11. Parliamentary Scrutiny of Central Government

Public Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 418-486
Author(s):  
Mark Elliott ◽  
Robert Thomas

This chapter examines the accountability of the central government to Parliament. It addresses questions such as: what is Parliament’s proper role in scrutinising government? What does the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility mean? And how does it operate in practice? The chapter also considers topics of particular importance to government accountability: freedom of information, accountability of the security and intelligence services, and financial accountability.

Public Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Elliott ◽  
Robert Thomas

This chapter examines the accountability of the central government to Parliament. It addresses questions such as: what is Parliament’s proper role in scrutinising government? What does the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility mean? And how does it operate in practice? The chapter also considers topics of particular importance to government accountability: freedom of information, accountability of the security and intelligence services, and financial accountability.


1980 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 37-41
Author(s):  
Bruce Page ◽  
Duncan Campbell

‘A spectre,’ wrote The Times on 16 July, ‘has been haunting the Committee Corridor of the House of Commons each Tuesday morning for the past five weeks as the Select Committee on Defence has taken evidence on the workings of the D Notice system. The invisible presence in Committee Room 8 has been that of Bismarck, the maker of modern Germany.’ The DPBC ( Defence Press and Broadcasting, or D Notice, Committee) consists of four top civil servants and 11 representatives of the British press and broadcasting organisations. Its origins date back to the period before the First World War when, as The Times put it, ‘Bismarck's observation on the help French newspapers had given to the Prussian general staff in discovering the disposition of French troops in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 … convinced the British defence establishment of the need for a system of press censorship’. The Committee issues so-called D Notices giving details of information it does not wish published and relies on the voluntary cooperation of editors and journalists in suppressing the information. Interest in the system, in recent years largely forgotten, was reawakened in February this year by the publication in the New Statesman of a series of articles by Duncan Campbell on such topics as telephone tapping and the activities of the MI5 and MI6 intelligence agencies. Admiral Ash, Secretary of the DPBC, wrote to Bruce Page, Editor of the New Statesman, to remind him of the ‘continuing validity’ of D Notices Nos 10 and 11 on the need to protect information concerning the intelligence services. In an exchange of letters with the Admiral, Bruce Page queried the validity of the D Notice system, which Duncan Campbell, writing in the New Statesman on 4 April, called ‘one of the greater mysteries of British journalism’ – misunderstood or ignored by British journalists and considered by their American and other foreign colleagues to be a typical example of ‘peculiarly British placid press complacency’. Many British journalists have, however, for some time now expressed criticism of the excessive secrecy with which the government and the civil service in this country conduct their affairs, campaigning for the abolition of Section Two of the Official Secrets Act ( see Index on Censorship 1/1978, pp 9–14) and for the introduction of Freedom of Information legislation. Prominent among them has been Harold Evans, Editor of the Sunday Times, and Bruce Page and Duncan Campbell of the New Statesman. In June and July this year a Sub-Committee on D Notices of the House of Commons Defence Committee held an enquiry into the workings of the D Notice system, with members of the DPBC, as well as other civil servants and journalists giving evidence. Some, including Richard Francis, BBC director of news and current affairs and a member of the DPBC ( see box on p 39), and Windsor Clarke, editorial consultant to the Westminster Press and vice-chairman of the Committee, spoke in favour of continuing the system. It could, said Mr Clarke, be discredited within a year if sufficient journalists criticised it, but that was most unlikely, ‘as the arrangement enjoyed wide support in the press’. In a 20- page submission to the parliamentary sub-committee, Bruce Page and Duncan Campbell argue for the system's abolition. Its inception had coincided with the ‘spectacular increase in the size and power of Britain's bureaucracy, which has continued almost without check until very recently’. The DPBC had increasingly become ‘an outpost of the Ministry of Defence’ losing rather than gaining in independence. Page and Campbell analyse the contents of the existing 12 D Notices, as well as dealing with several which have been abandoned, such as the one issued in 1967 in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent The Observer and Sunday Times from publishing the results of their investigations into the affair of the Soviet spy and former British Intelligence officer, Kim Philby. As in some other cases, the New Statesman journalists point out, the information was clearly known to the hostile power in question and would have been kept only from the British reader. Similarly, they describe D Notice No 9 as ‘virtually valueless’, as the British government itself publishes details of all major radio installations and the frequencies they use. ‘It is ludicrous that a D Notice is issued to prevent the British press discussing information which the government furnishes for publication overseas’. Below, we print an edited version of the evidence given to the House of Commons Sub-Committee on D Notices by Bruce Page and Duncan Campbell.


