6 Civil Damages

Author(s):  
Argenton Cédric ◽  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Stephan Andreas

This chapter deals with private litigation. It begins with some discussion of the general issues surrounding private enforcement and an overview of the United States, where the level of private enforcement in cartel cases has historically far exceeded that of public cases. The chapter then provides a summary of the state of private enforcement in each of the EU's current twenty-eight Member States, before the EU Damages Directive was adopted. In this respect, it attempts to give a summary of national initiatives in the absence of an EU framework but excludes reforms made in response to, or in direct anticipation of, the EU Damages Directive. This background is important to understand the issues that shaped the Directive. Finally, the chapter discusses the thorny issue of damage estimation.

2019 ◽  
pp. 47-79
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Orenstein

Western leaders and institutions did not fully realize that they were under attack from Russia between 2007 and 2012. Yet when they slowly realized that Russia had launched an all-out hybrid war against Western institutions, a determined response emerged. The United States and EU imposed several rounds of economic sanctions on Russia, punishing key individuals and sectors of the economy. The EU also sought to prevent Russia from using energy blackmail against its member states. It took measures to reduce Gazprom’s influence by ending discriminatory contract provisions and building interconnectors between countries. NATO shored up its defenses in Eastern Europe to prevent another Russian invasion. All the while, the EU and NATO continued the project of creating a “Europe whole and free,” including the lands in between, setting the stage for a deepening geopolitical confrontation with Russia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (4) ◽  
pp. 715-721

In July, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and other allies attributed a variety of malicious cyber activities, including the Microsoft Exchange hack, to China. This joint attribution builds on commitments made in June summits with NATO, the G7, the EU, and the United Kingdom, and is consistent with the Biden administration's multilateral approach to confronting cybersecurity threats and China more generally. Still, critics question whether the administration's efforts will succeed in altering the behavior of states that pose cybersecurity threats to the United States.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Banks ◽  
Preeti Gill

The accession of Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal into the European Community was a significant move towards manifesting everlasting peace by means of a single market. The incorporation of these four weaker countries into the European Union (EU) marked a break from the EU’s traditional purview. The paradigm shift of the EU’s approach to enlargement placed Member States onto a path that would harness the full capabilities of a common market in improving civilians quality of life while simultaneously achieving individual Member States’ objectives including growth, employment, and trade. The regional effects of the EU’s single market are drastically different from the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A much newer trading bloc (NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994), it lacks the wisdom and fine tuning of the EU. The governments of the United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the treaty1while hailing how it would “fuel economic growth and dynamic trade, stimulate investment while creating productive partnerships, work for small and medium sized businesses and provide fairness and certainty. NAFTA partners promote environmental protection, and provide greater job opportunities in North America”.2 Yet the effects seem to be the exact opposite. NAFTA has been called “one of the most innovative, astounding documents of the 20th century by the stoic…”3, but this so-called “innovative depth” has reduced barriers to trade and investment, without the necessary checks and balances. For Mexico, NAFTA merely expedited and formalized “the silent integration” that had been occurring since the Border Industrialization Project of 1965— without adding anything new to the table.4 Unlike the EU, NAFTA is a rigid document that has not reformed itself as needed to address issues of border control, immigration policies, and uneven socioeconomic development. In spite of sincere hopes for free trade and economic integration to raise living standards across the continent, the reality is that the unfettered markets have permitted NAFTA to persistently ignore the uneven economic development, and vulnerabilities each country faces. In so doing, the United States has been a quiet bystander to the inequalities proliferating from unchecked free trade. Both countries have been left vulnerable to NAFTA backlash. Mexico’s vulnerability stems from unsound economic development policies and overall slow growth. These factors have increased the US’ vulnerability, to migration. Fed up with uneven development, lack of job opportunities, poor working conditions, and low wages, many Mexicans are taking matters into their own hands and crossing the border, often illegally. Militaristic efforts to “defend” the border have done nothing but increase political tensions and migrant death tolls. NAFTA does not address the immigration problem and its root cause of unequal development. This paper begins with the European Union’s initial experience with enlargements and the experimentation process it underwent to reduce economic and social disparities between regions to further facilitate their single market objectives. After considering how the EU’s cohesion policy strengthened its own single market while simultaneously curbing migration, we present the NAFTA scenario, specifically against the backdrop of Mexico and the United States, in order to highlight the impotent mechanisms the United States relies upon to quiet the waves of economic migrants.


1997 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross D. Petty

Nearly 40% of the more than $270 billion spent on advertising throughout the world occurs in the United States and more than 25% more is spent in Europe (Adler 1996). Both the United States and European Union (EU) have a central government that is the source of marketwide law, as well as numerous states, each with its own individual laws. Although the EU drew on U.S. law when drafting its 1984 Directive on Misleading Advertising, many of its member states have legal traditions predating those of the United States, and they are reluctant to change. The author examines advertising law in both the United States and EU, specifically exploring the law of misleading, comparison, and unfair advertising. Differences between states in each market, the states and central government, and the United States and EU are analyzed to develop implications for both marketers and policy makers.


