‘The Great Britain of the South’: the Law of Contract in Early Colonial New Zealand

2019 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-47
Author(s):  
Warren Swain

Abstract Some nineteenth century writers like the Scottish born poet William Golder, used the term ‘the Great Britain of the south’ as a description of his new home. He was not alone in this characterisation. There were of course other possible perspectives, not least from the Māori point of view, which these British writers inevitably fail to capture. A third reality was more specific to lawyers or at least to those caught up in the legal system. The phrase ‘the Great Britain of the south’ fails to capture the complexity of the way that English law was applied in the early colony. The law administered throughout the British Empire reflected the common law origins of colonial legal systems but did not mean that the law was identical to that in England. Scholars have emphasised the adaptability of English law in various colonial settings. New Zealand contract law of this time did draw on some English precedents. The early lawyers were steeped in the English legal tradition. At the same time, English authorities were used with a light touch. The legal and social framework within which contract law operated was also quite different. This meant, for example, that mercantile juries were important in adapting the law to local conditions. Early New Zealand contract law provides a good example of both the importance of English law in a colonial setting and its adaptability.

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Jack Beatson ◽  
Andrew Burrows ◽  
John Cartwright

This introductory chapter first considers the nature and function of contract. It then discusses the contractual obligations in English law; the content of the contract law as set out in this book, which is concerned with the ‘general principles’ of contract rather than the detailed rules applicable to different types of contracts; the location of contract as part of the law of obligations and its relation to other parts of the law of obligations, tort and restitution of an unjust enrichment, and property law.


Author(s):  
Mindy Chen-Wishart

English law does not currently recognise a general duty of good faith, but this position is increasingly being challenged. In addition, good faith informs a diverse range of legal doctrines and principles. This chapter addresses the following: the meaning of good faith; good faith in current contract law; and the nature of good faith. It further considers whether English law should recognise a general good faith doctrine and the difference this might make to various aspects of the law.


Author(s):  
L.P. Chapman

From the farming point of view the high country of the South Island of New Zealand is generally taken to mean all the high native grassland devoted to the growing of wool and store stock and subject to risk of Slidui. This covers some 12 million acres of country with a great variety of topography, climate, and soils, Rainfalls range from 1%. in the arid regions of Otago to over 100in. in the heavy rainfall areas close to the main ranges, and soils and vegetation vary accordingly. The winter is long and the growing season short, a maximum of 6 months in most districts.


Author(s):  
Gary F Bell

Indonesia is one of the most legally diverse and complex countries in the world. It practises legal pluralism with three types of contract law in force: adat (customary) contract laws, Islamic contract laws (mostly concerning banking), and the European civil law of contract, transplanted from the Netherlands in 1847, found mainly in the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata). This chapter focuses on European civil law as it is the law used for the majority of commercial transactions. The civil law of contract is not well developed and there is a paucity of indigenous doctrine and jurisprudence, since most significant commercial disputes are settled by arbitration. The contours of the law are consistent with the French/Dutch legal tradition. In the formation of contracts, the subjective intention of the parties plays a greater role than in the common law. As with most jurisdictions with a Napoleonic tradition, the offer must include all the essential element of the contract, there is no concept of ‘invitations to treat’ or of ‘consideration’, the common law posting rule is rejected, and the contract is formed only when the acceptance is received. There are generally few requirements of form but some contracts must be in writing and some in a notarial deed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 97-144
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier ◽  
Jill Poole

Course-focused and comprehensive, Poole’s Textbook on Contract Law provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. Under English law, bargains and not gratuitous promises are enforced, thus a promise will not be enforceable if it is not contained in a deed (implying that any promise is taken seriously) or supported by consideration. Consideration refers to an act or a promise given in exchange for the promise (that is, the price for which the other’s promise was bought). The law does not recognize some acts or promises as good consideration, such as past consideration and performance of an existing legal duty. This chapter examines the general requirement in English law to provide consideration in order to enforce a contractual promise. The consideration requirement is relevant not only to the formation of a contract but also to the enforceability of promises altering the terms of an existing contract (alterations). An alteration promise that is not supported by consideration may still have some binding effect on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.