Author(s):  
Neri Fajarwati

The existence of the village government lately has not been able to function properly. One factor is that the capacity of the village apparatus is inadequate and the skills possessed are still very limited. Minimal education and training to improve the ability of village officials is the root of the problem. This study uses descriptive qualitative methods and the approach used in this study is a qualitative approach. The purpose of writing this article is to find out the things, efforts and constraints of developing the capacity of the current village apparatus. The problem of limited budget is an obstacle in improving the quality of village officials. The lack of a budget has had an effect on programs and activities in the context of developing the capacity of village apparatus that cannot be realized. The steps that can be used are, capacity building through training for orderly village administration, manuscripts and management of official letters, village government accountability reports, Compilation of Village Expenditure Budget, Village Fund Allocation Management and Village Wealth Management and Management of Village Owned Enterprises. The need for cooperation and attention between the Central Government and the Regional Government to conduct training on an ongoing basis, especially in the village of Cibodas    


Author(s):  
Lidia Valera-Ordaz ◽  
Doménech-Beltrán

The Covid-19 pandemic has produced not only a terrible sanitary crisis but also several problems related to the circulation of disinformation in the context of hybrid and increasingly fragmented media systems. In this work, we analyze a polemical question included in the Center for Sociological Research (CIS) survey conducted in April about the appropriateness of limiting free circulation of information to avoid diffusion of fake news and disinformation. The goals are to (1) analyze the sociodemographic traits of those in favor of limiting the free circulation of information, and (2) explore their general political preferences and affiliations, and the association with attitudes regarding freedom of information. The results obtained through a quantitative methodological approach based on contingency tables and standardized residuals indicate that the most common sociodemographic profile of those in favor of limiting the flow of information is the following: young women (between 18 and 25 years) with secondary education who live in small municipalities and belong to the lower social class. Moreover, the findings illustrate that there is a significant statistical association between supporting the limitation of information and different indicators of supporting the Socialist government: voting and sympathizing with the Socialist Party, self-location in the extreme left, and trusting both the central government management of the crisis and the leadership of Pedro Sánchez. Resumen La pandemia ocasionada por la crisis de la Covid-19 ha supuesto no sólo una terrible crisis sanitaria, sino importantes problemas relacionados con la difusión de desinformación en el contexto de sistemas mediáticos híbridos y crecientemente fragmentados. Analizamos la polémica pregunta del CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) sobre la pertinencia de limitar la libre circulación de información para restringir la difusión de bulos y noticias falsas. El objetivo es: 1) analizar las características sociodemográficas básicas de quienes se declararon partidarios de restringir la libre circulación informativa, y 2) explorar sus inclinaciones políticas e ideológicas, y su asociación con las actitudes en torno a la libertad informativa. Así, mediante una metodología cuantitativa basada en tablas de contingencia y residuos tipificados corregidos, los resultados reflejan que el perfil sociodemográfico más frecuente entre los partidarios de limitar la libertad informativa es el de una mujer joven (entre 18 y 25 años), con estudios secundarios, que vive en municipios pequeños y declara pertenecer a la clase social baja. Además, los resultados ilustran que existe una asociación estadística significativa entre apoyar la restricción informativa y diversos indicadores de apoyo al Gobierno central: votar y simpatizar con el PSOE, situarse en la extrema izquierda, confiar en la gestión de la pandemia del Gobierno central y confiar en su presidente.


Author(s):  
Amanda L. Tyler

The U.S. Constitution that emerged from the Constitutional Convention in 1787 created a stronger central government than had existed under the Articles of Confederation and for the first time established national courts. It also included the Suspension Clause, which provided: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” As explored in this chapter, a wealth of evidence from the Founding period demonstrates that in the Suspension Clause, the Founding generation sought to constitutionalize the protections associated with the seventh section of the English Habeas Corpus Act and import the English suspension model, while also severely limiting the circumstances when the suspension power could be invoked.


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