The international monetary fund in eastern europe: seven years of experience

1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiří Jonáš

Almost seven years ago, in January 1990, the IMF approved for Poland its first stabilisation program in Eastern Europe. The Fund's role was to provide financial support to macroeconomic stabilisation in the wake of rapid liberalisation of prices, opening of foreign trade and devaluation of currency. In 1991, as reforms in Eastern Europe unfolded, stabilisation programs for other countries followed. During the nearly seven years since, the IMF has provided billions of USD to countries in the region, and all of the former centrally planned economies except Slovenia have received financial support from the IMF. The Fund's financial assistance never comes with no strings attached. Such assistance must serve not only the immediate purpose of balance of payments support but also the longer-term objective of eliminating the problems causing the recipient country to seek the Fund's assistance.

1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-432

Sixth Annual Report on ExchangeRestrictionsOn May 4, 1955, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (Rooth) transmitted to the Governors and members of the Fund the sixth annual report on exchange restrictions. In the third series of consultations on exchange restrictions, the Fund had consulted with 45 member governments under Article XIV, Section 2, of the Articles of Agreement. During the year reviewed, March 1954 to April 1955, the Fund reported further progress toward convertibility, although progresshad been more gradual and mainly by means of numerous relatively small measures of relaxation. There had been greater reliance on monetary and fiscal measures for coping with balance of payments problems, as contrasted with earlier reliance on restriction of foreign trade and payments; this shift in emphasis had made possible the introduction and operation of facilities for increased convertibility. Developments in the exchange and monetary field had, the report noted, focused attention on the problem of discrimination, especially in the form of bilateral agreements, and on the question of whether these arrangements were justified in a world in which there was a general trend toward multilateralism, convertibility and freedom from restriction. The period reviewed in the report was also marked by larger exchange allocations for various purposes and significant relaxation of discrimination against dollar payments. In addition, exchange controls had been simplified or their administration liberalized in a number of countries.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mária Havrilová

The International Monetary Fund is a remarkable survivor. It was created to carry out specific functions in a world that has since vanished. Its role in the world economy still remains central. But in recent times, it has faced considerable criticism, both in terms of its role and its performance. We examine why IMF programs are often ineffective in achieving their goals, and whether there are any prospects for strengthening the IMF's role to become a genuine global monitor of financial flows and monetary issues. Then we examine the Fund's major role as lender of last resort to members who experience balance of payments problems. In particular, it will argue that the IMF's reliance on "conditionality" as a means of affecting change in the domestic policy of some of its members is misguided. Finally, a few suggestions on how the IMF could improve its procedures and brief evaluation of the IMF´s intervention in the Asian financial crisis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (5) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Oleksandr SHAROV ◽  

Ukraine became a member of the IMF in September 1992, shortly after the proclamation of independence in 1991. But in reality, the path to the IMF was much longer, since it began with the creation of the IMF as a specialized agency of the United Nations (taking into account that Ukraine was also the founder of the UN). During the membership period, Ukraine repeatedly turned to the International Monetary Fund for various assistance programs – both technical and financial ones. Nevertheless, in Ukraine there is a lack of understanding of the tasks and order of the functioning of the Fund (both among ordinary citizens and politicians), which requires an explanation in order to destroy certain myths on this issue. The first of the myths is that the IMF acts as a global «shadow government» while it is actually a mutual organization in which all members (including Ukraine) could and should play an appropriate role. In this regard, the role of economic diplomacy for the establishing of relations with the IMF and with its individual members is growing significantly. At the same time, the IMF is not an «international bank», which seeks to obtain from the countries high interest rates, but rather the international «mutual fund» of solidarity, which one needs to know how to use by. At the same time, the lack of the IMF credit programs with a member country is not necessarily a bad signal for it. Many countries have successfully reformed their economies without receiving financial assistance from the IMF. It is important to understand that the IMF does not impose its lending conditions, but takes note of the program that actually is designed (at least used to be designed) by a government of the recipient country. Finally, the IMF cooperates not only with governments of member states, but also with civil society institutions. Of course, if they are able to put pressure on their governments. Thus, a true understanding of the rules of the IMF – which are fixed in numerous documents – could help significantly improve the effectiveness of Ukraine’s relations with the International Monetary Fund.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hjálti Ómar Ágústsson ◽  
Rachael Lorna Johnstone

