Strategic ambiguity and the Trumpian approach to China–Taiwan relations

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoo Tiang Boon ◽  
Hannah Elyse Sworn

Abstract The notion of strategic ambiguity has long guided the United States’ engagement in cross-strait relations, requiring that Washington is intentionally unclear about whether and how it would intervene in a China-Taiwan conflict in order to preserve a balance of assurance and deterrence for both sides. This article unpacks the US approach to strategic ambiguity under Trump. Adopting a neo-classical realist perspective, it argues that domestic and individual level drivers-in particular, US populism, Congress and the foreign policy establishment, and Trump's transactional and personalized approach to foreign policy-have interacted with the shifting US-China balance of power to produce a different mode of American strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait. A common view is that as a function of the growing US-China power competition, the US has largely leaned towards Taiwan in recent years. Our analysis revises this assessment by revealing a form of strategic ambiguity under Trump that, despite appearing to upset the balance of ambiguity in favour of Taiwan-paradoxically and probably unintentionally-maintains assurances and warnings for both China and Taiwan. Yet, while Trump has arguably preserved the overall balance of strategic ambiguity, he has introduced greater volatility into cross-strait relations.

2021 ◽  
pp. 205789112110079
Author(s):  
Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi ◽  
Azhar Ahmad

The relations between Pakistan and the United States, throughout the course of history, have witnessed many ups and downs. At times, when their interests were aligned, strong socio-economic and military cooperation was seen between the two states. Yet, on other occasions they were at odds with and distant from each other. However, post 9/11, Pakistan–US relations were at its zenith, when Pakistan became the frontline ally of the US in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and the US granted Pakistan the prestigious status of non-NATO ally. Soon after, though, the partnership between the two states was in troubled waters: when the US repeatedly violated Pakistan’s sovereignty through drone strikes and covert ops, it diplomatically painted Pakistan as the bad guy by claiming it to be part of the problem (terrorism), not the solution, and by promoting India within the region. Furthermore, when Pakistan became part of China’s New Silk Road initiative, commonly known as the Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan–US relations saw its lowest point in history. This article critically analyzes post-9/11 Pakistan–US relations by application of two mainstream theories of international relations in tandem: Realism and (Neo)structural Realism. Realism explains the US foreign policy rationale, while Structural Realism explains Pakistan’s foreign policy choices in relation to the US.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-173
Author(s):  
Leandro Wolpert dos Santos

O objetivo deste artigo consiste em retratar um dos principais debates intelectuais que produziu cisões no pensamento diplomático brasileiro a partir dos anos 90, especialmente durante os governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e Lula da Silva (2003-2010), a saber: o tipo de relacionamento a ser estabelecido com os Estados Unidos. Para tanto, mostraremos de que forma este debate se manifestou, as correntes de pensamento por ele engendradas no interior do Itamaraty, o conjunto de crenças e percepções que sustentaram tais correntes no período em estudo bem como as estratégias de política externa delas oriundas. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam que, neste período, duas tendências se mostraram dominantes no Itamaraty, embora em momentos distintos. A primeira, que damos o nome de acomodacionista, teria predominado durante a administração Cardoso e defendia uma posição de maior aproximação aos EUA, no marco de uma estratégia de acomodação à ordem internacional liderada pela potência hegemônica. A segunda corrente, que chamamos de revisionista, teria ganho proeminência na administração Lula, e preconizava maior autonomia frente à potência hegemônica, com quem o relacionamento brasileiro devia se sustentar na igualdade irrestrita, dentro de uma lógica de equilíbrio de poder. Essa posição de distância relativa frente os EUA se enquadrava em uma estratégia de “multipolarização” ou desconcentração do poder mundial e de revisionismo da ordem internacional vigente. O desenvolvimento da pesquisa ancorou-se fundamentalmente na investigação de discursos, entrevistas, depoimentos, livros e artigos das principais autoridades a frente do Itamaraty (chanceleres e embaixadores) no período em estudo. Palavras-chave: Pensamento Diplomático; Política Externa Brasileira; Estados Unidos.     Abstract: The objective of this article is to portray one of the main intellectual debates that produced divisions in Brazilian diplomatic thought starting in the 1990s, especially during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula da Silva (2003-2010) governments, namely: the kind of relationship to be established with the United States. To do so, we will show how this debate manifested itself, the currents of thought generated by it within the Itamaraty, the set of beliefs and perceptions that underpinned these currents in the period under study as well as the foreign policy strategies that came from them. The results of the research indicate that, during this period, two tendencies were dominant in Itamaraty, although at different moments. The first, which we call the accommodationist, would have predominated during the Cardoso administration and advocated a position of greater approximation to the United States, within the framework of a strategy of accommodation to the international order led by the hegemonic power. The second current of thought, which we call revisionist, would have gained prominence in the Lula administration, and advocated greater autonomy against the hegemonic power, with whom the Brazilian relationship should be based on unrestricted equality, within a balance of power logic. This relative distance from the US was part of a strategy of "multi-polarization" or deconcentration of world power and revisionism of the current international order. The development of the research was fundamentally based on the investigation of speeches, interviews, testimonies, books and articles of the main authorities in front of the Itamaraty (chancellors and ambassadors) during the period of study. Keywords: Diplomatic Thought; Brazilian Foreign Policy; United States.     Recebido em: agosto/2017 Aprovado em: abril/2018.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. K. Pasha

