scholarly journals Tropism of SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV and influenza virus in canine tissue explants

Author(s):  
Christine H T Bui ◽  
H W Yeung ◽  
John C W Ho ◽  
Connie Y H Leung ◽  
Kenrie P Y Hui ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Human spillovers of SARS-CoV-2 to dogs and the emergence of a highly contagious avian-origin H3N2 canine influenza virus have raised concerns towards the role of dogs in the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and their susceptibility to existing human and avian influenza viruses which might result in further reassortment. Methods We systematically studied the replication kinetics of SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, influenza A viruses of H1, H3, H5, H7 and H9 subtypes and influenza B viruses of Yamagata-like and Victoria-like lineages in ex-vivo canine nasal cavity (NC), soft palate (SP), trachea (T) and lung (L) tissue explant cultures and examined ACE2 and sialic acid (SA) receptor distribution in these tissues. Results There was limited productive replication of SARS-CoV-2 in canine NC and SARS-CoV in canine NC, SP and L with unexpectedly high ACE2 levels in canine NC and SP. Meanwhile, the canine tissues were susceptible to a wide range of human and avian influenza viruses, which matched with the abundance of both human and avian SA receptors. Conclusions Existence of suitable receptors and tropism for the same tissue foster virus adaptation and reassortment. Continuous surveillance in dog populations should be conducted given the plenty of chances for spillover during outbreaks.

mBio ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bartram L. Smith ◽  
Guifang Chen ◽  
Claus O. Wilke ◽  
Robert M. Krug

ABSTRACTInfluenza A viruses cause an annual contagious respiratory disease in humans and are responsible for periodic high-mortality human pandemics. Pandemic influenza A viruses usually result from the reassortment of gene segments between human and avian influenza viruses. These avian influenza virus gene segments need to adapt to humans. Here we focus on the human adaptation of the synonymous codons of the avian influenza virus PB1 gene of the 1968 H3N2 pandemic virus. We generated recombinant H3N2 viruses differing only in codon usage of PB1 mRNA and demonstrated that codon usage of the PB1 mRNA of recent H3N2 virus isolates enhances replication in interferon (IFN)-treated human cells without affecting replication in untreated cells, thereby partially alleviating the interferon-induced antiviral state. High-throughput sequencing of tRNA pools explains the reduced inhibition of replication by interferon: the levels of some tRNAs differ between interferon-treated and untreated human cells, and evolution of the codon usage of H3N2 PB1 mRNA is skewed toward interferon-altered human tRNA pools. Consequently, the avian influenza virus-derived PB1 mRNAs of modern H3N2 viruses have acquired codon usages that better reflect tRNA availabilities in IFN-treated cells. Our results indicate that the change in tRNA availabilities resulting from interferon treatment is a previously unknown aspect of the antiviral action of interferon, which has been partially overcome by human-adapted H3N2 viruses.IMPORTANCEPandemic influenza A viruses that cause high human mortality usually result from reassortment of gene segments between human and avian influenza viruses. These avian influenza virus gene segments need to adapt to humans. Here we focus on the human adaptation of the avian influenza virus PB1 gene that was incorporated into the 1968 H3N2 pandemic virus. We demonstrate that the coding sequence of the PB1 mRNA of modern H3N2 viruses enhances replication in human cells in which interferon has activated a potent antiviral state. Reduced interferon inhibition results from evolution of PB1 mRNA codons skewed toward the pools of tRNAs in interferon-treated human cells, which, as shown here, differ significantly from the tRNA pools in untreated human cells. Consequently, avian influenza virus-derived PB1 mRNAs of modern H3N2 viruses have acquired codon usages that better reflect tRNA availabilities in IFN-treated cells and are translated more efficiently.


