms, (2) an ideological component grounded on long-lasting political identities, and (3) an affective component, motivated by (negative) attitudes toward parties and candidates. By blueprinting the systematic relationships between negative voting and each of these components in turn, and suggesting multiple research paths, this article aims to stimulate future studies on negative voting in multi-party parliamentary systems to motivate a better understanding of the implications of negativity in voting behavior in contemporary democracies.

Candidate campaigning in parliamentary systems

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 428-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rune Karlsen ◽  
Eli Skogerbø
Keyword(s):  
Parliamentary Systems

scholarly journals Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

Parliamentary Accountability and Reform

2021 ◽  
pp. 310-329
Author(s):  
Muiris MacCarthaigh
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
General Election ◽  
Lower House ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
The Government ◽  
Irish Politics

The assertion that the Irish parliament, Oireachtas Éireann, or more specifically its lower house Dáil Éireann, is poor at if not incapable of fulfilling its constitutional role of holding the government to account is an established feature of the study of Irish politics. In this chapter, the development of parliamentary accountability is examined in constitutional and comparative contexts. This is achieved by first looking at the idea of accountability and its manifestation within the Westminster family of parliamentary systems, including the Oireachtas. The chapter examines the three principal methods through which executive accountability to Dáil Éireann has been pursued, namely debates, questions, and, more recently, committees. An analysis of the parliamentary reforms that have been proposed and introduced to address perceived accountability deficits is then presented. In a final section, important changes that resulted from the outcome of the 2016 general election for the operation of parliamentary accountability are examined.

scholarly journals Electoral rules, forms of government, and political budget cycles in transition countries

2008 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Klasnja
Keyword(s):  
Transition Process ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Political Budget Cycles ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Optimal Outcomes ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

Recent studies have suggested the existence of 'election-year economics' in fiscal policy in transition countries. This study asks whether such electoral cycles in aggregate measures (overall expenditures, revenues and balance) and spending composition (broad vs. targeted outlays) differ among countries with different political systems. This question is motivated by a sharp division between majoritarian presidential systems in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and proportional-parliamentary systems in the Baltic's, Central and Southeastern Europe. Further, in the absence of context-sensitive theories, the paper asks whether observed outcomes in the transition process conform to the theoretical priors developed for conditions in stable democracies. Finally, the paper attempts to normatively establish whether either of the alternative combinations yields more optimal policy outcomes. The results suggest that the differences indeed exist, primarily on the revenue side and in the composition of expenditures. These results differ markedly from those for stable democracies, especially in the case of composition of spending. Normatively, presidential yields sub optimal outcomes in comparison to parliamentarians, likely due to inefficient system of constitutionally intended checks and balances. .

The American Political Scene

1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 140-150
Author(s):  
C. K. Rowland ◽  
Thomas W. Casstevens
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
The United States ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Political Event ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
General Elections ◽  
Political Scene ◽  
Selection Of

The American political scene is dominated, as these words are written, by presidential primaries and personal campaigns for presidential nominations. The selection of the chief executive, of course, will be the signal political event of the year 1980. Congressional elections, unlike general elections in parliamentary systems, rarely energize and organize the polity on a national basis. Presidential elections are the national political process in the United States.

Dynamic Coalition Logic: Granting and Revoking Dictatorial Powers

2021 ◽  
pp. 88-101
Author(s):  
Rustam Galimullin ◽  
Thomas Ågotnes
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Logic
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