Between September 2008 and August 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Iceland were engaged in cooperation under a stand-by agreement involving a loan from the IMF to Iceland of over 2bn USD. The IMF is one of a number of major international institutions that has been increasing its emphasis on good governance over the past two decades, in particular, emphasising the need for improved governance in debtor countries. In this paper, the authors review the extent to which principles of good governance were exercised in the interaction between the IMF and Iceland within the context of the stand-by programme.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nona Tamale

The COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a huge blow to every country, and many governments have struggled to meet their populations’ urgent needs during the crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stepped in to offer extra support to a large number of countries during the pandemic. However, Oxfam’s analysis shows that as of 15 March 2021, 85% of the 107 COVID-19 loans negotiated between the IMF and 85 governments indicate plans to undertake austerity once the health crisis abates. The findings in this briefing paper show that the IMF is systematically encouraging countries to adopt austerity measures once the pandemic subsides, risking a severe spike in already increased inequality levels. A variety of studies have revealed the uneven distribution of the burden of austerity, which is more likely to be shouldered by women, low-income households and vulnerable groups, while the wealth of the richest people increases. Oxfam joins global institutions and civil society in urging governments worldwide and the IMF to focus their energies instead on a people-centred, just and equal recovery that will fight inequality and not fuel it. Austerity will not ‘build back better’.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  

This volume is the Forty-First Issue of Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the IMF. It includes decisions, interpretations, and resolutions of the Executive Board and the Board of Governors of the IMF, as well as selected documents, to which frequent reference is made in the current activities of the IMF. In addition, it includes certain documents relating to the IMF, the United Nations, and other international organizations. As with other recent issues, the number of decisions in force continues to increase, with the decision format tending to be longer given the use of summings up in lieu of formal decisions. Accordingly, it has become necessary to delete certain decisions that were included in earlier issues, that is, those that only completed or called for reviews of decisions, those that lapsed, and those that were superseded by more recent decisions. Wherever reference is made in these decisions and documents to a provision of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement or Rules and Regulations that has subsequently been renumbered by, or because of, the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement (effective April 1, 1978), the corresponding provision currently in effect is cited in a footnote.


2019 ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
Jerome Roos

This chapter considers why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did it not prevent Argentina's record default of 2001. It suggests that the IMF was both unable and unwilling to stop it. While the second enforcement mechanism of conditional IMF lending was initially fully operative, helping to enforce Argentina's compliance in the first years of the crisis, the outcome of the megaswap greatly reduced the risk of an Argentine default to the international financial system. Combined with mounting domestic opposition in the United States to further international bailout loans, this greatly weakened the IMF's capacity to impose fiscal discipline on Argentina, eventually leading the Fund to pull the plug on its own bailout program, causing the second enforcement mechanism to break down altogether. The chapter recounts the process through which this breakdown occurred.


Author(s):  
Stephen C. Nelson

This chapter examines Argentina's relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the period 1976–1984. It tracks Argentina's engagement with the IMF from the arrival of a Fund mission soon after the military junta took power in 1976 through to the economic meltdown in the last months of 2001, which culminated in the withdrawal of IMF support for the country and the largest sovereign default in history to that point. The Argentina-IMF case is used to test the argument linking treatment of borrowers to shared economic beliefs. The chapter first provides an overview of economic policymaking in Argentina in 1976–1981 and in 1991–2001; economic policymaking in the latter period was dominated by neoliberals. It also compares the economic beliefs of neoliberals with those of structuralists and concludes with a discussion of the breakdown in Argentine-IMF relations.


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