2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 339
Author(s):  
C. S. KYRIAKIS (Κ. ΣΠ. ΚΥΡΙΑΚΗΣ) ◽  
K. Van REETH

The huge epizootics of highly pathogenic avian influenza (subtype H5N1) in Southeastern Asia over the last two years and especially the transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans have alerted the international scientific community. Many support that the threat of a new influenza pandemic appears greater today than ever before. During the 20th century, humanity has faced three pandemics, including the "Spanish flu" of 1918-19, which claimed over 20 to 40 million lives, and two less dramatic pandemics in 1957-58 and 1968-69. Influenza A viruses are single stranded RNA viruses belonging to the family Orthomyxoviridae. Their genome expresses only 10 proteins, most important of which are the two surface glycoproteins: haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). So far, 16 different types of haemagglutinin (HI to Η16) and 9 of neuraminidase (Nl to N9) have been recognized. Influenza A viruses are grouped into "subtypes", according to the HA and NA surface proteins they bear (for example Η I N I , H5N2). Natural reservoirs of influenza A viruses are the wild aquatic birds (migratory waterfowl), from which all types of HA and NA have been isolated. It is important to mention that migratory waterfowl do not show clinical signs of disease, but shed the virus through their excretions.The host range of flu viruses includes domestic poultry, and mammalian species from aquatic mammals to horses, humans and swine. Because of their segmented single stranded RNA genome, influenza viruses have a very high mutation rate (genetic drift) and the possibility to undergo reassortment. Reassortment may occur when more than one virus co-infect the same cell, exchange genes and as a result, provide a totally new influenza virus (genetic shift). At least two subtypes of influenza A viruses are currendy endemic within the human population (H1N1 and H3N2), causing every year outbreaks of disease with very low mortality, especially in elders. Unlike these endemic viruses, pandemic viruses have a much higher morbidity, affecting people of all ages. Η I N I , H3N2 and H1N2 influenza viruses are currently circulating in the European and American swine population. Some of the swine influenza virus subtypes, namely Η I N I and H3N2, are thus similar to those of humans, but there are still important antigenic differences between them. Only rarely swine influenza viruses may be transmitted or cause disease to humans. Unlike mammalian influenza viruses, influenza viruses of domestic birds are grouped in two "pathotypes": low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses, which cause localized infections and remain mild or subclinical, and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, which cause severe general infection with mortality up to 100% (fowl plague). The majority of avian influenza viruses are low pathogenic and only some, but not all, viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes are highly pathogenic. Occasionally low pathogenic Η5 or H7 viruses from wild birds transmit to poultry. Such viruses can undergo mutations in poultry as a result of which they may acquire a highly pathogenic phenotype. Until the recent avian influenza epizootics in Asia, the predominant theory for the creation of a pandemic virus supported that the pig was likely to act as an intermediate host for transmission of influenza viruses from birds to humans. The fact that genetic reassortment between human and avian viruses has also been shown to occur in pigs in nature, had led to the hypothesis that the pandemic viruses of 1957 and 1968 may have been generated through the pig. More recent data, however, come to question these theories and hypotheses: (a)the direct transmission of the H5N1 and H7N7 avian influenza viruses from birds to humans in Southeastern Asia and The Netherlands, and (b) the presence of cellular receptors recognized preferentially by the haemagglutinin of avian influenza viruses in the human conjunctiva and ciliated respiratory epithelial cells, which support that avian influenza viruses can be transmitted in toto (without reassortment) to and between humans or that humans can be the mixing vessel themselves. Furthermore, there is no solid scientific evidence to prove that any influenza virus reassortants, that have originated in swine, have posed a risk for humans. There are three criteria (conditions) an influenza virus must fulfill in order to be characterized as a pandemic virus: (a) it must be a new virus against which humans are immunologically naive, (b) it must be able to replicate in humans causing severe disease, and (c) it must be efficiendy transmitted among humans, causing wide outbreaks. So far the H5N1 influenza virus only fulfills the first and second condition, and even though it has been sporadically infecting humans for over two years, it has not yet been able to fully adapt to it's new host. Compared to the human population that may have been exposed to the H5N1 influenza virus in Asia, the number of patients and fatalities due to the H5N1 virus is very small. So far, it appears that swine do not play an important role in the epidemiology of this specific virus. Experimental infections of swine with highly pathogenic H5N1 virus have shown that it does not replicate extensively in pigs. Additionally, extensive serological investigations in the swine population of Viet Nam, indicated that the H5N1 virus merely spread to a very small number (~0.25%) of contact animals within the epizootic regions. Nevertheless, it is critical to continue monitor ring pigs and studying the behavior and spread of influenza viruses in these species.


