18. Unilateral acts, acquiescence, and estoppel

Author(s):  
James Crawford
Keyword(s):  

This chapter discusses the concepts of unilateral acts, acquiescence, and estoppel, and the relation between the three. All three are rooted in the principle of good faith, but unilateral acts are in their essence statements or representations intended to be binding and publicly manifested as such, whereas acquiescence and estoppel are more general categories, consisting of statements or representations not intended as binding nor amounting to a promise, whose binding force depends on the circumstances.

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaldi Pratama Bagus Putra

The legal consequences of the issuance of the land title certificate whose application is made by a party who is not the right holder / owner is legally flawed. Issuance of a legally invalid certificate and no binding force and cancellation by the court. The defendant obtains a parcel of land through an auction, the auction is proven by photocopies of the auction object certificate, according to Article 21 of the 2016 Bidding Guidelines that the registered land auction must include an original certificate, so The Defendant did not go through the correct legal procedures. For the issuance of a double certificate for the same land field, the buyer of the land field loses the ownership certificate that is purchased by another party as a buyer with good intentions, because it has been carried out in accordance with the correct legal procedure, which means that the purchaser's certificate is guaranteed legal certainty. Legal protection for the purchaser of good land rights, that the buyer as a buyer has good intentions, with the issuance of the HGB certificate Number 181 Village / Cicau Village covering an area of ​​26,700 m2 in the name of the Defendant, is impaired, so that legal protection provided to the Plaintiff is filing an objection to the issuance HGB certificate to the Land Office as a preventive legal protection. 


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris D.L. Hunt

IN Mellish v Motteux (1792) 170 E.R. 113, 157, Lord Kenyon observed that “in contracts of all kinds, it is of the highest importance that courts of law should compel the observance of honesty and good faith”. This passage echoes a similar statement by Lord Mansfield 25 years earlier in Carter v Boehm (1766) 97 E.R. 1162, 1910. Despite these early statements of principle, the modern common law has been notoriously hostile to the notion that contracting parties are under a general duty of good faith in the performance of their obligations (see W.P. Yee, “Protecting Parties' Reasonable Expectations: A General Principle of Good Faith” (2001) 1 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 195), and there is certainly “no firm line of modern cases to support such an obligation” in English law (see L.E. Trakman and K. Sharma, “The Binding Force of Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith” [2014] C.L.J. 598). Nevertheless, some recent decisions in Australia, Canada, and England have begun to imply obligations to perform certain types of promises, in certain classes of contracts, in an honest manner, crafting, in the words of Lord Bingham, “piecemeal solutions in response to piecemeal problems” (Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] 1 QB 433, 439 (CA)). A recent English example is Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v International Trade Corporation Ltd. [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) in which Leggatt J. found there to be an implied duty of “honesty” and “fidelity to the bargain” in the context of a long-term distribution contract. Importantly, His Lordship emphasised that whether such obligations can be implied is a matter of construction, which involves ascertaining the parties' objective intentions through conventional techniques such as the principle of business efficacy. As implying such obligations depends entirely on the context of each contract (at paras [137]–[143]) there is, at present, no general principle of good faith performance in English contract law, despite some case-by-case recognition (see Mid-Essex Hospital Services N.H.S. Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd. [2013] EWCA Civ 200, at [105], [150]).


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Genevieve Helleringer

AbstractSince their enactment in 1804 as part of the French civil Code, the provisions relating to contract law had, until recently, remained almost untouched. That is not to say that the law of contract had not altered, but rather that the text of the Code was no longer an accurate reflection of the actual state of the law as interpreted by the courts. An extensively restructured and modernized version came into force on 1st October 2016. In an attempt to map the new French law of contract, this paper first seeks to evaluate the robustness of the guiding principles set out in the Code. By analysing how these principles are applied to the formation, interpretation and enforcement of contracts, the paper concludes that freedom of contract and good faith emerge strengthened by the reforms, while the binding force of contract has become more qualified. The paper also highlights the existence of less obvious but important trends relating to the parties’ behaviour and to the role of the judge. It demonstrates how unilateralism, anticipation, and equity are implicit core ideas lying behind many of the new rules.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asos Namiq

