A new broom

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Guthrie
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Management Teams ◽  
Performance Improvements ◽  
Golden Parachutes ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Right

Rival management teams compete in the market for corporate control for the right to manage shareholders’ assets. The benefit that shareholders receive from this competition depends on the strength of the board of directors. The board affects the outcome directly due to its role during the takeover process and indirectly due to its role beforehand when it specifies the golden parachutes that the incumbent management team receives when a change in management occurs. This chapter uses the takeover of Anheuser-Busch by the global brewer InBev, and the sweeping changes that followed, to introduce the market for corporate control. It explains how a firm’s shareholders can benefit from performance improvements made well after they have sold their shares, as well as how they can benefit even if a takeover never takes place.

New Mexico

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Jones
Keyword(s):  
New Mexico ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
The State ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right

The fight over an exchange had a very different dynamic in New Mexico because there were no loud voices on the right calling for the state to reject control. Republican Governor Susanna Martinez supported retaining control, but strongly preferred a governance model that allowed insurers to serve on the board of directors and limited the degree of oversight by the board on the types of plans that could be sold on the exchange. Governor Martinez vetoed legislation in 2011 that would have set up a different model of an exchange. Institutional quirks meant the legislature did not have the opportunity to weigh in again for two years, until 2013. By this point it was too late and the state had to rely on the federal website despite passing legislation to run its own exchange.

scholarly journals OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BOARD EFFECTIVENESS AS DETERMINANTS OF TMT COMPENSATION IN SPANISH LISTED FIRMS / NUOSAVYBĖS FORMOS IR VALDYBOS EFEKTYVUMĄ LEMIANTYS VEIKSNIAI PASIRINKTOSE ISPANIJOS KOMPANIJOSE

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sanchez-Marin ◽  
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler ◽  
M. Encarnacion Lucas-Perez
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Board Effectiveness ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
The Board Of Directors

This study analyzes the influence of ownership structure and the board of directors on top management team (TMT) pay levels in a sample of Spanish listed firms. When panel data methodology is applied, the results show that TMT pay level is affected by the supervisory effectiveness of the board. This, in turn, is influenced by ownership concentration and the type of major shareholders. When ownership is dispersed, the board is more effective in their supervision and TMT pay level is lower. However, when ownership is concentrated, the quality of supervision and, consequently, TMT pay levels depend upon the type of shareholder that is predominant. Santrauka Analizuojama nuosavybes formos strukturos ir valdybos itaka aukšèiausio lygio Ispanijos kompaniju vadovu darbo užmokesèio dydžiui. Tyrimu duomenys parode, kad aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio dydis priklauso nuo valdybos kontroles ir jos efektyvumo itakos. Tai, žinoma, yra susijê su kompanijos savininko ir pagrindiniu akcininku pozicija. Kai savininko pozicija pasyvi, tuomet valdybos veiksmai kontroles srityje yra efektyvesni, taèiau aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio lygis yra gerokai mažesnis. Taèiau kai savininkas tiesiogiai dalyvauja kompanijos veikloje ir prisideda prie jos valdymo, tuomet kontroles kokybe ir aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio lygis priklauso nuo akcininko pozicijos.

scholarly journals KONTRAK PERSEROAN TERBATAS YANG MENGANDUNG TINDAKAN ULTRA VIRES

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Yoel Bello ◽  
Zulkifli Makkawaru ◽  
Abd. Haris Hamid
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
District Court ◽  
Limited Liability Company ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Right

Kegiatas usaha perseroan terbatas dilaksanakan oleh organ perseroan terbatas yaitu Direksi perseroan terbatas, Direksi dapat mewakili perseroan terbatas untuk melakukan kontrak dengan pihak terkait. Tindakan mewakili Perseroan Terbatas oleh Direksi harus sesuai dengan aturan sebagaiman dalam Undang-Undang No. 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas atau yang telah ditentukan dalam Anggaran Dasar Perseroan Terbatas. Apabilan tidakan Direksi Perseroan Terbatas  melaksanakan Kontrak yang dapat merugikan Perseroan karena bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang No. 40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas atau yang telah ditatur dalam Anggaran Dasar Perseroan Terbatas maka kontrak yang dibuat mengandung Ultra Vires. Jika Direksi melakukan tindakan Ultra Vires maka sesuai dengan Pasal 61 Undang-Undang No. 40 Tahun 2007 tentang Perseroan Terbatas, kepada Pemegang sahan berhak mengajukan Gugatan terhadap Perseroan ke Pengadilan Negeri. Limited liability companies are carried out by Directors of limited liability companies. The directors can represent limited liability companies to enter into contracts with related parties. The act of representing a Limited Liability Company by the Board of Directors must be in accordance with the provisions in Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies or those stipulated in the Articles of Association of Limited Liability Companies. If the actions of the Board of Directors of a Limited Liability Company implement a Contract that could be detrimental to the Company because it is contrary to Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies or those stipulated in the Articles of Association of Limited Liability Companies, the contracts made contain Ultra Vires. If the Board of Directors carries out Ultra Vires actions, in accordance with Article 61 of Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies, the shareholders have the right to file a lawsuit against the Company to the District Court.

