Saudi Arabia and the Iranian Nuclear Deal

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. K. Pasha

The signing of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5 + 1 countries (i.e., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) heralds a new US foreign policy approach in the Middle East. Amidst growing signs of declining geopolitical influence in the region, the United States chose to end its three-decade-old tension with Iran. This has alarmed its traditional regional allies and partners, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. While Israel had advocated a “military option” to stop Iranian nuclear ambitions and took the matters to the US Congress, Saudi Arabia preferred a less confrontationist approach due to its dependence upon the United States for security. Its reactions and the recent foreign policy choices underscore its anxiety over growing Iranian influence as well as its “interventionist” policy stoking instability in many Gulf and Arab states. In foreseeable future, both Saudi Arabia and Iran would have work for rapprochement and be content with their spheres of influence and continue depending on the United States to maintain stability and balance of power in the region.

2020 ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Simon Mabon

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has faced a number of serious challenges to its geopolitical position in the Persian Gulf regional security complex. Having long relied upon the United States as a guarantor of its security, recent friction between Washington and Riyadh, coupled with what appeared to be a burgeoning rapprochement between the US and Iran, has caused policymakers in Riyadh to reconsider Saudi foreign policy behavior.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-173
Author(s):  
Leandro Wolpert dos Santos

O objetivo deste artigo consiste em retratar um dos principais debates intelectuais que produziu cisões no pensamento diplomático brasileiro a partir dos anos 90, especialmente durante os governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e Lula da Silva (2003-2010), a saber: o tipo de relacionamento a ser estabelecido com os Estados Unidos. Para tanto, mostraremos de que forma este debate se manifestou, as correntes de pensamento por ele engendradas no interior do Itamaraty, o conjunto de crenças e percepções que sustentaram tais correntes no período em estudo bem como as estratégias de política externa delas oriundas. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam que, neste período, duas tendências se mostraram dominantes no Itamaraty, embora em momentos distintos. A primeira, que damos o nome de acomodacionista, teria predominado durante a administração Cardoso e defendia uma posição de maior aproximação aos EUA, no marco de uma estratégia de acomodação à ordem internacional liderada pela potência hegemônica. A segunda corrente, que chamamos de revisionista, teria ganho proeminência na administração Lula, e preconizava maior autonomia frente à potência hegemônica, com quem o relacionamento brasileiro devia se sustentar na igualdade irrestrita, dentro de uma lógica de equilíbrio de poder. Essa posição de distância relativa frente os EUA se enquadrava em uma estratégia de “multipolarização” ou desconcentração do poder mundial e de revisionismo da ordem internacional vigente. O desenvolvimento da pesquisa ancorou-se fundamentalmente na investigação de discursos, entrevistas, depoimentos, livros e artigos das principais autoridades a frente do Itamaraty (chanceleres e embaixadores) no período em estudo. Palavras-chave: Pensamento Diplomático; Política Externa Brasileira; Estados Unidos.     Abstract: The objective of this article is to portray one of the main intellectual debates that produced divisions in Brazilian diplomatic thought starting in the 1990s, especially during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula da Silva (2003-2010) governments, namely: the kind of relationship to be established with the United States. To do so, we will show how this debate manifested itself, the currents of thought generated by it within the Itamaraty, the set of beliefs and perceptions that underpinned these currents in the period under study as well as the foreign policy strategies that came from them. The results of the research indicate that, during this period, two tendencies were dominant in Itamaraty, although at different moments. The first, which we call the accommodationist, would have predominated during the Cardoso administration and advocated a position of greater approximation to the United States, within the framework of a strategy of accommodation to the international order led by the hegemonic power. The second current of thought, which we call revisionist, would have gained prominence in the Lula administration, and advocated greater autonomy against the hegemonic power, with whom the Brazilian relationship should be based on unrestricted equality, within a balance of power logic. This relative distance from the US was part of a strategy of "multi-polarization" or deconcentration of world power and revisionism of the current international order. The development of the research was fundamentally based on the investigation of speeches, interviews, testimonies, books and articles of the main authorities in front of the Itamaraty (chancellors and ambassadors) during the period of study. Keywords: Diplomatic Thought; Brazilian Foreign Policy; United States.     Recebido em: agosto/2017 Aprovado em: abril/2018.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-204
Author(s):  
D. B. Grafov

