scholarly journals The application of imperfect information game theory in social games

2021 ◽  
Vol 1883 (1) ◽  
pp. 012068
Author(s):  
Ni Guo ◽  
Zehui Qu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Social Games

scholarly journals The ambiguity dilemma in procurement projects

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 792-800 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Rajabi Asadabadi ◽  
Keiran Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Procurement Process

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to use game theory and ambiguity theory to show how “economically rational” vendors will behave in a procurement process that runs over more than one period. In light of that behavior, we have proposed “economically rational” counter-strategies on the part of purchasers.Design/methodology/approachBased on a perception–expectation framework, a unique game-based approach is designed. The authors have proposed “economically rational” counter-strategies on the part of purchasers, which are premised on the theory of rational agency.FindingsAmbiguity in the procurement process is a bane for procuring principals and a boon for suppliers – for the former, it is an issue to be managed, and for the latter it provides an opportunity to extract “insurance rents” from the principals. The authors show that, under certain conditions, the contracting principal can be exploited by a rational, rent-extracting vendor. In particular, they show that there is an incentive for a vendor to delay the resolution of ambiguities in the contract until late in the procurement process, when the insurance rents are at a maximum.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the current literature by highlighting an existing problem in the procurement process and describing it using decision theory under ambiguity in a game-like setting. Specifically, the authors use game theory in a unique way to deal with imperfect information coupled with ambiguity.

scholarly journals Robust Nash Dynamic Game Strategy for User Cooperation Energy Efficiency in Wireless Cellular Networks

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuhuan Wen ◽  
Baozhu Hu ◽  
Ahmad B. Rad ◽  
Xinbin Li ◽  
Huibin Lu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Base Station ◽  
Mobile Users ◽  
User Cooperation ◽  
Decode And Forward ◽  
Data Rates ◽  
The Game Theory

Recently, there is an emerging trend of addressing “energy efficiency” aspect of wireless communications. It has been shown that cooperating users relay each other's information to improve data rates. The energy is limited in the wireless cellular network, but the mobile users refuse to relay. This paper presents an approach that encourages user cooperation in order to improve the energy efficiency. The game theory is an efficient method to solve such conflicts. We present a cellular framework in which two mobile users, who desire to communicate with a common base station, may cooperate via decode-and-forward relaying. In the case of imperfect information assumption, cooperative Nash dynamic game is used between the two users' cooperation to tackle the decision making problems: whether to cooperate and how to cooperate in wireless networks. The scheme based on “cooperative game theory” can achieve general pareto-optimal performance for cooperative games, and thus, maximize the entire system payoff while maintaining fairness.

scholarly journals Insufficient declines in new HIV infection rates amidst high scores in HIV testing and awareness: ‘a game theory simulation’

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perez Nicholas Ochanda ◽  
Richard Ssempala ◽  
Allan Kayongo ◽  
Tonny Odokonyero
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Hiv Infection ◽  
Subjective Probability ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Probability Distributions ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Unprotected Sex ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Game Tree ◽  
Individual Probability

Abstract Aim Substantial progress has been made towards the 90–90–90 global targets; however, the pace at which new infections are declining remains undesirable to meet the UNAIDS 2020 global targets of below 500,000 new infections annually. We discussed the possibility of continued HIV incidence amidst remarkable scores in the 90–90–90 global targets. Subject and methods A game theory simulation was used to explain micro-level sexual interactions in situations of imperfect information on each partner’s HIV status. A non-cooperative sex game tree was constructed following the Harsanyi transformation in two scenarios; scenario one: a player assigns higher subjective probability that the partner is HIV negative; and in scenario two: a player assigns higher subjective probability that the partner is HIV positive. Subjective expected utilities were computed using hypothetical payoffs. Results Accepting unprotected sex is a pure strategy for both players in scenario 1. Player2 is likely to acquire HIV/AIDS. Accepting protected sex is a mixed strategy equilibrium for both players in scenario 2. Player2 is likely to avoid HIV infection. Conclusion Choice for safe or risky sex is a function of subjective probabilities individuals attach to their partners being infected or uninfected. More efforts towards addressing factors affecting individual probability distributions on riskiness of their sexual partners is required, especially for young women in Sub-Saharan Africa.

scholarly journals ¿Adquirir o integrar al proveedor? El dilema de una empresa: un modelo de teoría de juegos aplicado / Acquire or Integrate the Provider? The Dilemma of a Company: a Model of Game Theory Applied

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-98
Author(s):  
Luis Antonio Andrade Rosas
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Information Model ◽  
A Company