scholarly journals PENCATATAN PERUBAHAN DIREKSI DI KEMENTERIAN TERKAIT SEBAGAI DASAR PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA KEWENANGAN DIREKSI

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 369
Author(s):  
Maleakhi W. Sitompul
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Limited Liability Company ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Right ◽  
A Company

Research on the recording of changes to directors in the relevant Ministry, namely the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, aims to examine whether the authorized Directors in a company are Directors registered at the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. In addition, it is also to examine whether the provisions of Law no. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies and / or the Company's Articles of Association is sufficient to resolve disputes of authority in the event of a dispute regarding the composition and number of directors in a company, which one has the right to act against other parties. Disputes regarding the composition and authority of the Board of Directors in a limited liability company often become disputes in court, even though Indonesia's positive legal provisions have provided clear and firm rules about who the Board of Directors can represent in and out of court. Based on research, it can be seen that the starting point is from the provisions in Law No. 40 of 2007 Articles 29 and 98, changes in the members of the board of directors can only be effective for third parties, as from the date the changes are recorded in the Company Register by the Minister of Law and Human Rights in accordance with Law No. 40 of 2007 Articles 29 and 98.

Beerbohm Tree's Production of ‘The Tempest’, 1904

1995 ◽  
Vol 11 (44) ◽  
pp. 299-308
Author(s):  
Brian Pearce
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Literary Criticism ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
The Tempest ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Right ◽  
The University

Herbert Beerbohm Tree (1853–1917) is remembered today as a great character actor, as a personality, and as a wit: but as a producer he is seldom considered an important or even a positive influence on the course of Shakespearean interpretation in the twentieth century. Focusing on Tree's 1904 production of The Tempest, Brian Pearce argues that Tree was in fact an original and inventive director. Contrasting the faint praise or contempt of theatre historians with the adoption of many of Tree's ideas in later literary criticism of The Tempest, Pearce also suggests that the acceptance of the right of contemporary experimental directors to act in effect as ‘scenic artists’ sits oddly with attitudes to Tree's work, in which he fulfilled precisely such a role. Brian Pearce completed his PhD at the University of London in 1992, and since returning to South Africa has worked as a theatre director. He is a member of the board of directors of the Durban Theatre Workshop Company, and also teaches drama at Technikon Natal.

公司法第173條之1持股過半數股東召集股東會之解釋與適用

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (19) ◽  
pp. 1-50
Author(s):  
陳蕙君 陳蕙君
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
History Of ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Right ◽  
Management Power ◽  
A Company ◽  
Special Meeting

舊版公司法第173條第1項及第4項，原已分別規定了少數股東之股東會召集請求權（第1項）及少數股東之股東會自行召集權（第2項及第4項）以保障少數股東權益，惟少數股東在行使時仍必須透過董事會召集或先報經主管機關許可後始得自行召集，股東自行召集股東會門檻仍高。從而2018年8月1日公布之新法再增訂第173條之1，使繼續3個月以上持股過半數之股東可自行召集股東臨時會。本條創設出持股過半數股東得不經董事會或主管機關審查之股東會召集權，被業界稱為大同條款，認為容易引起市場派股東發動經營權爭奪戰。本文擬由少數股東權之規範本質及歷史沿革為基礎，透過介紹少數股東召集股東會之國內外規定，延伸檢視本次修法增訂創設出第173條之1所衍生之政策面或執行面相關問題並就主管機關提出之配套見解，試著梳理出脈絡並提出看法。 According to the Article 173 I of the Company Act (2015.7.1), any or a plural number of shareholder(s) of a company who has (have) continuously held 3% or more of the total number of outstanding shares for a period of one year or a longer time may, by filing a written proposal setting forth therein the subjects for discussion and the reasons, request the board of directors to call a special meeting of shareholder(s). And Article 173 IV of the Company Act (2015.7.1), When the board of directors fails or can not convene a shareholders' meeting on account of share transfer or any other causes, the shareholder(s) holding 3 % or more of the totle number of outstanding shares of the company may, after obtaining an approval from the competent authority, convene a shareholders' meeting. The minority shareholder(s) still face the highly restrictions of calls for special meeting of shareholder(s). After the amendment to Article 173-1 of the Company Act (2018.8.1), the shareholder(s) of a company who has (have) continuously held 50 % or more of the total number of outstanding shares for a period of 3 months and more then, can convene a shareholders' meeting without other restriction. It creates the right that can convene a shareholders' meeting without preview by board of directors or the competent authority for the shareholder(s) of a company who has (have) continuously held 50 % or more of the total number of outstanding shares. Therefore, it is been considered as raise the fight of management power easily. This article introduces the elementary and the history of the right to convene a special shareholders' Meeting of Minority shareholders of R.O.C or aboard. Then extend to overview the issues and questions from both policy and implementation of the amendment to Article 173-1 of the Company Act (2018.8.1) and the relative complementary measures of the competent authorities, then propose the author's opinion.