Qatar lobbied its interests in the US in order to ease tensions with the Gulf c tries which declared a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt accused Qatar of supporting terrorism, demanded to break off all ties with Iran and to close the Turkish military base on its territory. The article analyses the lobbying campaign against the blockade. It uses the facts and data disclosed by the consulting and lobbying firms according to “The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938” and “The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995”. Three main conclusions are drawn: 1) The US is not interested in settlement of dispute through the support of one party. The White House prefers the “divide and rule” strategy. 2) There is little chance of successful lobbying in the US for any state that cooperates with Iran. 3) The balance-of-power approach in analysing of the development of Qatari-Saudi crisis shows that attempt of the both parties to “buck-pass” by one superpower is uneffisient. The reason is that both Qatar and Saudi coalition act like US's clients. Although Qatar is not as powerful as its rivals, but it uses the “defensive realism” strategy, that allows it to disrupt aggressive efforts and increase the costs of the Saudi coalition.


Author(s):  
Lisel Hintz

This chapter shows how identity contestation theory extends to state and non-state actors outside of Turkey, aiding understanding of how identity struggles spill over into foreign policy. It focuses on (1) the Israeli Likud Party’s efforts to shore up hardline, anti-Iran support in the US Congress; (2) India’s foreign policy shifts under the Hindu nationalist BJP; (3) Iranian moderates’ use of the nuclear deal as Western engagement to advance their position back home; and (4) anti-apartheid activists’ normative suasion tactics to force the United States to discontinue support of South Africa’s apartheid regime. The chapter demonstrates how these groups can also use foreign policy as an arena via institutions, diaspora groups, and transnational civil society to circumvent identity-based obstacles back home. These cases include the ongoing diplomacy of Turkey’s Kurdish movement with EU institutions and the Gülen movement’s efforts to spread Turkish Calvinism through its vast institutional network abroad.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria do Céu de Pinho Ferreira Pinto

When the Arab Spring broke out, the United States was in a quandary over how to handle the crisis in its attempt to balance its moral obligations and ideals without undercutting its strategic interests and those of its close allies. Flaws in US diplomatic approach have contributed to one of the most serious foreign policy crisis for a US administration to date with consequential upheaval and erosion of the US-built balance of power. The reactions and policy responses of the Obama administration highlight the difficulties in grasping with the new reality in the Middle East and in enunciating a policy platform that could combine American interests and values.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-105
Author(s):  
Ognjen Pribicevic

The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden?s victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West?s victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


Author(s):  
Halyna Shchyhelska

2018 marks the 100th anniversary of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. OnJanuary 22, 1918, the Ukrainian People’s Republic proclaimed its independence by adopting the IV Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, although this significant event was «wiped out» from the public consciousness on the territory of Ukraine during the years of the Soviet totalitarian regime. At the same time, January 22 was a crucial event for the Ukrainian diaspora in the USA. This article examines how American Ukrainians interacted with the USA Government institutions regarding the celebration and recognition of the Ukrainian Independence day on January 22. The attention is focused on the activities of ethnic Ukrainians in the United States, directed at the organization of the special celebration of the Ukrainian Independence anniversaries in the US Congress and cities. Drawing from the diaspora press and Congressional Records, this article argues that many members of Congress participated in the observed celebration and expressed kind feelings to the Ukrainian people, recognised their fight for freedom, during the House of Representatives and Senate sessions. Several Congressmen submitted the resolutions in the US Congress urging the President of United States to designate January 22 as «Ukrainian lndependence Day». January 22 was proclaimed Ukrainian Day by the governors of fifteen States and mayors of many cities. Keywords: January 22, Ukrainian independence day, Ukrainian diaspora, USA, interaction, Congress


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Winger

Abstract In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document