Pathogens ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 1320
Author(s):  
Jin Zhao ◽  
Wanting He ◽  
Meng Lu ◽  
Haijian He ◽  
Alexander Lai

Cats are susceptible to a wide range of influenza A viruses (IAV). Furthermore, cats can serve as an intermediate host, and transfer avian influenza virus (AIV) H7N2 to a veterinarian. In this report, a novel reassortant influenza virus, designated A/feline/Jiangsu/HWT/2017 (H3N2), and abbreviated as FIV-HWT-2017, was isolated from nasal swab of a symptomatic cat in Jiangsu province, China. Sequence analysis indicated that, whilst the other seven genes were most similar to the avian-origin canine influenza viruses (CIV H3N2) isolated in China, the NS gene was more closely related to the circulating human influenza virus (H3N2) in the region. Therefore, FIV-HWT-2017 is a reassortant virus. In addition, some mutations were identified, and they were similar to a distinctive CIV H3N2 clade. Whether these cats were infected with the reassortant virus was unknown, however, this random isolation of a reassortant virus indicated that domestic or stray cats were “mixing vessel” for IAV cannot be ruled out. An enhanced surveillance for novel influenza virus should include pet and stray cats.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
Bishnu Prasad Upadhyay

Influenza virus type A and B are responsible for seasonal epidemics as well as pandemics in human. Influenza A viruses are further divided into two major groups namely, low pathogenic seasonal influenza (A/H1N1, A/H1N1 pdm09, A/H3N2) and highly pathogenic influenza virus (H5N1, H5N6, H7N9) on the basis of two surface antigens: hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). Mutations, including substitutions, deletions, and insertions, are one of the most important mechanisms for producing new variant of influenza viruses. During the last 30 years; more than 50 viral threat has been evolved in South-East Asian countriesof them influenza is one of the major emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases of global concern. Similar to tropical and sub-tropical countries of Southeast Asia; circulation of A/H1N1 pdm09, A/H3N2 and influenza B has been circulating throughout the year with the peak during July-November in Nepal. However; the rate of infection transmission reach peak during the post-rain and winter season of Nepal.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Su ◽  
Rhodri Harfoot ◽  
Yvonne Su ◽  
Jennifer DeBeauchamp ◽  
Udayan Joseph ◽  
...  

Abstract The emergence of a pandemic influenza virus may be better anticipated if we better understand the evolutionary steps taken by avian influenza viruses as they adapt to mammals. We used ancestral sequence reconstruction to resurrect viruses representing initial adaptive stages of the European avian-like H1N1 virus as it transitioned from avian to swine hosts. We demonstrate that efficient transmissibility in pigs was gained through stepwise adaptation after 1983. These time-dependent adaptations resulted in changes in hemagglutinin receptor binding specificity and increased viral polymerase activity. An NP-R351K mutation under strong positive selection increased the transmissibility of a reconstructed virus. The stepwise-adaptation of a wholly avian influenza virus to a mammalian host suggests a window where targeted intervention may have highest impact. Successful intervention will, however, require strategic coordination of surveillance and risk assessment activities to identify these adapting viruses and guide pandemic preparedness resources.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaorong Guo ◽  
Dong Yang ◽  
Ruchun Liu ◽  
Yaman Li ◽  
Qingqing Hu ◽  
...  

