Balance of Payments Adjustment, 1945 to 1986: The IMF Experience. Margaret Garritsen de VriesTheoretical Aspects of the Design of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs. Research Department of the International Monetary Fund

1990 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-421
Author(s):  
Santiago Levy
1987 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kendall W. Stiles

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently published a pamphlet on the question of whether the IMF, as an institution, imposes austerity on debtors. The response focused on the second half of the question and argued that IMF adjustment programs were, in fact, not systematically austere. However, from a political perspective, the first half of the question is much more provocative. Does the IMF “impose” its will on member states, and, if so, how? Many have argued i that, by virtue of its political connections with the financial centers of the world and its intellectual sophistication, the so-called “negotiations” which debtor nations conduct with Fund staff, prior to the drafting of an agreement on lending conditions, is little more than an exercise in coercion on the part of the Fund.


1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiří Jonáš

Almost seven years ago, in January 1990, the IMF approved for Poland its first stabilisation program in Eastern Europe. The Fund's role was to provide financial support to macroeconomic stabilisation in the wake of rapid liberalisation of prices, opening of foreign trade and devaluation of currency. In 1991, as reforms in Eastern Europe unfolded, stabilisation programs for other countries followed. During the nearly seven years since, the IMF has provided billions of USD to countries in the region, and all of the former centrally planned economies except Slovenia have received financial support from the IMF. The Fund's financial assistance never comes with no strings attached. Such assistance must serve not only the immediate purpose of balance of payments support but also the longer-term objective of eliminating the problems causing the recipient country to seek the Fund's assistance.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mária Havrilová

The International Monetary Fund is a remarkable survivor. It was created to carry out specific functions in a world that has since vanished. Its role in the world economy still remains central. But in recent times, it has faced considerable criticism, both in terms of its role and its performance. We examine why IMF programs are often ineffective in achieving their goals, and whether there are any prospects for strengthening the IMF's role to become a genuine global monitor of financial flows and monetary issues. Then we examine the Fund's major role as lender of last resort to members who experience balance of payments problems. In particular, it will argue that the IMF's reliance on "conditionality" as a means of affecting change in the domestic policy of some of its members is misguided. Finally, a few suggestions on how the IMF could improve its procedures and brief evaluation of the IMF´s intervention in the Asian financial crisis.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hjálti Ómar Ágústsson ◽  
Rachael Lorna Johnstone

Between September 2008 and August 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Iceland were engaged in cooperation under a stand-by agreement involving a loan from the IMF to Iceland of over 2bn USD. The IMF is one of a number of major international institutions that has been increasing its emphasis on good governance over the past two decades, in particular, emphasising the need for improved governance in debtor countries. In this paper, the authors review the extent to which principles of good governance were exercised in the interaction between the IMF and Iceland within the context of the stand-by programme.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nona Tamale

The COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a huge blow to every country, and many governments have struggled to meet their populations’ urgent needs during the crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stepped in to offer extra support to a large number of countries during the pandemic. However, Oxfam’s analysis shows that as of 15 March 2021, 85% of the 107 COVID-19 loans negotiated between the IMF and 85 governments indicate plans to undertake austerity once the health crisis abates. The findings in this briefing paper show that the IMF is systematically encouraging countries to adopt austerity measures once the pandemic subsides, risking a severe spike in already increased inequality levels. A variety of studies have revealed the uneven distribution of the burden of austerity, which is more likely to be shouldered by women, low-income households and vulnerable groups, while the wealth of the richest people increases. Oxfam joins global institutions and civil society in urging governments worldwide and the IMF to focus their energies instead on a people-centred, just and equal recovery that will fight inequality and not fuel it. Austerity will not ‘build back better’.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  

This volume is the Forty-First Issue of Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the IMF. It includes decisions, interpretations, and resolutions of the Executive Board and the Board of Governors of the IMF, as well as selected documents, to which frequent reference is made in the current activities of the IMF. In addition, it includes certain documents relating to the IMF, the United Nations, and other international organizations. As with other recent issues, the number of decisions in force continues to increase, with the decision format tending to be longer given the use of summings up in lieu of formal decisions. Accordingly, it has become necessary to delete certain decisions that were included in earlier issues, that is, those that only completed or called for reviews of decisions, those that lapsed, and those that were superseded by more recent decisions. Wherever reference is made in these decisions and documents to a provision of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement or Rules and Regulations that has subsequently been renumbered by, or because of, the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement (effective April 1, 1978), the corresponding provision currently in effect is cited in a footnote.


2019 ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
Jerome Roos

This chapter considers why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did it not prevent Argentina's record default of 2001. It suggests that the IMF was both unable and unwilling to stop it. While the second enforcement mechanism of conditional IMF lending was initially fully operative, helping to enforce Argentina's compliance in the first years of the crisis, the outcome of the megaswap greatly reduced the risk of an Argentine default to the international financial system. Combined with mounting domestic opposition in the United States to further international bailout loans, this greatly weakened the IMF's capacity to impose fiscal discipline on Argentina, eventually leading the Fund to pull the plug on its own bailout program, causing the second enforcement mechanism to break down altogether. The chapter recounts the process through which this breakdown occurred.


Author(s):  
Stephen C. Nelson

This chapter examines Argentina's relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the period 1976–1984. It tracks Argentina's engagement with the IMF from the arrival of a Fund mission soon after the military junta took power in 1976 through to the economic meltdown in the last months of 2001, which culminated in the withdrawal of IMF support for the country and the largest sovereign default in history to that point. The Argentina-IMF case is used to test the argument linking treatment of borrowers to shared economic beliefs. The chapter first provides an overview of economic policymaking in Argentina in 1976–1981 and in 1991–2001; economic policymaking in the latter period was dominated by neoliberals. It also compares the economic beliefs of neoliberals with those of structuralists and concludes with a discussion of the breakdown in Argentine-IMF relations.


1976 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frieder Roessler

In view of recent proposals to grant the International Monetary Fund new instruments to press countries to adjust balance of payments disequilibria, the question arises of the efficacy of such means of pressure. An analysis of the Fund's power shows, inter alia, that conditions attached to currency purchases by deficit countries can only influence the techniques of adjustment but not the length of the adjustment period, that it is normally not possible for the Fund to expose individual surplus countries to inflationary or expansionary pressures, that the scarce currency clause is unworkable in present monetary conditions, and that the Fund's system of charges and remunerations cannot be used to exert financial pressure on countries in imbalance. The general avoidance of sanctions by the Fund's Executive Directors suggests that it would only be useful to make additional pressures available to the Fund, as contemplated by the Committee of Twenty, if the authority to take decisions on sanctions were transferred to a separate judicial or quasi-judicial body.


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