Representational pull, enactive escape velocity
Two different paths have been taken by researchers who argue that embodiment is crucial for understanding the mind. The first path is embodied functionalism, essentially the claim that traditional cognitivism needs to take into account the lessons of cognitive linguistics, dynamical systems explanations, and autonomous robotics seriously, so as to include bodily structures and processes in accounts of cognition. However, what it means to be a cognitive system remains unchanged and ruled by the computer metaphor. The other path rejects this metaphor and proposes that the self-organizing living body is constitutive of what it is to be a mind. This path, represented by enactivism, is not committed to a representational view of the mind, but rather understands it as an emergent, relational, world-involving phenomenon. The sensorimotor approach to perception may be interpreted in these terms; however, this approach requires a nonrepresentational account of sensorimotor mastery and a theory of agency.