Abstract Background: Detecting avian influenza virus has become an important public health strategy for controlling the emerging infectious disease. This study aimed to analyze the efficiency of two surveillance systems in detecting the emerging avian influenza viruses. Methods: A modified influenza surveillance system (ISS) and a new built pneumonia surveillance system (PSS) have been used to monitor the viruses in Changsha City, China. The ISS is based on monitoring outpatients in two sentinel hospitals to detect mild influenza and avian influenza cases, and PSS is based on monitoring inpatients in all 49 hospitals to detect severe and death influenza cases. Results: During the study period, 3551917 outpatients were monitored by the ISS system, among which 126076 were influenza-like illness (ILI) cases, with the ILI% of 3.55%. Totally, 14913 throat swabs were collected by the ISS system, among which 2016 were tested positive of influenza or avian influenza virus. Among the positive results, 621 were H3N2, 135 were seasonal H1N1, 610 were influenza A/H1N1 (pandemic in 2009), 106 were untyped influenza A, 540 were B, 1 was H5N6, 1 was H7N9, and 2 were H9N2 virus. 5491560 inpatient people were monitored by the PSS system, among which 6.61% (362743/5491560) were pneumonia cases. 10.55% (38260/362743) of reported pneumonia was severe or death cases. 3401 throat swab or lower respiratory tract samples were collected, among which 2094 were tested positive of influenza or avian influenza virus. Among the positive results, 78 were H3N2, 17 were seasonal H1N1, 1871 were influenza A/H1N1, 103 were untyped influenza A, 16 were B, 1 was H5N6, and 8 were H7N9 virus. Of 15 avian influenza cases reported from January, 2005 to September, 2016, 26.7% (4/15) were mild cases detected by the ISS system, while 60.0% (9/15) were severe or death cases detected by the PSS system. Two H5N1 severe cases were missed by the ISS system in January, 2009 when the PSS system was not available. Conclusion: The two systems seem to be of high efficiency in detecting the emerging avian influenza viruses but need to be verified in other cities or countries.


Author(s):  
Jessica A. Belser ◽  
Taronna R. Maines ◽  
Terrence M. Tumpey ◽  
Jacqueline M. Katz

Efficient human-to-human transmission is a necessary property for the generation of a pandemic influenza virus. To date, only influenza A viruses within the H1–H3 subtypes have achieved this capacity. However, sporadic cases of severe disease in individuals following infection with avian influenza A viruses over the past decade, and the emergence of a pandemic H1N1 swine-origin virus in 2009, underscore the need to better understand how influenza viruses acquire the ability to transmit efficiently. In this review, we discuss the biological constraints and molecular features known to affect virus transmissibility to and among humans. Factors influencing the behaviour of aerosols in the environment are described, and the mammalian models used to study virus transmission are presented. Recent progress in understanding the molecular determinants that confer efficient transmission has identified crucial roles for the haemagglutinin and polymerase proteins; nevertheless, influenza virus transmission remains a polygenic trait that is not completely understood. The clinical implications of this research, including methods currently under investigation to mitigate influenza virus human-to-human transmission, are discussed. A better understanding of the viral determinants necessary for efficient transmission will allow us to identify avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.


2015 ◽  
Vol 89 (10) ◽  
pp. 5406-5418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henan Zhu ◽  
Joseph Hughes ◽  
Pablo R. Murcia

