Russia and Foreign Policy

Author(s):  
Robert H. Donaldson

Russian foreign policy has both been similar and unique to that of other great powers. As a general rule of statecraft, Russia has pursued balance-of-power policies, which essentially involves the mobilization of power to countervail the power of an enemy or a potential adversary. The enduring goals pursued by Russian foreign policy have placed primary emphasis on ensuring national security, promoting the economic wellbeing of the country, and enhancing national prestige. The dominant theme in the Russian foreign policy under the tsars is that of expansionism. No single motive force can be found to explain tsarist Russian expansionism; rather, the influences of geography, regime type, the international system, and ideology all weigh in, though in different proportions at different times. The ideology known as Marxism–Leninism has also had a significant effect on Soviet and post-Soviet policy. Meanwhile, Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin’s primary aim in foreign policy, like Mikhail Gorbachev’s before him, was to create a nonthreatening external environment that would be most conducive to his country’s internal economic and political development. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin pursued a pragmatic, cautious, and nuanced policy. The most visible change that Putin brought to Russia’s foreign policy was a heightened level of presidential activism. In his second presidential term, Putin further changed the direction of Russian foreign policy, increasingly demanding that Russia be recognized as a great power and be given commensurate weight in the resolution of global issues.

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-139
Author(s):  
Michael McFaul

Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-462
Author(s):  
Maria Raquel Freire

This article touches upon the main dynamics in Russian foreign policy since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. Following a Constructivist approach to the analysis of foreign policy, the article positions this study at the intersection of domestic processes and external relations, as well as understanding foreign policy as a combination of material and ideational aspects. The discursive practices that drive foreign policy shaping and making are the result of social interaction, and thus, of the combination of these elements, in different formats and weights. Three main dimensions in Russias foreign policy course are identified, namely a normative one, defining the guiding principles for foreign policy shaping, the status dimension as the power-alignment underlining foreign policy making, and an identity-driven dimension, ontologically characterizing foreign policy. These three dimensions of analysis are co-constitutive and reinforce each other at different moments and in distinct configurations. The article concludes that Russian foreign policy in the last twenty years has kept its main end-goal quite stable - great power status, - what has changed have been the means - and ways of doing - to achieve this, both regarding a more assertive foreign policy, and increased pressure for revising the international order, attributing Russia the label of a revisionist power in the international system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-56
Author(s):  
Irina Busygina ◽  
Mikhail Filippov

In this article, we explore the inherent trade-offs and inconsistencies of Russia’s policies toward the post-Soviet space. We argue that attempts to rebuild an image of Russia as a “great power” have actually led to a reduction of Russian influence in the post-Soviet region. The more Russia acted as a “Great Power,” the less credible was its promise to respect the national sovereignty of the former Soviet republics. In 2011, Vladimir Putin declared that during his next term as president, his goal would be to establish a powerful supra-national Eurasian Union capable of becoming one of the poles in a multipolar world. However, Russia’s attempt to force Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union provoked the 2014 crisis. The Ukrainian crisis has de-facto completed the separation of Ukraine and Russia and made successful post-Soviet re-integration around Russia improbable.


1968 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tareq Y. Ismael

The emergence of the new states of Africa into world politics not only influenced the traditional balance of power in the international system, but also created a response among the older African states to restore the equilibrium of order maintained on the continent and fill the vacuum created by the departure of the colonial powers without clashing with the new nationalist movements. Henceforth, the search for influence had to take an ideological overtone. The activities of Egypt in Africa are a reflection of this. Since the mid-fifties, her African policy has aimed at creating a sense of community, cultural loyalty, and political integration. An attempt was made to reinforce the existing culture created by Islam and to transform it into what Pye and Verba call ‘political culture’.1 Thus, Egypt turned gradually toward the employment of religion on the African continent as an instrument of its foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Carla Martinez Machain ◽  
Rebecca Kaye ◽  
Jared Oestman