公司法第173條之1持股過半數股東召集股東會之解釋與適用

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (19) ◽  
pp. 1-50
Author(s):  
陳蕙君 陳蕙君
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
History Of ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Right ◽  
Management Power ◽  
A Company ◽  
Special Meeting

舊版公司法第173條第1項及第4項，原已分別規定了少數股東之股東會召集請求權（第1項）及少數股東之股東會自行召集權（第2項及第4項）以保障少數股東權益，惟少數股東在行使時仍必須透過董事會召集或先報經主管機關許可後始得自行召集，股東自行召集股東會門檻仍高。從而2018年8月1日公布之新法再增訂第173條之1，使繼續3個月以上持股過半數之股東可自行召集股東臨時會。本條創設出持股過半數股東得不經董事會或主管機關審查之股東會召集權，被業界稱為大同條款，認為容易引起市場派股東發動經營權爭奪戰。本文擬由少數股東權之規範本質及歷史沿革為基礎，透過介紹少數股東召集股東會之國內外規定，延伸檢視本次修法增訂創設出第173條之1所衍生之政策面或執行面相關問題並就主管機關提出之配套見解，試著梳理出脈絡並提出看法。 According to the Article 173 I of the Company Act (2015.7.1), any or a plural number of shareholder(s) of a company who has (have) continuously held 3% or more of the total number of outstanding shares for a period of one year or a longer time may, by filing a written proposal setting forth therein the subjects for discussion and the reasons, request the board of directors to call a special meeting of shareholder(s). And Article 173 IV of the Company Act (2015.7.1), When the board of directors fails or can not convene a shareholders' meeting on account of share transfer or any other causes, the shareholder(s) holding 3 % or more of the totle number of outstanding shares of the company may, after obtaining an approval from the competent authority, convene a shareholders' meeting. The minority shareholder(s) still face the highly restrictions of calls for special meeting of shareholder(s). After the amendment to Article 173-1 of the Company Act (2018.8.1), the shareholder(s) of a company who has (have) continuously held 50 % or more of the total number of outstanding shares for a period of 3 months and more then, can convene a shareholders' meeting without other restriction. It creates the right that can convene a shareholders' meeting without preview by board of directors or the competent authority for the shareholder(s) of a company who has (have) continuously held 50 % or more of the total number of outstanding shares. Therefore, it is been considered as raise the fight of management power easily. This article introduces the elementary and the history of the right to convene a special shareholders' Meeting of Minority shareholders of R.O.C or aboard. Then extend to overview the issues and questions from both policy and implementation of the amendment to Article 173-1 of the Company Act (2018.8.1) and the relative complementary measures of the competent authorities, then propose the author's opinion.

scholarly journals Board of Directors as a Strategic Sparring Partner

2021 ◽  
pp. 41-43
Author(s):  
Roman Lombriser
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Scenario Analysis ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
The Other ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Executive Team ◽  
Strategy Process ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Pessimistic Scenario

AbstractWhat role can board of directors play in the strategy process of an SME? The case of “Light-Tech” (a luxury lamp producer) shows how. The chairman and several of the other directors had bad feelings about the issue of technology replacement. Contrary to the top management team, they were not convinced that the breakthrough of the new LED technology in the market was still far away. To address this issue, the board of directors—together with the executive team—performed a scenario analysis for about 3 hours. Then, the board requested the top management team to formulate a precautionary strategy which much better prepares the SME for the pessimistic scenario. Result: 2 years later, the pessimistic scenario reveals itself as reality. By performing a scenario analysis together with the top management team, the board of directors were able to play an important role as constructive sparring partners.

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