Global Jurist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Paul Martinez ◽  
Pierpaolo Marano

AbstractEffective October 1, 2018, the Member States of the European Union had to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of January 20, 2016 on insurance distribution (IDD). The IDD arose out of a desire to give insurance customers equal protection regardless of the type of distributor from which they obtained insurance. Essentially, the IDD seeks to level the playing field of protections for insurance customers by simplifying, consolidating, and expanding customer protections when needed. The IDD has the stated goal of focusing on “the area of the disclosure of information” to customers. The directive is intentionally broad and applies “to persons whose activity consists of providing insurance or reinsurance distribution services to third parties.”Although it is much too early to predict the course of the IDD within the European Union, a comparison can be drawn with the Model Acts promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in the United States to glean an inkling as to where the IDD might be headed. Parts of the Model Acts have been in place for a number of years and, while the legal regimes they cover are modestly different, there are nonetheless broad lessons that can be drawn in the comparison of the two. Whether the path of the IDD follows the arc of the Model Acts, or not, will perhaps be attributed to three instrumental aspects: 1.The IDD is unquestionably focused on customer protection. The NAIC is more nearly concerned with uniformity. It may be that the IDD’s focus will contribute to better traction among the EU Member States then Model Acts have experienced in the United States.2.Unlike the IDD, the NAIC Model Acts are not comprehensive with respect to customer protection.3.The NAIC Model Acts have seen inconsistent adoption by the states, a factor that has contributed to a lack of uniformity and constancy across any number of insurance products. While the IDD should not suffer from spotty adoption, the relative flexibility of the EU Member States in adopting more stringent rules may lead to a lack of uniformity and consistency similar to that of the Model Acts. Thus, the IDD may very well face the same headwinds faced by the Model Acts in the United States.Accurate predictions are always elusive when dealing with the implementation of regulation and legislation. Accordingly, we will watch with curiosity whether the IDD, which takes a much more global approach in customer protection, will see more success.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Filauro ◽  
Zachary Parolin

This study applies improved household income data to measure and decompose trends in pan-European income inequality from 2006 to 2014. To contrast the relative significance of economic homogeneity versus the efficacy of welfare state and labour market institutions in shaping income distributions, we compare the structure of inequality in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU-28) to that of the 50 United States. This comparison stands in contrast to the standard practice of evaluating the United States against individual EU Member States. Despite the greater relative heterogeneity of the EU-28 and our corrections for the underreporting of household income in the United States, post-fisc income inequality in the EU-28 remains lower than that of the United States from 2006 onward. Moreover, inequality appears to be rising in the United States, while it has remained stagnant since 2008 in the EU-28. In both unions, and particularly the United States, within-state income differences contribute more to union-wide inequality than between-state differences. In a counterfactual analysis, we find that if the EU-28 matched the between-state homogeneity of the United States, but maintained its relative within-country inequalities, pan-European inequality would fall by only 20 percent. Conversely, inequality in the United States would fall by 34 percent if it matched the within-country inequality of the EU-28. Our findings suggest that the strengthening of egalitarian institutions within the 28 Member States is more consequential than economic convergence in reducing pan-European income inequality. We highlight institutional challenges towards achieving a ‘more equal’ Europe and discuss implications for future EU policymaking.


Author(s):  
Marcus K. Harmes

This chapter discusses the influences of earlier gothic works on the making of The Curse of Frankenstein. It describes the use of the uncanny, or the appearance of things, objects, situations or people that promote feelings of dread or uncertainty as characteristic of the gothic style. It discusses some of the earlier gothic works in literature and cinema, and the state of horror films in the 1950's as a low point in horror cinema. It discusses comedy horror and points out that in the early development of The Curse of Frankenstein, the film was originally going to at least be partly comedic, which is a reminder of the condition of the horror industry in both Britain and the United States prior to 1956. The chapter points out that while conventional wisdom insists that these horrors made in Hollywood eventually tailed off in quality, they did not lose popularity, giving Hammer a viable model for adaptation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 187-210
Author(s):  
Philip Nash

This chapter has two parts. First, it summarizes the Big Six’s contributions. Their small numbers belied their gradually broadening assignments, and their strong performances and people’s diplomacy greatly enhanced host-country goodwill toward the United States. Moreover, they aided in changing the attitudes of male officials and thus helped pave the way for the greater gender progress in more recent decades. Second, the chapter assesses the progress women have made in the US Foreign Service since 1964. While female Foreign Service Officers and ambassadors are far more numerous now, official discriminatory policies have mostly ended, and women have now routinely reached the highest positions in the State Department, they still are greatly underrepresented in prestige posts, face misogyny and double standards, and have a long way to go before they achieve gender equality in diplomacy.


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