The EU: A Successful Military Conflict Manager?

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Peen Rodt
2010 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD G. WHITMAN ◽  
STEFAN WOLFF
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-43
Author(s):  
Juhan Värk

AbstractFor a long time Russia has regarded the European Union and China as its main economic and trade partners, giving preference to the EU. A sudden change occurred in October 2008, when as a response to the EU’s sharp criticism of the Kremlin over the Georgian-Russian military conflict, Russia decided to re-orient its foreign economic and trade policy from the EU to China and partially also to India. At the same time Russian-Chinese military and energy cooperation started to grow. Russia sold China oil and gas at low price and supplied it with advanced weaponry, which has increased China’s aggression toward its neighbours. Russia also started to politically and militarily support China’s activities in Syria and Iran, which, in turn, worsened Russia’s relations with several EU Member States, including Germany, France and Italy, with whom Russia was planning to cooperate in the developing of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin still declares a great continuing friendship and solidarity with China and is hoping to see the worsening of China’s conflict with the US, which, Putin claims, could avert China’s direct conflict with Russia. Several leading Russian military and political experts describe this hope as unrealistic. At the same time, the volume of EU-Russian mutual trade was almost 395 billion US dollars in 2011, which exceeds in volume the Chinese-Russian trade volume by more than four times. It shows that Russia’s trade reset from the EU to China has been negligible. Also, it is bad news for Russia and China that Iran today stifles cooperation with Georgia and Chinese separatist Uyghurs, and Syrian Bashar al-Assad’s regime is developing cooperation with al Qaeda, and does not explain Russia’s and China’s current similar foreign policy toward Iran and Syria.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-91
Author(s):  
Yaryna Turchyn ◽  
Lesya Dorоsh

Abstract The purpose of the article is to examine the Eastern Partnership initiative as a component of the European Neighbourhood Policy and a tool of regional security by taking into account the factor of Russian aggression and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Based on methods of analysis and synthesis, content analysis of primary and secondary sources of information, modelling and prediction, the following objectives are achieved: (1) to determine the vulnerabilities in the programme design, given the current geopolitical threats, and (2) to develop proposals to change the security component of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) within the context of the Russian- Ukrainian conflict. The significant shortcomings of the existing EaP model are highlighted, in particular, the initiative overall ineffectiveness, the EU membership perspective in the long run, disregarded national features, the lack of commitment by the EU countries to strengthen the integration, the security component weakness and the insufficient European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) financial support. It is concluded that intensification of the cooperation of the EaP partner countries in the area of security will not only contribute to the initiative development, but it will also enhance national securities and promote the development of a zone of stability and democracy as well as the European security space consolidation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 170-175
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Ivanov

This report describes the goal, mission, composition of participants, main events and results of the applied research seminar in the format of a field trip under the aforementioned name, which was organized and held during the summer semester 2019 by Jun.-Prof. Dr. Steffen Eckеhard (Ph.D. in Political Science at Konstanz University, Germany) for the MA-students of the International Administration and Conflict Management Program, with assistance from professors and students of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv’s Faculty of History. The seminar consisted of two parts. The first – preparatory-theoretical, was conducted at Konstanz University, Germany. The second – empirically-practical, was held for a week in Kyiv. Aside from Germans, as much as half of the research group consisted of exchange students from other countries: Great Britain, Netherlands, Canada, Lithuania, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine and Sweden. Overall, the students conducted 16 interview meetings with representatives of international, domestic, public and non-profit organizations in just five days. Such interviews were conducted with, among others, the students who took part in the Revolution of Dignity and military conflict in Donbas on Ukraine’s side. Besides, Ukrainian politicians, “NV” radio station’s editor-in-chief, political scientists and employees of international organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN also helped the participants of the seminar to formulate their own view of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Based on the collected and analyzed information, 6 reports were prepared. They can be accessed in English at the official web-page of the research group: https://www.polver.uni-konstanz.de/eckhard/teaching/applied-teaching