Great powers have traditionally played a major role in the study of foreign policy. From a variety of work on foreign policy analysis, it is known that great powers are more active in their foreign policy than other states in the international system are. Whether the actions are disbursing foreign aid, creating alliances, conflict involvement, or others, studies will often control for great power status, with the underlying expectation being that major powers will be more likely to utilize these foreign policy tools. In fact, when considering relevant dyads in quantitative studies of foreign policy analysis, states have to be contiguous for the dyad to be considered relevant, but an exception is made for dyads containing at least one major power, given the ability of great powers to project their power beyond their borders. Key literature on the foreign policy behavior of great powers discusses different ways of defining great powers. In particular, the debate over defining great power status has focused on whether a great power should be defined solely on its physical capabilities, or also on intangible factors, such as its foreign policy interests or whether the state is recognized as a great power by others in the international system. Further, there are questions of whether great powers have to be military powers or whether economic superiority is enough to classify a state as a great power. There is also the issue of regional powers: states that are clearly military, economic, and political leaders within a limited geographic region, but not at the global level. Should these states be considered great powers, or should that classification be reserved for global powers? The literature on great-power foreign policy also discusses cooperative and conflictual behaviors of great powers in the international system. It addresses great power war, focusing on how they are more conflict prone than minor powers, and reviews the issues that drive great powers to engage in conflict, such as positional issues and the intent to shape the international system to their liking. It also discusses a variety of foreign policy actions, both coercive and cooperative, that major powers are more likely to engage in than their minor-power counterparts. In addition, there is much work done on the relationships between great powers and between great powers and minor powers, stressing the competitive nature of major-power interactions and the trade-off between economic and military security and policy concessions that defines major-minor power interactions.


Author(s):  
Manjeet S. Pardesi

The assessment of an opponent as a strategic rival is analytically equivalent to evaluating its strategic image. The central decision-makers of states reevaluate the image of other regional states and the great powers of the system in response to strategic shocks, as they have an impact on interstate interaction capacity. Interaction capacity in the international system can be affected by three types of changes—military, political, and economic. A strategic rivalry is a process that initiates when the central decision-makers of at least one state in a dyad ascribe the image of an enemy to the other as a consequence of such shocks. It is important to empirically demonstrate the ascription of these images through a cognitive process because strategic rivalries are a function of decision-maker perceptions by definition. Four types of enemy images are identified here—expansionist states, which are territorially revisionist; hegemonic states, which circumscribe a given state’s foreign policy choices; imperial states, which intervene in a given state’s domestic affairs in addition to being hegemonic; and peer-competitors, who pose latent and/or long-term threats. Once formed, these images are sustained over long periods of time and change only slowly in response to additional strategic shocks. These images also inform the strategy that a given state pursues toward its rival.


Subject Russian foreign policy in 2016. Significance Russian foreign policy is driven by an amalgam of realpolitik, nationalism and anti-Western ideology, and consists of both defensive and offensive strategies. The robust, confrontational approach championed by President Vladimir Putin in recent years has produced successes in such areas as the military campaign in Syria, but an undecided outcome in Ukraine and mixed results in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Impacts A NATO summit this July may result in a tougher, more coordinated stance on Russia. Following its official partial withdrawal from Syria, the Russian military will conduct selective attacks. Russia will need careful diplomacy to keep Belarus and Kazakhstan from drifting away as allies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen C. Lynch

Russia’s foreign policy does not follow directly from the nature of its internal political system but rather from the interaction of that political system with other political systems. Russian policy toward the Western world is best understood in terms of the capacity of Russia’s post-Soviet rulers to achieve two goals that are in implicit tension with each other. They are: a) maximizing the benefit to the Russian state of the country’s multifaceted relations with the Western world; and b) securing Russia’s status as the undisputed hegemon throughout the country’s historical borderlands. These broad policy objectives—shared by Russian liberals and nationalists alike–have been common to both the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, albeit expressed in different ways over time and with differing expectations of being able to reconcile the two. Building upon authoritarian and interventionist patterns established early in the Yeltsin years and reacting to the West’s refusal to acknowledge Russian regional primacy, Putin has consolidated an arbitrary personalist regime at home and waged war along the Russian periphery, even at the cost of relations with the Western world. In this respect, Putin’s regime may usefully be seen as a “state-nation” with a strong imperial imprint, building upon powerful legacies of Russian political development. The removal of Putin from power will not in se change that regime type or key challenges in Russiane Western relations.


2003 ◽  
Vol 82 (6) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Robert Legvold ◽  
Bobo Lo

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