2021 ◽  
pp. 315-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier ◽  
Jill Poole

Course-focused and comprehensive, Poole’s Textbook on Contract Law provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. This chapter focuses on the legal treatment of ‘mistake’. It considers mistakes that prevent agreement (mutual or cross-purposes mistakes and unilateral mistake as to terms, particularly identity mistakes). It also examines the remedy of rectification when the contract does not accurately reflect what the parties agreed. It also considers the defence of non est factum. It then considers mistakes that are presumed to nullify consent if both parties entered into the contract under the same fundamental mistake. The doctrine of common mistake in English law is designed to protect the interests of third parties and to ensure certainty in transactions. A fundamental common mistake arises in cases where there is true impossibility or failure of consideration; the contract is automatically void and any money or property involved has to be returned. Distinctions can arise depending upon whether the impossibility is initial (common mistake) or subsequent (frustration doctrine). Categories of common mistake at common law include mistake as to subject matter (res extincta) and mistake as to ownership (res sua). A mistake as to quality will rarely be sufficiently fundamental to render the contract void. This chapter also discusses Lord Denning’s attempts to introduce an equitable jurisdiction to set aside on terms in cases of mistakes as to quality. These were rejected in Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd meaning that there is no remedial flexibility in such instances.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Richard Taylor ◽  
Damian Taylor

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. This introductory chapter explains how contract law is structured and how it fits into the overall scheme of the law of obligations and into English law more generally. It explains the boundaries between contract law, torts and unjust enrichment and restitution. It also explains the wider range of situations covered by the law of contract, and puts the law of contract into its social and economic context.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Elizabeth Bowyer

<p>The study considers women as witnesses in New Zealand’s colonial courts from c.1840 to 1900. An analysis of women as witnesses adds another dimension to what is known about the everyday but often compelling presence of women in New Zealand’s colonial courts. In 1840 British law was formally implemented in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The law’s institutional structures would soon follow. In 1841 the Supreme Court was established followed by the Resident Magistrate Courts in 1846. The courts were a part of formal British governance. While women were excluded from serving as judges, barristers, solicitors, court officials and jury members, they did appear before the courts as victims, defendants, spectators and witnesses. Being a witness was the only form of verbal participation women could undertake in the court processes during the nineteenth century.   Existing scholarly work has tended to concentrate on women appearing in the courts in the nineteenth century as victims or defendants. This study explores the complex agency of women using the law and as active participants in its deliberations. Four substantive chapters consider women as witnesses in cases involving petty offences, violent crime, civil cases and the Native Land Court and finally cases of divorce, bigamy and action of breach of promise of marriage.   Courts were significant public places in colonial New Zealand. They were places where disputes were settled, grievances could be aired, conduct was put on trial and order was maintained. A long established element of the legal tradition was that unprejudiced and fair justice could only be assured if the courts were open and public spaces. Thus, the witness stand was a place where women had a public voice.   Women’s eligibility to appear as witnesses in the court changed over the period under study. In 1840 when British law formally arrived in New Zealand women were restricted in the cases and circumstances in which they could take the stand. Wives were unable to give evidence in cases involving their husbands. From 1843 to 1889 gradual changes to evidence law allowed women to take the stand in different ways and by 1900 women appeared as witnesses in case types ranging from civil actions to the most violent offences in the criminal law. Changes in married women’s property law in 1860, and more significantly in 1884 and divorce law from 1867 generally extended the number and kind of cases in which women gave testimony in the courts. From the 1860s the Native Land Court became a familiar place for many Māori women forced to resort to the Court to establish title over land. Evidence suggests women’s knowledge of whakapapa and the oral histories of iwi and hapū were vital on the witness stand to ‘prove’ their link with land.   The study shows the variety of ways in which the courts were places where women spoke on a public stage, and where their words were often recorded and reported on as part of the official proceedings of the justice system. As witnesses they were also in courtrooms where they watched and were watched in a public domain and their words were heard long before they had any say in political representation. Once women had the vote, from 1893, they were eager to reform the justice system: seeking the opportunity for women to serve on juries, to serve as police, to qualify as lawyers, and in reforming the most egregious injustices such as the differential grounds for wives and husbands to petition for divorce. The application of the law, and the making of the law, proved uneven but had closely interrelated phases in the history of women in colonial New Zealand.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Luke Richard Nottage

<p>Part One of this thesis develops the "form-substance" analytical framework proposed by Atiyah and Summers to contrast English and US law generally, comparing also New Zealand and especially Japanese law. From this perspective, it argues that both US and Japanese law prefer distinctly more substantive reasoning, whereas both English and New Zealand law maintain a more formal orientation. Part Two focuses on three areas of contract law, and the development of contract law theory, arguing that the framework helps explain differing approaches adopted in these jurisdictions. Closer attention to the "law in action" as well as the "law in books", however, results in refinements to their analytical framework. It also suggests that "neo-proceduralist" models of law generally, and private law in particular, may be becoming increasingly important in both explaining and justifying developments in all four legal systems. Part Three introduces several of these models, which go beyond "form-substance" dichotomies without necessarily being inconsistent with them. This thesis therefore aims to offer new perspectives in three disciplines: comparative legal studies, contract law, and general legal theory.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robert Alexander Moodie

