Using a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Issuance Requirement to Set Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risks

Author(s):  
Paul Kupiec
Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Marco Locurcio ◽  
Francesco Tajani ◽  
Pierluigi Morano ◽  
Debora Anelli ◽  
Benedetto Manganelli

The economic crisis of 2008 has highlighted the ineffectiveness of the banks in their disbursement of mortgages which caused the spread of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) with underlying real estate. With the methods stated by the Basel III agreements, aimed at improving the capital requirements of banks and determining an adequate regulatory capital, the banks without the skills required have difficulties in applying the rigid weighting coefficients structures. The aim of the work is to identify a synthetic risk index through the participatory process, in order to support the restructuring debt operations to benefit smaller banks and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), by analyzing the real estate credit risk. The proposed synthetic risk index aims at overcoming the complexity of Basel III methodologies through the implementation of three different multi-criteria techniques. In particular, the integration of objective financial variables with subjective expert judgments into a participatory process is not that common in the reference literature and brings its benefits for reaching more approved and shared results in the debt restructuring operations procedure. Moreover, the main findings derived by the application to a real case study have demonstrated how important it is for the credit manager to have an adequate synthetic index that could lead to the avoidance of risky scenarios where several modalities to repair the credit debt occur.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 89-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Düllmann ◽  
Philipp Koziol

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabel Argimon ◽  
Gerard Arqué Castells ◽  
Francesc Rodríguez Tous

The main objective of this research is to gather empirical evidence on the effects of more or less stringency and more or less risk sensitivity in regulatory capital requirements on the observed behaviour of European banks during the initial years of the financial crisis. To do so, we use the indices built in Argimón and Ruiz (2010), which capture such characteristics of capital regulation. We test their incidence using changes in yearly data for individual banks for 25 countries of the European Union covering the period 2007-2009. Our results show that more stringency and risk sensitivity in capital regulation resulted in higher capital increases, with limited effect on risk taking. However, for well capitalized banks, higher risk sensitivity resulted in higher capital and higher risk, thus requiring striking the right balance, so as to lead to increased stability.


2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 503-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALFRED GALICHON

I show that the structure of the firm is not neutral with respect to regulatory capital budgeted under rules which are based on the Value-at-Risk. Indeed, when a holding company has the liberty to divide its risk into as many subsidiaries as needed, and when the subsidiaries are subject to capital requirements according to the Value-at-Risk budgeting rule, then there is an optimal way to divide risk which is such that the total amount of capital to be budgeted by the shareholder is zero. This result may lead to regulatory arbitrage by some firms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-336
Author(s):  
R. Chami ◽  
T. Cosimano ◽  
E. Kopp ◽  
C. Rochon

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-216
Author(s):  
Mohd Yaziz Mohd Isa ◽  
Md. Zabid Hj Abdul Rashid

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the adequacy of regulatory capital funds through loss provisioning policies because of worsening credit quality associated with distressed financial conditions. A financial distress occurs when banks have difficulty in honoring financial commitments. This paper is expected to unveil how the provisioning mechanisms can address concerns associated with pro cyclicality of regulatory capital funds requirements, and how the banks behave in distressed financial conditions to share risks. The pro cyclicality of regulatory capital funds is the effect of various components of the financial system that aggravates the economic cycle such as during the expansion of the economy when banks are able to provide more loans and meet regulatory capital requirements with ease, while during the contraction of the economic cycle, can lead to deterioration of asset quality, and the resultant need to make loss provisions and recognize impairment. In turn, the situation puts further pressures on the capital requirements held by banks and their risk-sharing behavior. The paper analyzes a sample of Islamic banks in Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach By estimating credit risk-related information through loss provisioning policies, the paper uses an unbalanced panel data on all Islamic banks in the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia from 2003 to 2014. The association consists of full-fledged Islamic banks and several foreign-owned entities. Findings The paper findings support that Islamic banks during observed period of distressed financial conditions were less discouraged to increase their regulatory capital funds to share risks. Intuitively, they were more encouraged to engage in risk-shifting behavior. Also, the risk-shifting behavior was found to have a significantly high potential in foreign-owned Islamic banks than in domestic Islamic banks. Research limitations/implications Although the study is based on a sample of Islamic banks in Malaysia, the findings suggest targeted interventions aimed at discouraging risk shifting or transfer of risks in an interest-free Islamic financing. Practical implications The outcome of this paper has practical implications for Islamic banks to build a buffer of capital funds to face downward pressures during heightened financial uncertainties while serving as protection to depositors. Moreover, this study has practical implications for shareholders to avail themselves the benefits of high investment accounts financing. The Islamic banks can continue to play their role in promoting inclusive growth, reducing inequality and accelerating poverty reduction. Social implications Although the current study is based on a sample of Islamic banks in Malaysia, the finding suggests that the extent of risk shifting was significantly more incentivized among the foreign-owned rather than the domestic Islamic banks. This information can be used to develop targeted interventions aimed at discouraging risk shifting or transfer of risks in an interest-free Islamic financing. Originality/value This paper is the first that investigates on adequacy of regulatory capital funds of Islamic banks through loss provisioning policies.


Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Hong Fan ◽  
Chirongo Moses Keregero ◽  
Qianqian Gao

When setting banks regulatory capital requirement based on their contribution to the overall risk of the banking system we need to consider that the risk of the banking system as well as each banks risk contribution changes once bank equity capital gets redistributed. Therefore the present paper provides a theoretical framework to manage the systemic risk of the banking system in Nigeria based on macroprudential capital requirements, which requires banks to hold capital that is proportional to their contribution to systemic risk. Using a sample of 10 Nigerian banks, we reallocate capital in the system based on two scenarios; firstly in the situation where the system shocks do not exist in the system, we find that almost all banks appear to hold more capital; secondly, we also consider the situation where the system shocks exist in the system; we find that almost all banks tend to hold little capital on four risk allocation mechanisms. We further find that despite the heterogeneity in macroprudential capital requirements, all risk allocation mechanisms bring a substantial decrease in the systemic risk. The risk allocation mechanism based on ΔCoVaR decreases the average default probability the most. Our results suggest that financial stability can be substantially improved by implementing macroprudential regulations for the banking system.


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