Two Election and Removal of the President

Author(s):  
Fisher Louis

This chapter discusses the constitutional provisions for choosing the president by electors; eligibility to the Office of President; the number of terms a President could serve; compensation and emoluments; the President's oath; disability and death; the Twenty-Fifth Amendment; the Vice President; impeachment and censure; and executive immunity.

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel K. Goldstein

Vice President Thomas R. Marshall has been criticized for not acting more aggressively to exercise presidential powers and duties after President Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke in October 1919 which compromised his ability to discharge his office for much of the remainder of his term. Yet Marshall faced formidable constraints in the constitutional, political, institutional, and factual context in which he operated. This paper examines these constraints on Marshall's political behavior. His conduct becomes understandable when viewed in the context of those inhibiting factors. The paper also considers the impact of the presidential inability provisions of the subsequently ratified Twenty-Fifth Amendment which renowned Wilson scholar Arthur Link suggested would have made no difference. While questioning the practicality of that counter-factual, the paper argues that the Amendment would have been helpful but suggests that a Wilson-like situation, if one could be imagined in modern times, could present a relatively taxing challenge to our constitutional system.


Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C

Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been used, though it should have been used when President Reagan was shot and nearly killed in 1981. He was unconscious for hours and incapacitated for days, but his administration decided not to transfer power to Vice President Bush. Several years later, Reagan’s staff considered Section 4 more seriously, due to concerns about the President’s performance. They decided against it. Reagan did, however, invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s less exciting Section 3 prior to a planned surgery, setting a precedent followed by President George W. Bush on two occasions.


Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C

The text of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is dense and requires careful unpacking. Section 4 allows a president to be displaced from power if the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet declare that he is unable to discharge his powers and duties. The text then provides for the President to return to power. If the Vice President and Cabinet oppose his attempt, Congress is empowered to resolve any disputes. All of this is subject to specific procedural requirements and time limits. This chapter presents all of these details in both bullet-point form and with a comprehensive flowchart.


1988 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bert E. Park

In 1967 Congress passed the Twenty-fifth Amendment to rectify an apparent inadequacy in the U. S. Constitution dealing with one of the gravest dangers to executive function–disability in the presidency. For 180 years, imprecise wording had bound the public welfare beneath a constitutional sword of Damocles which threatened to sever the legal discovery of inability in our Chief Executive from its occurrence. On at least four occasions during the last 100 years alone, executive function has been paralyzed by medically defined presidential inability, while two perplexing questions restricted a satisfactory resolution to the problem. First, in such a circumstance, does the office of the presidency devolve to the vice-president, or does the vicepresident merely serve as an acting president, assuming only its powers and duties? Second, who shall determine when the president is disabled and, its corollary, when that disability has ended? In the first instance, the amendment's sponsors ultimately determined that the vice-president assumes the powers and duties, but not the office itself, when the president becomes disabled. In the second, the sponsors proposed that the vice-president and the cabinet are jointly responsible for determining the duration of inability when, for medical or other reasons, the president is unable to do so.


2017 ◽  
pp. 95-108
Author(s):  
Parlindungan Sitorus

AbstractPolitical discourse that is being discussed today is Provincial Assembly of the Republic ofIndonesia proposes the fifth amendment of Contitution 1945 that candidates of Presidentand Vice President can be from individual candidate; by offering amendment of paragraph6A article (2) Constitution 1945 to become “Candidate of President and Vice Presidentcome from the proposal of political party of general election participant or from individual”.This discourse actually based on idea to realize democratization in the practice ofpresidential election; that sovereignty is on the people’s hand and to provide the maximumspace for the people who has capability to lead this great nation; and basically all people isequal in front of Law and Governance. Provincial Assembly believes that that proposal iscompatible with democracy principle that related to recognition on people’s right to electand to be elected even without having any political party.Keywords: Individual candidate, People aspiration, Democratization, “Deparpolisasi”


2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-36
Author(s):  
John D. Feerick

This article focuses on potential gaps caused by the absence from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment of provisions to deal with the disability of a Vice President and the omission from the statutory line of succession law of provisions comparable to Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment for when there is an able Vice President. The analysis offers a critical review of the latent ambiguities in the succession provision to the United States Constitution, noting problems that have arisen from the time of the Constitutional Convention, to John Tyler's accession to office, to numerous disability crises that presented themselves throughout the twentieth century, to the present day. As the world becomes more complex and threats to the presidency more common, continued examination of our succession structure and its adequacy for establishing clear and effective presidential succession provisions under a broad range of circumstances is of paramount concern. This article embraces this robust discussion by offering some suggestions for improving the system in a way that does not require a constitutional amendment. The first part of the analysis traces the events that have driven the development of the nation's succession procedures. The second part examines the inadequacies, or “gaps,” that remain in the area of presidential inability, and the third part sets forth recommendations for resolving these gaps.


2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-13
Author(s):  
Robert E. Gilbert

On June 29, 2002, President George W. Bush invoked the United States Constitution's Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967. By so doing, he helped focus attention on the amendment's two disability provisions, Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 provides for voluntary transfer of power from the president to the vice president and is wholly dependent on the president's wishes. Section 4 provides for involuntary transfers of power, possibly over the president's objection. This controversial provision allows a vice president, with the assent of a majority of the cabinet, to become acting president. Critics have long argued that the vice president and cabinet officers, since they all owe their positions to the president, may be excessively reluctant to act even when action clearly is warranted. Therefore, some of these critics have proposed that a presidential disability commission be established at the beginning of every administration either to act under Section 4 in place of the cabinet or to provide formal and regular medical assessments so as to press for action in the event of presidential inability. I argue that such proposals are unwise and that their implementation would be counterproductive and even dangerous, both to the presidency and to the nation.


Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C

A number of misconceptions float around about Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Not just the general public but respected journalists and academics have misinterpreted several crucial features of the section. This chapter debunks the most important misconceptions. The truth is that: (1) The Vice President and Cabinet, not Congress, are in charge of invoking Section 4; (2) A Section 4 action does not remove the President from office; (3) Section 4 is for use against Presidents who are actually incapacitated, and not for use against merely “unfit” Presidents who are lazy, incompetent, irresponsible, screwy, dishonest, or in violation of constitutional norms; (4) The President cannot retake power immediately upon declaring that he is not disabled. He must have the assent of either the Vice President, the Cabinet, or some portion of Congress.


Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C

The broader issue of when a president is unfit, as opposed to unable, is not within the purview of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. If the Vice President, the Cabinet, two-thirds of the House, and two-thirds of the Senate (a Section 4 consensus) believe the President must be stopped, there likely would be some point at which a simple majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate (an impeachment consensus) would reach the same conclusion. Section 4 is not a permanent displacement; impeachment and removal are. Section 4 is not a mechanism for the voting public to change its mind about the leader it has placed in the White House. Attempts to use it in that way would not work very well, given the difficulty in mustering the necessary votes against the President. Unless a President is truly incapacitated, or if he is potentially incapacitated but is definitely wreaking irreparable havoc, Section 4 is designed to fail.


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