<p>The law of gaming and wagering contracts in New Zealand has a long and complex history which pre-dates the birth of this nation by almost two centuries. The Gaming Act 1908 (N.Z.) is a consolidating statute, but ss.69, 70 and 71, the enactments having specific application in this area, fall far short of providing a complete code of the law. English statutes enacted in the reigns of Charles II (1664), Anne (1710) and William IV (1835) have always been, and continue to be in force in this country, and indeed, their survival here has been more complete than in England where many of their provisions have been excised by the process of legislative repeal. The New Zealand law of gaming and wagering contracts is very much a product of the English experience for the English enactments in force here are in turn supplemented by New Zealand provisions which have been largely copied from English Gaming Acts of 1845 and 1892. But the New Zealand Legislature has not been completely lacking in imagination. Section 71 of the Gaming Act 1908 (N.Z.) has no counterpart in the English statutes, and sections 69 and 70 of the New Zealand Act both contain subtle, but significant differences, to their English equivalents. However, although New Zealand law in this area is modelled on that of England, there the similarity ends. English law in existence and applicable to the circumstances of the Colony of New Zealand on the 14th of January 1840 was declared to be in force in New Zealand by the English Laws Act, 1858 (N.Z.). That Act did not, however, apply subsequent English enactments, and substantial reforms to the law of gaming and wagering contracts effected by the gaming Act, 1845 (U.K.) were not adopted in New Zealand until the colonial Gaming and Lotteries Act was enacted in 1881. The English Act of 1845 replaced the gaming contract provisions of the Act of Anne (1710) and repealed all but those securities provisions of that Act that had been modified by the Gaming Act, 1835 (U.K.) Thus, within a period of five years from the inception of the colony, New Zealand was applying English gaming laws that were more than two centuries old whilst the English Courts were faced with the prospect of construing a brand new Act. Thirty six years later the colonial legislature adopted verbatim the contract provisions in the Imperial Act of 1845. But by an apparent over-sight the colonial draftsman failed to effect the substantial repeals of the Acts of 1664 and 1710 the English Act had done. But that was only the first of the colonial errors. A further English Act in 1892 was copied and enacted by the colonial legislature in 1894 but with an appendage that demonstrated that the New Zealand legislature had not fully understood the full import of the English measure. This created difficulties of interpretation which were only compounded by a further error of the draftsman of the 1881 Act when he mistakenly copied s.6 of the Betting Houses Act 1853 (U.K.) into s.34 of the former Act without realising the significance of doing so. The 1894 Act also introduced what is now s.71 of the 1908 Act, a provision the reason for the enactment of which has remained unexplained to the present day. When a consolidation of the Colonial Acts was effected by the Gaming Act 1908 the law of gaming and wagering contracts was already in a state of considerable confusion. That confusion was, of course, carried into that Act, but it did not end there and indeed can be said to have gained a new dimension when, as recently as 1970, the New Zealand legislature enacted the Illegal Contracts Act. The New Zealand law of gaming and wagering contracts is largely a product of misunderstandings and errors that occurred when legislative attempts were made to re-enact and effect modifications of the English statutes in this country. In this work the writer seeks to identify the points of departure and to find a rational basis for the law of gaming and wagering contracts and this investigation proceeds in the context of a recognised need for proposals for reform. To this end, in chapters 1 and 2 the social climate in which the Acts of 1664, 1710, 1835 and 1845 are enacted, and their purpose and scope, is identified. In chapter 3 the case for the proposition that the Acts of 1664, 1710 and 1835 are in force in New Zealand is made out and this is followed in chapter 4 by an attempt to explain the motivation behind the enactment of the colonial Acts of 1881 and 1894. Included in this chapter is an outline of the difficulties inherent in both the language of these Acts, and the construction applied to them by the Courts, Chapter 5 is devoted to ascertaining the actual scope of the law of gaming and wagering contracts in New Zealand today and in the penultimate chapter the Impact upon, and the implications for that law, of the Illegal Contracts Act 1970 is discussed. Each section is, where appropriate, accompanied by specific proposals for reform, and those proposals are brought together in summary form in chapter 7.</p>


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