The contract is the Sharia of the Contracting Party as a rule that does not govern the contract only upon formation, but also upon execution, since the terms of the contract are transformed, after its formation, into a law that imposes itself, and its sanctity cannot be violated. That is, when the contract is valid and enforceable, it must be executed according to what it contains and in accordance with good faith and trust between people, and this is called the principle of binding force of the contract. Whenever the contract is binding on both parties, one of the parties cannot be the only one to rescind or amend it. The mandatory limits of the contract are not limited to what the contracting parties have agreed only, but include all of its requirements in accordance with legislative and customary rules, and what justice requires, and what is imposed by the nature of the full-time obligation of the contract. When executing the contract, the extent of the debtor’s commitment to the contract is measured in the manner in which it is implemented, and his agreement with the requirements of the contract, that is, the closer the method of implementation is with the requirements of the contract, the debtor is considered on the right path in fulfillment, and the more the method of implementation is far from the requirements of the contract, the debtor is considered in breach of his contractual obligations. Since the debtor may deviate from the prescribed path in some cases due to the difficulty of implementing the obligation on the one hand, and the difficulty of harmonizing the circumstances and methods of implementation on the other hand, the law allowed the creditor to object to the debtor’s behavior whenever he saw it as different from the contract based on the binding force of the contract. But this right granted to the creditor is not an absolute right. Rather, it is restricted by his act or statement that revealed to the debtor the safety of his conduct in the implementation of the contract, meaning that despite the recognition of the right to object to the creditor, the creditor may be suspended by what was previously issued by him, i.e. closed The door of objection to it, and this is called the rule of judgment closure that we have chosen as the subject of our study. We deal with it by research and study to show the limits of this rule, and its impact on modifying the binding force of the contract, whether by making mandatory certain clauses in the contract or even creating new clauses, or by stripping a contractual obligation of its binding force.


2018 ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Paulina Zamorano Valenzuela

ResumenLa gran mayoría de la doctrina se encuentra conteste en que las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana tienen efectos erga omnes, es decir, obligan no solo a los Estados partes del proceso objeto de la decisión, sino que también a los que no participaron del juicio como partes. La fuerza vinculante de los fallos de la Corte se extiende tanto a lo resolutivo como a su fundamentación, adquiriendo preponderancia su labor interpretativa de la Convención Americana y del resto delcorpus iuris interamericano.La fundamentación de la autoridadres judicata de sus fallos tiene como origen el deber de los Estados de respetar y garantizar los derechos consagrados en la Convención Americana, así como la obligación de los Estados de cumplir de buena fe los tratados internacionales. Sin embargo, ¿a través de qué medio se podría operativizar el efectoerga omnes de las sentencias de las Corte Interamericana? Una de las herramientas que facilitaría el cumplimiento de las decisiones de este órgano por parte de los Estados que no formaron parte del juicio, es a través del control de convencionalidad, el cual entrega lineamientos acerca de los sujetos obligados y el objeto de la obligación. El artículo muestra al control de convencionalidad como una de las herramientas que permite la concretización del efecto erga omnes de las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana y su papel en la construcción delius commune latinoamericano.Palabras clave: Efecto erga omnes; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; Ius Commune latinoamericano.ResumoA grande maioria da doutrina se encontra acorde com as decisões da Corte Interamericana pois têm efeitos erga omnes, ou seja, vinculam não apenas os Estados partes ao processo objeto da decisão, mas também aos que não participaram do julgamento como partes. A força vinculante das decisões da Corte se estende tanto ao resolutivo como a sua fundamentação, adquirindo preponderância seu trabalho interpretativo da Convenção Americana e do restante docorpus iuris interamericano. A fundação da autoridade res judicata de suas decisões tem como origem o dever dos Estados de respeitar e garantir os direitos consagrados na Convenção Americana, bem como a obrigação dos Estados de cumprir de boa-fé os tratados internacionais. No entanto, por meio de que poder-se-ia operacionalizar o efeito erga omnes das sentenças da Corte Interamericana? Uma das ferramentas que facilitaria o cumprimento das decisões deste órgão por parte dos Estados que não formaram parte do julgamento, é através do controle da convencionalidade, o qual entrega alinhamentos sobre os sujeitos obrigados e o objeto da obrigação.O artigo mostra ao controle da convencionalidade como uma dasferramentas que permite a concretização do efeito erga omnesdas decisões da Corte Interamericana e seu papel na construçãoda ius commune latino-americana.Palavras-chave: Efeito erga onmes; Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos; Ius Commune Latino-Americano. AbstractMost authors considered that the decisions of the Inter-American Court have erga omnes effects, that is, they obligate not only the States parties to the process subject of the decision but also those who did not participate in the trial as parts. The binding force of the Court’s rulings extends both to reasons and to its ratio decidendi, acquiring a preponderance of its interpretative work of the Convention and the rest of the Inter-American corpus iuris. The foundation of the res judicata authority of its rulings is based on the duty of the States to respect and guarantee the rights enshrined in the Convention, as well as the obligation of the States tocomply in good faith with international treaties. However, how the erga omnes effects of the judgments of the Inter-American Court could be operationalized? One of the tools that could be used to compliance with the decisions of the Court by the States that were not part of the trial, is through the control of conventionality, which provides guidelines on the subjects and the obligation. The article shows the control of conventionality as one of the tools that allows the concretion of theerga omnes effect of the decisions of the Court and its role in the construction of the Latin American ius commune.Keywords: Erga onmes effect; Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Ius Commune latinoamericano.