ABSTRACTInfluenza A viruses (IAVs) are maintained mainly in wild birds, and despite frequent spillover infections of avian IAVs into mammals, only a small number of viruses have become established in mammalian hosts. A new H3N2 canine influenza virus (CIV) of avian origin emerged in Asia in the mid-2000s and is now circulating in dog populations of China and South Korea, and possibly in Thailand. The emergence of CIV provides new opportunities for zoonotic infections and interspecies transmission. We examined 14,764 complete IAV genomes together with all CIV genomes publicly available since its first isolation until 2013. We show that CIV may have originated as early as 1999 as a result of segment reassortment among Eurasian and North American avian IAV lineages. We also identified amino acid changes that might have played a role in CIV emergence, some of which have not been previously identified in other cross-species jumps. CIV evolves at a lower rate than H3N2 human influenza viruses do, and viral phylogenies exhibit geographical structure compatible with high levels of local transmission. We detected multiple intrasubtypic and heterosubtypic reassortment events, including the acquisition of the NS segment of an H5N1 avian influenza virus that had previously been overlooked. In sum, our results provide insight into the adaptive changes required by avian viruses to establish themselves in mammals and also highlight the potential role of dogs to act as intermediate hosts in which viruses with zoonotic and/or pandemic potential could originate, particularly with an estimated dog population of ∼700 million.IMPORTANCEInfluenza A viruses circulate in humans and animals. This multihost ecology has important implications, as past pandemics were caused by IAVs carrying gene segments of both human and animal origin. Adaptive evolution is central to cross-species jumps, and this is why understanding the evolutionary processes that shape influenza A virus genomes is key to elucidating the mechanisms underpinning viral emergence. An avian-origin canine influenza virus (CIV) has recently emerged in dogs and is spreading in Asia. We reconstructed the evolutionary history of CIV and show that it originated from both Eurasian and North American avian lineages. We also identified the mutations that might have been responsible for the cross-species jump. Finally, we provide evidence of multiple reassortment events between CIV and other influenza viruses (including an H5N1 avian virus). This is a cause for concern, as there is a large global dog population to which humans are highly exposed.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liang Chen ◽  
Feng Zhu ◽  
Chenglong Xiong ◽  
Zhijie Zhang ◽  
Lufang Jiang ◽  
...  

In 2013, two new avian influenza viruses (AIVs) H7N9 and H10N8 emerged in China caused worldwide concerns. Previous studies have studied their originations independently; this study is the first time to investigate their co-originating characteristics. Gene segments of assorted subtype influenza A viruses, as well as H10N8 and H7N9, were collected from public database. With the help of series software, small and large-scale phylogenetic trees, mean evolutionary rates, and divergence years were obtained successionally. The results demonstrated the two AIVs co-originated from H9N2, and shared a spectrum of mutations in common on many key sites related to pathogenic, tropism and epidemiological characteristics. For a long time, H9N2 viruses had been circulated in eastern and southern China; poultry was the stable and lasting maintenance reservoir. High carrying rate of AIVs H9N2 in poultry had an extremely high risk of co-infections with other influenza viruses, which increased the risk of virus reassortment. It implied that novel AIVs reassortants based on H9N2 might appear and prevail at any time in China; therefore, surveillance of H9N2 AIVs should be given a high priority.


2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 29-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Hrnjakovic-Cvjetkovic ◽  
Dejan Cvjetkovic ◽  
Vera Jerant-Patic ◽  
Vesna Milosevic ◽  
Jelena Tadic-Radovanov ◽  
...  

Introduction. Influenza A viruses can infect humans, some mammals and especially birds. Subtypes of human influenza A viruses: ACH1N1), ACH2N2) and A(H3N2) have caused pandemics. Avian influenza viruses vary owing to their 15 hemagglutinins (H) and 9 neuraminidases (N). Human cases of avian influenza A In the Netherlands in 2003, there were 83 human cases of influenza A (H7N7). In 1997, 18 cases of H5N1 influenza A, of whom 6 died, were found among residents of Hong Kong. In 2004, 34 human cases (23 deaths) were reported in Viet Nam and Thailand. H5N1 virus-infected patients presented with fever and respiratory symptoms. Complications included respiratory distress syndrome, renal failure, liver dysfunction and hematologic disorders. Since 1999, 7 cases of human influenza H9N2 infection have been identified in China and Hong Kong. The importance of human infection with avian influenza viruses. H5N1 virus can directly infect humans. Genetic reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses may occur in humans co infected with current human A(HIN1) or A(H3N2) subtypes and avian influenza viruses. The result would be a new influenza virus with pandemic potential. All genes of H5Nl viruses isolated from humans are of avian origin. Prevention and control. The reassortant virus containing H and N from avian and the remaining proteins from human influenza viruses will probably be used as a vaccine strain. The most important control measures are rapid destruction of all infected or exposed birds and rigorous disinfection of farms. Individuals exposed to suspected animals should receive prophylactic treatment with antivirals and annual vaccination. .


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