Politics versus Professionalism: The Effect of Institutional Structure on Democratic Decision Making in a Contested Policy Arena

2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Bourdeaux
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Policy Arena

Towards an Enhanced Institutional Structure of the Eurasian Economic Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 152 ◽  
pp. 102-111
Author(s):  
Igor V. Pilipenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Economic Commission ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
The Eu

This article considers how to enhance the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in order to enable timely decision-making and implementation of governance decisions in the interests of Eurasian integration deepening. We compare the governance structures of the EAEU and the European Union (EU) using the author’s technique and through the lens of theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism elaborated with respect to the EU. We propose to determine a major driver of the integration process at this stage (the College of the Eurasian Economic Commission or the EAEU member states), to reduce the number of decision-making bodies within the current institutional structure of the EAEU, and to divide clearly authority and competence of remaining bodies to exclude legal controversies in the EAEU.

scholarly journals La peculiare costituzione dell'Unione Europea

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Erik Fossum ◽  
Agustin José Menendez
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Distinctive Features

A unique political animal, the European Union has given rise to important constitutional conundrums and paradoxes that John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez explore in detail in this book. The authors consider the process of forging the EU's constitution and the set of fundamental norms that define the institutional structure, the decision-making procedures, and the foundations of the Union's democratic legitimacy. Their analysis illuminates the distinctive features of the EU's pluralist constitutional construct but also the interesting parallels to the Canadian constitutional experience and provides the tools to understand the Union's development, especially during the Laeken (2001–2005) and Lisbon (2007–2009) processes of constitutional reform.

Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Dilip Mookherjee
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Herbert Simon ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Selective Incentives ◽  
Individual Choices

Work by Axelrod, Hardin, and Taylor indicates that problems of repeated collective action may lessen if people use decentralized strategies of reciprocity to induce mutual cooperation. Hobbes's centralized solution may thus be overrated. We investigate these issues by representing ongoing collective action as an n-person repeated prisoner's dilemma. The results show that decentralized conditional cooperation can ease iterated collective action dilemmas—if all players perfectly monitor the relation between individual choices and group payoffs. Once monitoring uncertainty is introduced, such strategies degrade rapidly in value, and centrally administered selective incentives become relatively more valuable. Most importantly, we build on a suggestion of Herbert Simon by showing that a hierarchical structure, with reciprocity used in subunits and selective incentives centrally administered, combines the advantages of the decentralized and centralized solutions. This hierarchical form is more stable than the decentralized structure and often secures more cooperation than the centralized structure. Generally, the model shows that the logic of repeated decision making has significant implications for the institutional forms of collective action.

Decision-making in American and British foreign policy: an open and shut case

1987 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zara Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
International System ◽  
National Interest ◽  
British Foreign Policy ◽  
International Environment ◽  
Common Problems ◽  
Policy Arena ◽  
Governmental Action

In the foreign policy arena, decision-making represents that area of governmental action where domestic and foreign interests intermesh. Regardless of size, resources or power, all states operate in an international environment not of their own making and not under their own control. This international system creates and limits the state's possible actions and reactions. At the same time, all those involved in national foreign policy making act in a domestic context which shapes the national interest and the choice of options. Given this Janus-like position, nations respond to common problems but evolve distinctive and different methods of handling them. A comparison between British and American practice reveals striking parallels and contrasts.

scholarly journals Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Idea of Community in the Institutional and Decision-making Sphere of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 540-552
Author(s):  
Michal Piechowicz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Evolutionary Development ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Intergovernmental Cooperation ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Eu

The Treaty of Lisbon (TL) altered the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) not only in its institutional structure, but also in its function and decision making processes. These changes affected the competences of member states, other authorities, and their relationships. They also influenced the prospects for intergovernmental cooperation and the evolutionary development of communitisation phenomena within this policy.

Part VII Structure and Operations, Ch.37 Executive Boards and Councils

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wessel Ramses A
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Executive Boards

This chapter focuses on the so-called ‘Boards’ or ‘Councils’ of international organizations (IOs). Alongside a central congress in the form of an ‘Assembly’ and a Secretariat, the Board completes the ‘elementary triad’ forming the basis of the institutional structure of most IOs. Boards differ in almost every aspect: their name, composition, meeting frequency, competences, decision-making procedures, etc. Critical analyses of the increasing role of IOs often relate to extensive regulatory and executive powers of Boards, or the sub-organs and agencies created by them. While technological developments and the increasing complexity of many issues (e.g. the environment, health or finances) calls for a certain distance between the actual rule-makers and politics, this development also caused an intensified debate on the (democratic) legitimacy and accountability of the normative bodies. In that sense, not so much the Boards themselves will be the subject of academic debates, but more the normative institutional machinery in the form of committees and agencies that acts under their mandate, both formally or informally.

Editor's Introduction

1985 ◽  
Vol 18 (03) ◽  
pp. 536-543
Author(s):  
Bernard Grofman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Expert Witness ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Statistical Analyses ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Policy Arena

This minisymposium brings together excerpts from the expert witness declarations of four political scientists in an important case challenging California's congressional reapportionment as an unconstitutional political gerrymander,Badham v. Eu(D.C. California, 1984). These declarations are merely the “opening gun” inBadham. If the case goes to trial, we can anticipate additional statistical analyses will be performed and, of course, each of these experts would be subject to cross-examination about his testimony. Nonetheless, these four declarations represent an excellent illustration of the potential for political science (and political scientists) to be helpful to (even if not determinative of) judicial decision-making in an important policy arena.The basic issues raised byBadhamare as follows:What is a gerrymander? Are there manageable standards through which political gerrymandering can be detected and measured? Is there (prima facie) evidence giving rise to a (rebuttable) presumption that the California congressional plans in 1981 and 1983 were political gerrymandering? Ought political gerrymandering to be justiciable? If so, did the degree of political manipulation in the California congressional plan(s) rise to the level of constitutional violation? If political gerrymandering is held justiciable, on whom should the burden of proof of gerrymandering rest?

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