This work argues that fundamental differences of opinion as to the nature of science affect whether the “S” in STEM can really apply to all the natural sciences, which will affect how we structure and implement improvements in STEM education. The first part of the argument deals with often-taught definitions of words like “law” and “theory” that don’t really apply to much of physics. In the second part, we notes that mathematics remains inseparable from education in the physical sciences, but this is not the case in biology. Moreover, an appreciation for the worth of mathematical or theoretical models, even disjoint from experiments, is not generally a part of biological education. The third part is “the tyranny of hypotheses.” One of the “cultural” shocks I’ve had moving into biological fields is constantly hearing people talk about “hypotheses” and seeing a steady stream of bar graphs with asterisks and p-values. In physics, one almost never discusses hypotheses; rather, one test relationships between parameters, either analyzing them within some mechanistic framework, or empirically determining what the underlying functional relationship is.
Functional relationship between myology and ecology in carnivores: do forelimb muscles reflect adaptations to prehension?