The signing of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5 + 1 countries (i.e., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) heralds a new US foreign policy approach in the Middle East. Amidst growing signs of declining geopolitical influence in the region, the United States chose to end its three-decade-old tension with Iran. This has alarmed its traditional regional allies and partners, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. While Israel had advocated a “military option” to stop Iranian nuclear ambitions and took the matters to the US Congress, Saudi Arabia preferred a less confrontationist approach due to its dependence upon the United States for security. Its reactions and the recent foreign policy choices underscore its anxiety over growing Iranian influence as well as its “interventionist” policy stoking instability in many Gulf and Arab states. In foreseeable future, both Saudi Arabia and Iran would have work for rapprochement and be content with their spheres of influence and continue depending on the United States to maintain stability and balance of power in the region.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria do Céu de Pinho Ferreira Pinto

When the Arab Spring broke out, the United States was in a quandary over how to handle the crisis in its attempt to balance its moral obligations and ideals without undercutting its strategic interests and those of its close allies. Flaws in US diplomatic approach have contributed to one of the most serious foreign policy crisis for a US administration to date with consequential upheaval and erosion of the US-built balance of power. The reactions and policy responses of the Obama administration highlight the difficulties in grasping with the new reality in the Middle East and in enunciating a policy platform that could combine American interests and values.


Asian Survey ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 754-778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean P. Chen

The PRC’s increasingly assertive foreign policy behaviors have triggered heightened anxiety among its regional neighbors. Washington has abided by a long-standing strategic ambiguity policy to manage the Taiwan Strait impasse. However, as the KMT’s “1992 consensus” policy places Taiwan in close union with Beijing, Taipei’s security positions sometimes go against the interests of the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. Pulling Taiwan away from China’s orbit is congruent with US interest in continuing that enduring policy framework and ensuring a healthy balance across the Strait.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 303-303
Author(s):  
HwaJung Choi ◽  
Robert Schoeni ◽  
Tsai-Chin Cho ◽  
Kenneth Langa

Abstract The paper’s goal is to assess whether and, if so, the extent to which prevalence in disability of adults near retirement ages in the US increased over time compared to their peers in England and examine income group differences in the relative trends. This study uses 2002-2016 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) focusing on adults aged 55-64. Annual percent changes over the period of 2002-2016 for limitations in instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) and activities of daily living (ADL) are estimated for each survey (HRS and ELSA) using multivariable logistic regressions to adjust for individual-level characteristics While disability prevalence of adults ages 55-64 in England improved over the years of 2002-2016 (annual % change= -2.01 for IADL; - 2.53 for ADL), disability prevalence of US adults has not improved and in fact even worsened in terms of IADL (annual % change= +1.35). There are substantial variations in the IADL/ADL trends by income groups. In the US, the adverse trends in disability were more pronounced among the lowest income groups (annual % change in IADL=1.76 for bottom 20% vs. -2.08 for top 20%; annual % change in ADL=1.08 for bottom 20% vs. -2.08 for top 20%). In England, the disability status improved over time for all but the lowest income group. We will examine further to identify specific factors contributing to divergent/convergent trends in disability between the US and England.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 271-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE CUMINGS

At the inception of the twenty-first century—not to mention the next millennium—books on ‘the American Century’ proliferate monthly, if not daily. We now have The American Century Dictionary, The American Century Thesaurus, and even The American Century Cookbook; perhaps the American Century baseball cap or cologne is not far behind. With one or two exceptions, the authors celebrate the unipolar pre-eminence and comprehensive economic advantage that the United States now enjoys. Surveys of public opinion show that most people agree: the American wave appears to be surging just as the year 2000 beckons. Unemployment and inflation are both at twenty-year lows, sending economists (who say you can't get lows for both at the same time) back to the drawing board. The stock market roars past the magic 10,000 mark, and the monster federal budget deficit of a decade ago miraculously metamorphoses into a surplus that may soon reach upwards of $1 trillion. Meanwhile President William Jefferson Clinton, not long after a humiliating impeachment, is rated in 1999 as the best of all postwar presidents in conducting foreign policy (a dizzying ascent from eighth place in 1994), according to a nationwide poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This surprising result might also, of course, bespeak inattention: when asked to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the US, fully 21 per cent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered ‘don't know’), and a mere seven per cent thought foreign policy issues were important to the nation. But who cares, when all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds?


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Winger

Abstract In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.


Author(s):  
Natalia B. Pomozova ◽  

The complex development of China and its transformation into a superpower arouses the US fears, what results in the trade and economic wars between the two countries, as well as in a discursive confrontation. As the conflict between the United States and China escalates, the struggle will intensify not only for markets, but also for the hearts and minds of Europeans (in this article, in particular, Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy are considered). Reflection on Beijing’s behavior in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic will become one of the important sociological factors that will affect the attitude of European citizens towards China, what, in turn, will have a significant impact on the implementation of the PRC’s foreign policy strategy.


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