Ordinary Language and Philosophical Conversion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Norris
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
First Person ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Person Plural ◽  
First Person Plural ◽  
Made In

This chapter evaluates Cavell’s reception of Austin’s ordinary language philosophy, showing it to be more critical than it has been understood to be. For Austin, the ordinary language philosopher speaks in the first-person plural to remind other philosophers of “what we say when” so as to correct the mistakes those philosophers have made in writing about ethics, epistemology, etc. But Austin cannot give a compelling explanation of why those other philosophers require such reminders: how can they have been wrong about their language and its implications, since they too are one of us who speak the language? On Cavell’s account, we forget what we say when—or, what comes to the same thing, fail to mean what we say—because we evade ourselves. Ordinary language philosophy does not correct mistakes but addresses the uncanny nature of the ordinary, that it is not yet what it is.

A deixis emocional em português europeu contemporâneo: alguns contributos

2019 ◽  
pp. 225-235
Author(s):  
Ana Cristina Macário Lopes
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Plural ◽  
First Person Plural

This paper is a contribution to the description of the structures that express emotional deixis, in European contemporary Portuguese. The analysis of our empirical data show that, in Portuguese, demonstratives are not the only category that encodes emotional deictic meaning; possessives and first person plural display the same function, in some contexts. It is also discussed the semantic bleaching of the deictic space adverbs cá and lá and it is argued that it can only be described and explained in illocutionary terms, and not in the framework of emotional deixis.

Colloquial features in Word Englishes

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Collins ◽  
Xinyue Yao
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
American English ◽  
World Englishes ◽  
Evolutionary Status ◽  
First Person ◽  
Functional Interpretation ◽  
Person Plural ◽  
World English ◽  
First Person Plural ◽  
Grammatical Change

A powerful discourse-pragmatic agent of grammatical change in English since the mid-twentieth century has been the increasing acceptance of colloquialism. Little is known, however, about its influence on grammatical developments in regional varieties of World English other than the two inner circle ‘supervarieties’, British and American English. This paper reports findings from a corpus-based study of three grammatical categories known to be undergoing a colloquialism-related rise in contemporary English, across a range of registers in ten World Englishes: quasi-modals (have to, have got to, be going to, want to), get-passives, and first person plural inclusive let’s. In each case comparisons are drawn with non-colloquial variants: modals (must, should, will, shall), be-passives, and let us. Subsequent functional interpretation of the data is used to explore the effect upon the quantitative patterns identified of the phenomenon of colloquialism and of further factors with which it interacts (including Americanism, prescriptivism, and evolutionary status).

Whose Dream Is It Anyway?

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 263-287
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
External World ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Second Line ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
First Line ◽  
Standard Type ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism

I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in the first, which is characteristic of Analytic philosophers to this day, the focus is on the meaning of ‘know’—what it ‘refers’ to, its ‘semantics’ and its ‘pragmatics’; in the second, which characterizes Continental responses to Descartes, the focus is on the philosophizing or meditating subject, and its relation to its body and world. I argue that the first approach is hopeless: if the Cartesian worry that I could be dreaming right now so much as makes sense, the proposal that—under some theory of knowledge (or of ‘knowledge’)—my belief that I am sitting in front of the computer right now may still be (or truly count as) a piece of knowledge, would rightfully seem to the skeptic to be playing with words and missing the point. I then argue that the practice of Ordinary Language Philosophy, which has mostly been linked to the first line of response to Cartesian skepticism, may be seen as actually belonging with the second line of response; and I show how a form of what may be called “Existentialist Ordinary Language Philosophy” can be used to reveal the nonsensicality of the Cartesian skeptical worry. My argument takes its cue from Thompson Clarke’s insight—an insight that Clarke himself has not pursued far or accurately enough—that our concept of Dream is not a concept of the “standard type.”

INFLUENCE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY ON ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF H. L. A. HART

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (18) ◽  
pp. 315-330
Author(s):  
Luana Sion Li
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Legal Philosopher ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy ◽  
The Way

This article discusses the influence of emerging linguistic philosophy theories in the 20th century on the development of analytical jurisprudence through an examination of the way those theories influenced the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Although Hart is significantly influenced by linguistic philosophy, his legal theory could not have been developed solely with it. This is evidenced by Hart’s disownment of the essay Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, his attempt to employ ideas from ordinary language philosophy in the context of law. Hart’s theoretical development shows that he was above all not a linguistic, but a legal philosopher; and that analytical jurisprudence, albeit influenced by linguistic philosophy, depends on aspects beyond it.

Ordinary Language Philosophy

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Method Of Cases

The article presents, clarifies, defends, and shows the contemporary relevance of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as a general approach to the understanding and dissolution of at least very many traditional and contemporary philosophical difficulties. The first section broadly characterizes OLP, points out its anticipation in Immanuel Kant’s dissolution of metaphysical impasses in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, and then shows its contemporary relevance by bringing its perspective to bear on the recent debates concerning the philosophical ‘method of cases’. The second section responds to a series of common objections to, and misunderstandings of, OLP.

Are we visible? An interdisciplinary data-based study of self-mention in research articles

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohsen Khedri
Keyword(s):  
Applied Linguistics ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Environmental Engineering ◽  
Research Articles ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Plural ◽  
Rhetorical Strategy ◽  
Original Contribution ◽  
Subjective Strategies ◽  
First Person Plural

AbstractResearch articles have often materialized through the use of impersonal objective strategies viz. abstract rhetors, passive constructions, and nominalizations. However, intrusive or subjective strategies, such as self-mentions, appear to integrate impersonal structures. As a rhetorical strategy to explicitly portray authorial selves, self-mentions help writers to project themselves into the discourse by marketing themselves and demarcating their original contribution to the field. Here, an interdisciplinary approach was adopted to examine explicit authorial presence in a comparable corpus of 40 research articles in applied linguistics, psychology, environmental engineering, and chemistry by taking into consideration: (i) the frequency of using exclusive first person plural pronouns (

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