2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 598-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon E. Trakman ◽  
Kunal Sharma

AbstractThis article evaluates the established judicial proposition that an agreement to negotiate in good faith is antithetical to the principles of the common law. English courts are reluctant to enforce such agreements on the ground that they constitute unenforceable “agreements to agree”. Recently, courts have started to recognise an exception in cases where parties agree to negotiate over a term mandated by an existing agreement, such as to review a price clause or resolve a dispute by undertaking negotiations in good faith. The primary arguments against enforcing an independent agreement to negotiate in good faith are threefold. First, parties engaged in good faith negotiations are assumed to lack a serious legal intention to contract. Second, such an agreement is substantively uncertain in nature and does not promise to produce a contract. Third, the failure of parties to conclude their negotiations does not lead to an easily identifiable loss. In light of these considerations, this article considers the viability of enforcing an agreement to negotiate in good faith in the absence of a pre-existing contract. It argues that the legal obstacles to recognising agreements to negotiate have been overstated. Given the commercial value of enforcing such agreements, it proposes that agreements to negotiate in good faith should be recognised and given legal content by common law courts.


Moreana ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (Number 176) (1) ◽  
pp. 65-76
Author(s):  
Joshua Avery
Keyword(s):  

This study draws upon the Platonic dialogue tradition as a background for interpreting the conversation between More and his daughter Margaret Roper, as depicted in Margaret’s letter to Alice Alington. With an eye to the famously ironic Socrates, this article will propose the interpretation of a puzzling statement regarding More’s apparent good faith in the sincerity of others who have reversed their positions regarding the problematic oath. Is More expressing ironic distance or straightforward charity in his ambiguous language? The argument is that More, utilizing his legal and literary skills, carefully crafts a rhetoric that paradoxically joins remarkable charity with worldly-wise irony.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-103
Author(s):  
Komang Sukaniasa

International agreements are agreements between international subjects that give rise to binding obligations in international rights, which can be bilateral or multilateral. Based on these opinions, an understanding can be taken that international treaties are agreements or agreements entered into by two or more countries as subjects of international law that aim to cause certain legal consequences. International agreements, whether ratified or through approval or acceptance or accession, or other methods that are permitted, have the same binding force as ratified international treaties established in the Ratification Law of International Treaties. Once again, it is equally valid and binding on the state. Therefore, the authors consider that the position of international treaties are not made in the form of the Ratification Act of the International Agreement but are binding and apply to Indonesia. Then Damos Dumoli Agusman argues that ratification originates from the conception of international treaty law which is interpreted as an act of confirmation from a country of the legal acts of its envoys or representatives who have signed an agreement as a sign of agreement to be bound by the agreement.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document