2020 ◽  
pp. 09-36
Author(s):  
Nuno Magalhães

The European Union (EU) has recently become the most active conflict manager, currently deploying more operations than any other organisation. There has been a total of 13 operations of military nature from 2003 to 2019, deployed in Europe and in Africa. The discourse at the level of the European Union emphasizes not only the security of its members but also the importance of humanitarian norms. Do these norms drive the deployment of EU’s military operations? There is literature that recognizes the relevance of norms, suggesting that these factors may indirectly or even directly have a driving impact. On the contrary, I suggest that there is no normative driving impact. To be precise, I argue that power distribution and exposure to conflicts are the fundamental conditions driving the deployment of military operations by the EU.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 197-206
Author(s):  
Jakub Siotor

Ukraine and Russian gas transit to the European Union. Current situation and perspectives for the future Ukraine is the most important transit state of Russian gas to the European Union. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 caused the military conflict what affects mutual business relations between those two countries until today. It was one of the reasons that made Gazprom start thinking of new gas transition installation omitting Ukraine. The purpose of the study is to show current role of the Ukraine in Russian gas transit to the European Union. The first part of the article describes current situation of the gas sector in Ukraine and historical review of relations with Russia concerning gas trade. The second part shows current ways of Russian gas distribution to the EU and the perspectives connected with new gas pipelines projects – Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream. The third part focuses on giving an answer to the question: weather the Ukraine still is to be the Russian gas transit state in the second decade of the 21st century? The study is based on scientific and press articles as well as on information given at official websites of the following institutions: European Union, government of Ukraine, government of Russia, NGOs from Ukraine, Russia and EU states. The article is also based on discussion that took place in Warsaw at 11th of May 2019 during International Conference Quo Vadis Ukraine held by phd research organization „Ucrainica”.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25242644 ◽  
pp. 8-18
Author(s):  
Žaneta Ozoliņa ◽  
Iveta Reinholde

The article looks at ways on how Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union are contributing to peace and stability in Ukraine. Since 2014, after the Euromaidan and its demands for Europeanization of the country, the EU and other international donors are assisting Ukraine in its modernization efforts. The spread of violent military conflict in Eastern Ukraine required multilateral engagement of strategic partners in transformation of security and defence sectors, as well as active participation in conflict management in the Eastern part of the country. EU was taking part in various initiatives offered by member states, the Community itself, and Ukraine. The article questions whether those instruments, which constitute the essence of CSDP, have been utilized, and how beneficial those efforts were for Ukraine. The article also explores what improvements in the implementation of CSDP could enhance transformation of security sector in Ukraine and what are the main communication channels used to explain the reforms. Cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union was considered in a historical aspect. The authors emphasize that the first mechanisms for cooperation with the former Soviet Union republics were proposed by the European Union in 1994. These are the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) and the TEMPUS (Trans-European Mobility Programme for University Studies) programmes that Ukraine has used in part. Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU within the framework of the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine, the aim of which was facilitating the transformation of the civil security sector, was also considered. The article gives an overview of the tools that the European Union has at its disposal to work with other countries in the civil security sector. The results of the work of the EU in Ukraine after 2014, when the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine was launched, are analyzed. A list of issues to consider in the future is given.


Baltic Region ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Z. Zhiznin

The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project (NS 2) along the bottom of the Baltic Sea is aimed to increase gas supply from Russia to Germany and other EU countries. It serves mutual economic interests: the predicted growth in gas demand in the EU markets and the need to strengthen the energy security of the EU. The implementation of the NS 2 project is complicated by the need to allow for the EU energy legislation and by the expanding influence of geopolitical factors on EU – Russia cooperation, including those stemming from the aggressive US energy diplomacy seeking to prevent the project from being successful and thus promoting the geopolitical interests of Washington. In this work, we aim to study the economic and geopolitical stances taken by the project’s supporters and opponents and to evaluate the prospects of NS 2. To this end, we carry out a factor analysis and employ the methods of economic, statistical and geopolitical analysis.We conclude that the project is high on the agenda of both EU-Russia economic relations and world politics. The project has good prospects despite counteraction from its geopolitical opponents. This is explained by it having a decided economic edge over alternative options for the EU. The launch of NS 2 may contribute both to providing the energy security of the EU and to easing the military tensions between NATO and Russia in the Baltic region. The need to ensure the reliable operation of gas supply infrastructure makes any military conflict in the region impossible.


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