ABSTRACTSometimes, the size of a company exceeds the level of sales and generates losses; to reduce them, it is proposed that the company incorporates its supplier. Such incorporation can be done in two ways: i) acquire it completely, or ii) associate it. An imperfect information model is built for the company, and the types of suppliers that exist are determined. Based on a signal from the provider, a threshold is derived from which it is beneficial for the company to incorporate the supplier. In addition, 50% could be granted to the provider if it is of healthy finances.RESUMENEn ocasiones, el tamaño de una empresa sobrepasa el nivel de ventas y genera pérdidas; para reducirlas, se propone la incorporación de una proveedora por parte de la empresa. Tal incorporación la puede hacer de dos formas: i) Adquirirla completamente, o ii) asociarla. Se construye un modelo de información imperfecta para la empresa, y se determinan los tipos de proveedoras que existen. Con base en una señal de la proveedora, se deduce un umbral a partir del cual es benéfico para la empresa incorporar a la proveedora. Además, podría otorgarse el 50% a la proveedora si fuera de finanzas sanas.

scholarly journals Sociological game theory: agency, social structures and interaction processes

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom R. Burns ◽  
Ewa Roszkowska ◽  
Nora Machado ◽  
Ugo Corte
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Applied Mathematics ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Social Games ◽  
Interaction Processes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

This article presents two sociological theories, alternatives to classical game theory. These social science-based game theories discussed here present reformulations of classical game theory in applied mathematics (CGT). These theories offer an important advance to classical game theory, thanks to the application of central concepts in sociology and social psychology, as well as the results of empirical analyses of individual and collective behaviour. These two theories emerging in the social sciences are, the first, based on systems theory, is social science game theory (SGT); the other is Erwing Goffman’s interactionist theory (IGT) based on social psychology. Each of these theories, both focused on the analysis of social games, are presented and contrasted with classical game theory, highlighting the centrality of social rules in structuring and regulating human behaviour, and the need to include them in any analysis.

Game Theory Basics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard von Stengel
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Direct Proof ◽  
Minimax Theorem ◽  
Introductory Courses ◽  
Game Trees ◽  
Self Study ◽  
Or Economics ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

Game theory is the science of interaction. This textbook, derived from courses taught by the author and developed over several years, is a comprehensive, straightforward introduction to the mathematics of non-cooperative games. It teaches what every game theorist should know: the important ideas and results on strategies, game trees, utility theory, imperfect information, and Nash equilibrium. The proofs of these results, in particular existence of an equilibrium via fixed points, and an elegant direct proof of the minimax theorem for zero-sum games, are presented in a self-contained, accessible way. This is complemented by chapters on combinatorial games like Go; and, it has introductions to algorithmic game theory, traffic games, and the geometry of two-player games. This detailed and lively text requires minimal mathematical background and includes many examples, exercises, and pictures. It is suitable for self-study or introductory courses in mathematics, computer science, or economics departments.

scholarly journals Behavioral modelling of subjects in legal cases-games with imperfect rationality

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 01011
Author(s):  
Valentina Sergeevna Nikitina
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Legal Cases ◽  
Irrational Behavior ◽  
Developing Directions ◽  
Imperfect Rationality ◽  
Reasonable Behavior

Game theory, applied in various fields, including in law, studies conflict game models and searches for their formatted solutions, makes it possible to solve many tasks and problems, predict the behaviour of subjects in various situations, thereby explaining the behavior logic of the individuals in conflict of interests. However, human behavior is not always rational (reasonable), moreover, it can be difficult to predict which strategy the player will choose when making his move in the game. In this regard, it is advisable to consider rational behavior as an accepted and reasonable behavior of game participants and irrational behavior as deviant, unpredictable behavior of players, which relies on the internal regulation of a person (beliefs, intuition, creativity, feelings, emotions, etc.) and which studies one of the developing directions of game theory in modern science – evolutionary game theory. The study aims to determine the types of irrational behavior of players, which puts other players in a difficult position and precludes from determining each other’s optimal strategies for mutual benefit and stability, using the example of legal incidents modeling through games with imperfect rationality. The authors believe, that to achieve this goal using the methods of analysis and modeling, the imperfections of rationality can be considered and studied, the types of irrational behavior of players can be defined using the games with imperfect calculation of the game, imperfect information and changes in goals during the game (with a multipersonal representation of the game) and a complete absence of rationality.

THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE IN GAMES

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (04) ◽  
pp. 1340030 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROHIT PARIKH ◽  
ÇAĞIL TAŞDEMİR ◽  
ANDREAS WITZEL
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Knowledge States ◽  
States Of Knowledge

We propose a theory of the interaction between knowledge and games. Epistemic game theory is of course a well-developed subject but there is also a need for a theory of how some agents can affect the outcome of a game by affecting the knowledge which other agents have and thereby affecting their actions. We concentrate on games of incomplete or imperfect information, and study how conservative, moderate, or aggressive players might play such games. We provide models for the behavior of a knowledge manipulator who seeks to manipulate the knowledge states of active players in order to affect their moves and to maximize her own payoff even while she herself remains inactive, except for influencing the states of knowledge of the other players.

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