6. Crisis? What crisis?

Author(s):  
James Fulcher

Is capitalism in a state of crisis? Crises are in fact a normal part of the functioning of a capitalist society. ‘Crisis? What Crisis?’ looks at crises in capitalism from ‘tulipomania’ in 17th-century Amsterdam through to the 2007–2008 financial crisis and ‘great recession’, the most serious crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It considers the future of capitalism and argues that it may be shaped not by the institutions and structures of the static or declining countries of the West, but the countries of the East. It discusses whether there are alternatives to capitalism and argues that alternatives exist within capitalism rather than outside it.

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 538-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoffer Koch ◽  
Gary Richardson ◽  
Patrick Van Horn

In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 967-1004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Shiller

This address considers the epidemiology of narratives relevant to economic fluctuations. The human brain has always been highly tuned toward narratives, whether factual or not, to justify ongoing actions, even such basic actions as spending and investing. Stories motivate and connect activities to deeply felt values and needs. Narratives “go viral” and spread far, even worldwide, with economic impact. The 1920–1921 Depression, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the so-called Great Recession of 2007–2009, and the contentious political-economic situation of today are considered as the results of the popular narratives of their respective times. Though these narratives are deeply human phenomena that are difficult to study in a scientific manner, quantitative analysis may help us gain a better understanding of these epidemics in the future. (JEL D72, E32, G01, N10)


Res Publica ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-80
Author(s):  
Steven Philip Kramer

The inability of reformist socialism to cape with the rise of fascism and the Great Depression led to a significant challenge by neo-socialists.In Belgium, this challenge was led by De Man and Spaak. In 1933, the POB accepted De Man's Plan as its program of action; in 1935 it entered into the Van Zeeland government. Although in many ways, theneos showed greater understanding of the nature of advanced capitalist society than the orthodox reformists, they displayed an alarming tendency to try to preempt fascism by emulating certain fascist positions.De Man and Spaak broke with socialist internationalism and collective security. De Man became convinced of the bankruptcy of democratic institutions and of the democratic states. This attitude ultimately led him from neutralism to collaboration, in the belief that fascism was indeed the wave of the future.


2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229

Judit Temesvary of Hamilton College reviews, “Financial Crises, 1929 to the Present” by Sara Hsu. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores and analyzes the events, causes, and outcomes of crises from the Great Depression to the Great Recession. Discusses the financial system and roots of crisis; the 1930s and 1940s—the Great Depression and its aftermath; the 1950s through the 1970s—the intercrisis period; the 1980s—emerging markets debt default crises; the early 1990s—advanced countries crises; the mid-1990s—the Mexican crisis and the Asian financial crisis; the late 1990s and the early 2000s—the Russian financial crisis, the Brazilian financial crisis, and the Argentine crisis; the late 2000s—the Great Recession of 2008; and preventing future crises. Hsu is Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New York, New Paltz.”


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (1503) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Anderson ◽  
◽  
Michael Bordo ◽  
John V. Duca ◽  
◽  
...  

Author(s):  
John L. Campbell

Chapter 7 explains that the financial crisis and Barack Obama’s presidency pushed political polarization into extreme political gridlock in Washington. Americans became disgusted. The 2008 financial crisis exacerbated America’s economic woes and made people angry. The fact that Obama was America’s first African American president made things worse. So did his moves to handle the financial crisis and Great Recession, and reform the national health care system. Trump tapped the public’s anger, turning it to his electoral advantage. He promised that because as a billionaire he wasn’t beholden to anyone, he would unify the country and cut through the gridlock by “draining the swamp” in Washington. And if Congress didn’t cooperate, he said that he would move unilaterally by issuing executive orders that would get the job done. It worked and he was elected president.


Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Giuseppe Telesca

Why were elite bankers and financiers demoted from ‘masters’ to ‘servants’ of society after the Great Depression, a crisis to which they contributed only marginally? Why do they seem to have got away with the recent crisis, in spite of their palpable responsibilities in triggering the Great Recession? This chapter provides an analysis of the differences between the bankers of the Great Depression and their colleagues of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century—regarding their position within, and attitude towards the firm, work culture, mental models, and codes of conduct—complemented with a scrutiny of the public discourse on bankers and financiers before and after the two crises. The authors argue that the (relative) mildness of the Great Recession, compared to the Great Depression, has contributed to preserve elite bankers’ and financiers’ status, income, wealth, and influence. Yet, the long-term consequences of their loss of reputational capital are difficult to assess.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 36-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albrecht Ritschl

AbstractThe Great Recession of 2008 hit the international economy harder than any other peacetime recession since the Great Contraction after 1929. Soon enough, analogies with the Great Depression were presented, and conclusions were drawn regarding the political response to the slump. This paper is an attempt to sort out real and false analogies and to present conclusions for policy. Its main hypothesis is that the Great Recession resembles the final phase of the Great Contraction between 1931 and 1933, characterized by a fast spreading global financial crisis and the breakdown of the international Gold Standard. The same is also true of the political responses to the banking problems occurring in both crises. The analogy seems less robust for the initial phase of the Great Depression after 1929. The monetary policy response to the Great Recession largely seems to be informed by the monetary interpretation of the Great Depression, but less so by the lessons from the interwar financial crises. As in the Great Depression, policy appears to be on a learning curve, moving away from a mostly monetary response toward mitigating counterpart risk and minimizing interbank contagion.


2019 ◽  
pp. 94-112
Author(s):  
Edward Fieldhouse ◽  
Jane Green ◽  
Geoffrey Evans ◽  
Jonathan Mellon ◽  
Christopher Prosser ◽  
...  

The Global Financial Crisis, which began in 2007–8, was the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and acted as a large shock to British politics. The economic vote is usually thought about as a short-term mechanism: a reward or punishment for the incumbent depending on recent economic conditions. In this chapter we examine how this shock played a role in the outcome of the 2015 General Election, seven years after the crisis began. The Global Financial Crisis continued to affect voting behaviour in 2015 for two reasons: first, it did long-lasting damage to perceptions of Labour’s economic competence, and second, it created a political opportunity for the Conservatives to blame the previous Labour government for the aftermath of the financial crisis.


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