New Zealand

Author(s):  
Adrian Ward ◽  
Gledhill Kris

New Zealand is a common law country. The judicial structure is the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, which are appellate courts only; the High Court, which hears appeals from District Courts in some situations but is also a court of first instance; the District Court, which is principally a court of first instance but also hears appeals from some Tribunals; and various Tribunals. There is also a Family Court, in which warranted District Court judges sit, and which—along with the High Court—deals with adult protection matters.

Author(s):  
Claire van Overdijk ◽  
Terence Seah

Singapore is a common law country. Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court (High Court and Court of Appeal) and the State Courts (District Courts and Magistrates’ Courts). Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Mental Capacity Proceedings to District Court) Order 2010, proceedings under the Mental Capacity Act (cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (‘MCA’) are now first heard by the District Court.


Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.


2019 ◽  
pp. 24-45
Author(s):  
Stephen Taylor ◽  
Astra Emir

This chapter discusses the sources of UK employment law and relevant institutions, and looks at court structure. The main source is statutes—Acts of Parliament, regulations and EU law. The common law is judge-made and has evolved over centuries as cases are brought to court and appealed up through the court hierarchy. The laws of contract, trust and tort all play a part in employment regulation. Most cases relating to common law matters are brought to the County Court or the High Court. Employment tribunal cases can be appealed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) and then the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and, if concerning an EU matter, to the European Court of Justice. Other important institutions in the employment law include the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
LG Curlewis

In this matter, which resulted in an enquiry by the Supreme Court of Appeal and ultimately a unanimous decision, the facts were the following: the appellant, Mrs Y M (M) appealed against an order that she and her minor daughter (Y) submit to DNA testing to determine whether Mr L B (B), the respondent, was the biological father of Y. The order was sought by B, who also claimed that, if the tests proved that he was indeed the father, he should be given full parenting rights. The North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) (Murphy J sitting as court of first instance), ordered that M submit herself and Y to DNA tests within 30 days of the date of the order, and postponed the other relief sine die. The Supreme Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal. On appeal, B filed no heads of argument, and nor was there any appearance on his behalf.


Author(s):  
Halson Roger

The penalty doctrine has recently been subject to extensive review in the highest appellate courts of the Supreme Court of the UK and the High Court of Australia. Despite the agreement between senior appellate tribunals in the two major common law jurisdictions on the importance of a historical perspective, both propose subtly different historical analyses to justify very different conclusions about the ambit of the modern common law jurisdiction to set aside so-called penalties. This disagreement makes necessary an investigation of the history of the control of penalty clauses back to its earliest origins, in order to understand the modern doctrine. This chapter discusses the early history prior to 1600, later history from 1600 to 1915, and the case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v New Garage and Motor Co (1915).


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 629
Author(s):  
Thomas Geuther

For many years the English courts have struggled to develop a principled approach for determining when a public authority can owe a duty of care in respect of the exercise of its statutory powers. Initially, public authorities received no special treatment. Then the courts conferred an almost complete immunity on them, requiring public law irrationality to be established before considering whether a duty could arise. The English approach has not been adopted elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada have developed different tests, and the New Zealand courts, while never explicitly rejecting the English position, have never followed it. This paper argues that a modified version of the Canadian Supreme Court's approach should be adopted in New Zealand. It proposes that irrationality be a precondition to the existence of a duty of care only where policy considerations are proved to have influenced the decisions of a public authority in exercising its statutory powers.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.


Author(s):  
Michael Tsele

When a party refers to evidentiary material in the course of litigation, ordinarily this party is under an obligation to make this evidence available to his opponent, particularly when called upon to do so. However, over the years various principles have developed which make this obligation subject to certain limitations. The Fochville cases dealt with a situation where a party to litigation sought to withhold certain information from its adversary, notwithstanding the fact that the material had been relied upon as a ground for the institution of the litigation. This note critiques the judgments of the High Court and in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal in this dispute. In so doing, it draws on useful foreign law to argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment was an unfortunate one in that the court failed to clarify with reasonable precision the circumstances in which a party to litigation involving children's interests may legitimately resist disclosing evidence to his adversary, in which the party resisting disclosure invokes the principle of public interest immunity. In this regard, the note concludes that the High Court's overall approach to the issue is to be preferred.       


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-352
Author(s):  
Devina Puspita Sari

The photocopy acceptable in the court if it matched with the original letter and the strength of that photocopy is the same as the original letter. However, sometimes the original letter has been lost so that it cannot be shown at trial. This paper discusses whether a photocopy that cannot be matched with the original letter can be accepted in the civil procedural law and if it can be accepted how the strength of it, then the discussion will look at the judge’s consideration in two cases related to the issue. The results of discussions are that photocopies that cannot be matched with the original letter can be accepted as evidence if the photocopy matches or is strengthened with other evidence, as the jurisprudence of Decision Nr. 112 K/Pdt/1996 and Decision Nr. 410 K/pdt/2004. The jurisprudence has been followed by similar cases, which is the Decision of the Central Jakarta District Court Nr. 164/Pdt.G/2004/PN.Jkt.Pst jo. Decision of The Jakarta High Court Nr. 234/Pdt/2005/PT.DKI jo. Decision of The Supreme Court Nr. 1498 K/Pdt/2006 which in this case a photocopy can be accepted because it is strengthened by the recognition of the opposing party and The Pontianak District Court Nr.52/Pdt.G/2003/PN.Ptk which received a photocopy because it was strengthened with  witness testimony. The photocopy has a free power of proof (depends on the judge’s assessment). The use and assessment of the strength of the photocopy cannot be independent, but must be linked to other valid evidence. Abstrak Fotokopi surat dapat diterima dalam persidangan apabila dapat dicocokkan dengan aslinya, dan kekuatan pembuktiannya sama seperti surat aslinya. Tulisan ini membahas, dalam hal surat aslinya tidak dapat ditunjukkan di persidangan, apakah fotokopi surat dapat diterima dalam pembuktian hukum acara perdata, dan, apabila dapat diterima, bagaimanakah kekuatan pembuktiannya. Artikel ini menunjukkan, fotokopi surat yang tidak dapat dicocokkan dengan aslinya dapat diterima sebagai alat bukti surat jika bersesuaian atau dikuatkan dengan alat bukti lain, sebagaimana Putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 112 K/Pdt/1996 dan Putusan Nomor 410 K/pdt/2004 yang telah menjadi yurisprudensi. Yurisprudensi ini telah diikuti dalam perkara serupa, yaitu dalam Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat Nomor 164/Pdt.G/2004/PN.Jkt.Pst jo. Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Jakarta Nomor 234/Pdt/2005/PT.DKI jo. Putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 1498 K/Pdt/2006, di mana dalam perkara ini fotokopi surat dapat diterima karena dikuatkan dengan pengakuan pihak lawan. Demikian juga dalam Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Pontianak Nomor 52/Pdt.G/2003/PN.Ptk, yang menerima fotokopi surat yang tidak dapat dicocokkan dengan aslinya karena dikuatkan dengan alat bukti keterangan saksi. Dengan demikian, fotokopi surat memiliki kekuatan pembuktian yang bebas, artinya diserahkan kepada penilaian hakim. Penggunaan dan penilaian kekuatan pembuktian fotokopi tersebut tidak dapat berdiri sendiri, tetapi harus dikaitkan dengan alat bukti lainnya yang sah.  


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